


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The Princeton theological
review



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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. 2—April, 1903.

I.

THE ALLEGED LEGALISM IN PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION.

COMPARISONS between the teaching of Paul and the teaching of Jesus are the fashion of the day. A purely historical and a practical motive combine to lend interest to these comparisons. Prompted by whichever motive, the problem sought to be solved by them is the continuity or non-continuity of the religious impulse which shaped the origin of Christianity. The historian asks: Were two distinct forces introduced, the one by Jesus, the other by Paul? Or must we say that, on the whole, Paul's work lay in the line of the further carrying out of the principle introduced by Christ? If the former, can we determine the exact relation of difference or perhaps even heterogeneity in which the two stood to each other? Can we trace the interaction between them in their subsequent development, the degree in which each contributed toward the final result, and the mission which in virtue of this final result Christianity has since then accomplished in the world? If the latter, can we point out the unity of fundamental principle in the variety of doctrinal formulation? Can we draw the lines which run from the centre posited by Jesus to the several points of the wide circumference along which we observe the versatile and comprehensive religious genius of Paul moving? To the practical mind, on the other hand, this same problem of continuity, or lack of continuity, appears of decisive importance for the attitude to be assumed toward the modern attempt to supplant the theology of the Reformation, so largely based on Paul, by a less elaborate, less speculative, more congenial, be-

cause supposedly more humanitarian type of religious thought. As Paul is usually identified with the traditional theology, so Jesus has come to stand in many minds for the milder, more simple, form of Christianity toward which the tide has been setting for some time and seems to be setting ever increasingly. The watchword, "Back to Christ," implies the charge, whether consciously realized or not, that Paul has deflected the original impulse imparted by Jesus to Christianity, by bringing to bear upon it another force of decidedly lower character. If such a view could be historically justified, it would furnish the best conceivable defense of the modern desire to shake off the theological trammels of the past. If it cannot be justified, if it can be shown that the theology of Paul is the legitimate offspring of the teaching of Jesus, then an equally strong apology for the type of religion inherited from the Reformation will have been furnished. Paul being the true heir and successor of Jesus, all those who profess to be historic Christians must feel in some sense bound to Paul, as they desire to be loyal to Christ.

Naturally the problem becomes most accentuated where it touches the centre of Paul's teaching. This, we may still insist, is the doctrine of justification. Recent attempts to dislodge it from this position, and to make the mystical aspect of the believer's relation to Christ, as mediated by the Spirit, entirely coördinated with it,—so that each of the two covers the entire range of religious experience, and becomes in reality a duplicate of the other in a different sphere,—we cannot recognize as correct from the apostle's own point of view.* In our opinion Paul consciously and consistently subordinated the mystical aspect of the relation to Christ to the forensic one. Paul's mind was to such an extent forensically oriented that he regarded the entire complex of subjective spiritual changes that take place in the believer and of subjective spiritual blessings enjoyed by the believer as the direct outcome of the forensic work of Christ applied in justification. The mystical is based on the forensic, not the forensic on the mystical.

Nor will it do to deprive the doctrine of justification of its central place in the apostle's teaching, by explaining its prominence from either apologetic or missionary motives. The former explanation—the apologetic—is defended by Bruce, who with a sort of partiality for what, in the many-sided equipment of the apostle, he feels to be most akin to his own temperament, interprets Paul as the ideal apologete, and intimates that, had not the apostle

* Cfr. Titius, *Der Paulinismus unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Seligkeit*, pp. 21, 270; Ho'tzmann, *N. T. Theologie*, II, 117.

been forced to it by the exigencies of the Judaistic controversy, he would never have made so much as he does in his epistles of the forensic side of man's relation to God. The implication of such a position would seem to be that, as the apologete distributes the emphasis not according to the inherent and eternal values of things but according to the requirements of a passing situation, so we have no right to say that in Paul's own consciousness justification was the great dominating religious concern.* The latter explanation—the missionary—is presented by Paul Wernle, whose treatise, *Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus*, created no little stir in Germany some years ago. According to this writer Paul never intended his doctrine of justification to apply to the Christian life in its further progress. The true Pauline Gospel is that justification disposes of the sins of the pre-Christian past and enables the convert to begin with a clean record. After this record has begun salvation is no longer made dependent on the forgiving grace of God but on holiness of life such as will enable the Christian to stand blameless in the judgment-day. Wernle finds the main proof for this position in the fact that Paul nowhere consoles the readers of his epistles, when they have fallen into sin, with the free pardon of justification, but either requires their excommunication from the Church or their instantaneous conversion. It was Paul's own personal experience and his theoretical conviction with regard to others, that the Christian can and ought to be sinless. With the stubborn facts of the actual state of affairs in his churches he had not reconciled this theory.† To both Bruce and Wernle it ought to be sufficient answer to quote Rom. v. 1-11 and viii. 31-39. The fervor of religious emotion which these passages and others like them breathe is, *toto genere*, different from the heat engendered by controversial debate. Neither are missionary formulas of provisional and relative validity adapted to kindle it. It proves that, where Paul rose to the most intense and comprehensive appreciation of what Christianity stands for, he did not leave behind him the consciousness of justification. On the contrary, it is from this consciousness that he draws the power to wing himself to the sublimest heights of religious enthusiasm.

If then justification forms the core of the Pauline Gospel, to it ought to be applied the main test which will determine the fact and the degree of the harmony or disharmony of this Gospel with that of Jesus. A judgment reached on this point will in all likelihood be typical of the judgment one would reach by instituting the comparison at any other point of the system. Because inter-

* *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, p. 47.

† For an answer to Wernle cfr. Gottschick, "Paulinismus und Reformation," in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1897, pp. 393 seq.

preters are aware of this, it is common with them to conduct the exposition of the Apostle's doctrine of justification with a side-glance at the teaching of Jesus. One of the most current forms in which the result of such a comparison expresses itself is as follows. There is similarity and dissimilarity between the two. The similarity lies in the conception of the religious ideal to which both attain. The dissimilarity in the way along which each attains it. The religious ideal to Paul as well as to Jesus is a relation of sonship to God, a state in which everything is determined by the principle of love and not by the Judaistic principle of give and take, of forensic retribution. So far as the Christian life after justification itself is concerned, the apostle consistently carries out his supreme principle of absolute freedom from the law as the means of securing eternal life. Between God and the Christian there is no commercial exchange, but only the interchange of love and filial obedience. This lies entirely in the line of what Jesus taught concerning the fatherhood of God and the sonship of man: it may even claim to be a more complete and more explicit application of it, since in Jesus' mind no clearly defined view seems to have existed as to the bearing of this principle on the question of the observance of the Jewish law. In other words, the anti-legalism of Jesus was naïve and positive, that of Paul was self-conscious, antithetical as well as positive. But Jesus, it is believed, stands infinitely above Paul in the manner in which He reaches this sublime conception of the religious ideal. To Him it was simply the natural, normal relation of man to God, into which even sin could bring no fundamental disturbance. God is Father not only, but in all religious transactions deals with man in the sole capacity of Father. Even into the removal of the barrier which sin has raised between man and God no other attribute enters but that of fatherly love. No atonement, no justification are required: these are not even possible from Jesus' standpoint because they would belie the fatherhood of God: simple forgiveness is the only thing necessary. Consequently here the road of access to the religious ideal and the ideal religious state itself are perfectly harmonious, the conception of God which determines both being one and the same. It is different with Paul. In his conception of Christianity the road which leads to the ideal and the ideal itself are in irreconcilable conflict. Through his doctrine of justification the apostle reintroduces into his system the fundamental error of Judaism, the error that God deals with man on the basis of law and commercial exchange, instead of on the basis of love and fatherhood. For in justification God acts, so far as its forensic side is concerned, not on the

principle of love, but in the capacity of a judge who sternly exacts from man what is due to the law. The fact that the point at which the satisfaction of the debt is insisted upon is transferred from the sinner to Christ is a mere formal difference, which in no wise affects the religious principle involved, nor the plane on which the transaction moves. Thus we are confronted with the singular phenomenon, that the apostle readmits into the very foundation of his own system an error, which with great energy he had pursued into every corner of the Jewish religious mind and endeavored to expel. He recognizes in the entrance into the Christian life that for which, once within, he has no further use. Or, as Pfleiderer has strikingly expressed it, he overcomes the Jewish legalism by means of its own presuppositions, and for doing so pays the penalty of making his doctrine a compromise between the prophetic and Pharisaic theory, so that its value as a positive expression of the Christian consciousness must appear highly problematical, inasmuch as it is too seriously weighted with the associations of the Jewish legal religion ever to become an adequate formula for the religion of the grace of God and the sonship of man.* The apostle had still too much of the Jew in him to rise to the sublime simplicity of Jesus, who swept away at one stroke the basis of legalism and could after that well afford to leave the superstructure for the moment unassailed. Paul cleared away the superstructure, but has reëmbedded the greater part of the basis in the foundation of his own theology.

The charge brought against the apostle is a serious one. As we have already seen, the doctrine of justification cannot be relegated to a subordinate place in the Pauline teaching. If error attaches to it, it must needs be a *vitium originis* which will corrupt the system in all its ramifications. It is not the purpose of the present paper to reconcile Paul with Jesus. Where a comparison between two historic bodies of religious truth is made, for the correctness of the conclusion everything depends on the correctness with which each of the two has been interpreted for itself. In order to test the validity of the above comparison, we should, therefore, have to ask, first of all, whether the interpretation of the teaching of Jesus which enters into it can be considered correct and adequate. Did Jesus actually recognize no other relationship of God to man than that of fatherhood, and no other principle of treatment of man by God than that of paternal love? A

* *Das Urchristenthum*, Zweite Auflage, I, 260. Cfr. also Wendt, *Die Lehre Jesu*, second edition, p. 503; also *Zeitschrift f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 1894, pp. 75-77; Titius, *Der Paulinismus*, pp. 44, 45; Wernle, *Die Anfänge unserer Religion*, pp. 187-189: "Whoever looks at Paul's doctrine of justification, free from all Protestant prejudice, cannot fail to pronounce it one of his most unfortunate creations."

great deal has been said and might again be said to the contrary, some of which would perhaps make the distance between Paul and Jesus in the matter of the relative importance assigned to the divine righteousness and the divine love appear less formidable than it is often represented. But, as has been said, we do not here intend to raise this large problem. All we are concerned with for the moment is the charge of *internal contradiction within the limits of the Pauline system itself*. The doctrine of justification is said to be inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the apostle's own theology.

Before we enquire into the justice of this charge, an important distinction ought to be drawn. We take for granted that the criticism the charge implies is not a dogmatic or philosophical criticism, but a biblico-theological criticism, *i.e.*, that it relates to an inconsistency within the range of Paul's own doctrinal thinking. He need not have been aware of the contradiction itself, but he must have consciously realized each of the two positions which are asserted to be irreconcilable. Not about a contradiction between what he ought to have inferred from any one of his principles and what he did infer from any other can we debate; but exclusively about an alleged disharmony between what he did infer from certain premises in two actual cases. The necessity for drawing and strictly observing this distinction will at once become apparent, if we formulate it with concrete application to the problem in hand. If it be contended that the mere recognition of the principle of love as foremost in the nature of God and in His soteriological procedure must of necessity exclude the absolute validity of the principle of righteousness as manifested in the insistence upon satisfaction, and that Paul, therefore, when giving such prominence to the divine love as he actually does, was no longer in a position to frame a doctrine of vicarious atonement or forensic justification without involving himself in a palpable contradiction,—then it is plain that we are confronted with a philosophical or dogmatic criticism. The question raised in this case will not be what view did Paul himself hold as to the possible coëxistence or mutual exclusiveness of absolute love and absolute righteousness; but simply to what length do we feel bound to go from our philosophical or dogmatic standpoint in making the element of divine love, when once it is emphatically affirmed, supersede all other elements in the nature of God and in the work of salvation? It were idle to charge Paul with self-contradiction on such terms. The contradiction really lies between a philosophical or dogmatic theory built by us on a Pauline principle and a theory built by Paul on another principle. But the case will be different, if

it can be shown that Paul himself in certain connections carries the supremacy of the attribute of love in God so far as consciously to override the absolute validity of the principle of righteousness; and then, in other connections, for temperamental reasons, because the old Judaism in him reasserted itself, rehabilitates this latter principle, in a way which negatives the principle of love. If Paul himself in the progress of his thinking reached the conclusion that God is so supremely and so exclusively love, that every forensic relationship between Him and man is derogatory to His character and consequently irreligious, and nevertheless in his doctrines of atonement and justification makes everything revolve around a forensic relationship,—in that case and in that case only, a biblico-theological contradiction will have been made out and the charge of relapse into the legalistic error of Judaism substantiated.

The apostle's polemic against the Jewish legalism proceeds along two distinct lines of attack. In the first place, it is rejected because utterly impracticable and futile, because it has never led and can never lead to the end for which the Jewish mind pursues it. In the second place, not satisfied with this practical-dismissal of it, Paul condemns it on the fundamental ground of its irreligious character and tendency. Our consideration of the former of these two points can be brief. According to Rom. viii. 3 there is an *ἀδυνατον τοῦ νόμου*, an inability of the law to effect what must be accomplished, if the religious ideal is to be realized. Gal. iii. 21 implies that the law which has been given cannot make alive. In this whole chapter the representation is, throughout, that the law-method of justification is ineffective because it curses instead of blessing. In 2 Cor. iii. 6 likewise, it is said that the law, because it is *γράμμα*, i.e., an external instrument without power to project itself into the heart of man, fails to impart life as the Spirit does. These are commonplaces of the Pauline theology. But it is plain that judgments of this class imply nothing derogatory to the law-method of securing eternal life in the abstract. The disability under which the legal system labors is not inherent in the system itself, but arises wholly from the fact that men attempt to put it in operation in a state of sin. What under normal conditions would be not only effectual but perhaps desirable or preferable to any other method may, under abnormal conditions, become so absolutely useless as to evoke scorn from one who has made practical acquaintance with its futility in a painful experience. We can actually feel the scorn and contempt which in his heart the apostle poured upon the worthlessness of the efforts to keep the law in which Judaism was

squandering its religious energy. It is but natural that under such circumstances his words are not always carefully qualified, that, while speaking about the manner in which the system *de facto* operates, he should sometimes appear to condemn the objective principle of it in the abstract. It can be easily shown, however, that this is never his intention. In the first passage cited above Paul affirms in so many words that the *ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου* is due to the *σάρξ*, i.e., to the sinful condition of human nature. The law in itself has no religious defect; it is neither weaker nor stronger than by reason of its nature one could expect it to be; within the category of law it is perfectly normal, spiritual and good (cfr. Rom. vii. 12, 14); only, it addresses itself to a mind which is sinful and cannot react upon its stimulus, so that the result is "weakness," in the sense of inefficacy. The same is implied where Paul speaks of the law as bringing man under the curse. This again is an effect due entirely to the collision of the law and sin. In 2 Cor. iii. 6 the figure of the *γράμμα* comprises the two elements of the inefficacy and the condemnatory function of the law; for, because it is *γράμμα* the law is affirmed not merely to fail of giving life but also to kill positively; the *γράμμα*, therefore, is in opposition to the spirit a "letter" in the sense of something external, and in addition to this, a "letter" in the sense of a writ of condemnation. Inasmuch as condemnation presupposes sin, no reflection is cast on the law itself or the forensic relationship between God and man regulated by it. On the contrary, the very conception of the curse of the law enforced by God involves the full recognition and maintenance on the apostle's part of the forensic relation of accountability and inevitable liability to punishment in case of sin, as the broad fundamental plane on which God and man religiously meet. Ritschl has in vain tried to prove that Paul conceives of the curse of the law as detached or detachable from God.* And if it is God's curse, then, the mere fact of Paul's insistence on it stamps the whole scheme of man's treatment by God on the forensic basis with the apostle's approval. For it should not be overlooked, that the right of God to curse in case of transgression of the law is, from Paul's point of view, after all but the reverse side of his prerogative to bless and reward with the gift of eternal life where the law is obeyed.† The apostle's doctrine of sin and

* Cfr. *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, second edition, pp. 246-256, and *Bible Student*, 1902, pp. 55, 56.

† The above statement is not intended to deny that a distinction may be drawn between the two directions in which the forensic principle works, as to the necessity with which the principle is set in operation by God. Dogmatically it is a much-disputed question whether the function of rewarding the good is as

the curse, therefore, is sufficient to prove his staunch adherence to the principle in question, as a primary principle of divine procedure. When he speaks contemptuously of the law-method as a thing that is weak, that is no more than a letter, that can but curse, these very expressions of contempt are based on the axiom that the legal relationship of man to God must have effect. It would be too little to say that the criticism of Jewish legalism involved in them is consistent with a high regard for the forensic principle in the abstract; in reality, it is the direct outcome of the latter. Because Paul is supremely concerned about the absolute necessity of meeting in some real way the legal demands of God, he pours contempt on the futile efforts of Judaism in this direction.

More careful consideration is required by the second point. The apostle does not confine himself to the rejection of the law-scheme on the ground of its ethical impracticability, but carries the polemic into the specifically religious sphere by affirming that the Judaistic principle is unworthy of God and of the ideal relation that should exist between God and man. Here, it must be granted, the trend of his argument might seem to favor the modern assertion that in his best moments, when he most thoroughly disengaged himself from all Jewish prepossessions, the apostle actually proceeded to an unqualified negation of the forensic idea as applicable between man and God. In such a passage as Rom. iii. 27: "Where then is glorying? It is excluded. By what manner of law? Of works? Nay: but by a law of faith," we seem to hear the religious idealist who associates reward as such with an impious spirit, and identifies religious disinterestedness with the essence of piety. In Rom. iv. 2-5 also, the argument drawn from the case of Abraham reads as if the mere suggestion of anything having been earned by works, so as to give man a real ground for glorying over against God, were sufficient to brand the system under which this might be accomplished as irreligious in the apostle's judgment. To this may be added Rom. x. 3, where the Judaistic attitude is characterized as a species of irreligious self-assertion which refuses to subject itself to the right-

essential to the righteousness of God as the opposite function of punishing the evil. Paul coördinates the two without intimating a distinction (Rom. ii. 9, 10). Nevertheless it is possible to assume that he believed the latter necessary, the former a matter of choice. Rom. iv. 4 does not disprove this, for here the obligatory character of the reward belongs to it in contrast with the gift of grace *when no work precedes*. A "reward of debt" in contrast with "grace" may yet be "a reward of favor," if the position of the creature toward God be considered. Perhaps Paul found fault with the Jewish principle among other reasons for this, that it conceived of the reward as absolutely and in every relation "a reward of debt."

eousness of God. Nevertheless we believe that even here, the statements of the apostle, more closely examined, do not bear out the modern contention. Their meaning is not that the scheme of works of itself must produce or invite such irreligious self-assertion against God, where no sin is previously given; but simply that, where it is applied by sinful human nature, it cannot help fostering the type of sin indicated, so that, altogether apart from the question of practicableness, the plan of grace and faith is alone adapted to the actual condition of human nature, is indeed the only plan which effectually safeguards the interests of true religion. It is true Paul nowhere formulates this in the abstract, as we have here attempted to formulate it; but the simple reason for this is that he was naturally led to deal with it in the concrete, since the Jews alone had had the opportunity of putting the system into practice. What Paul therefore condemns is the irreligious character of the legal system in its Judaistic form. But he certainly was not of the opinion that the system was solely responsible for the Jewish sins of vainglory and meretricious exploitation of God. These were typical Jewish faults, but legalism had not produced them, certainly not produced them out of a previously faultless Jewish character. The most that can be said is that, in the apostle's view, an interaction between these peculiar sinful tendencies and the legalistic conception of religion had taken place, so that the latter had stimulated the former, and the former more and more vitiated the latter. The Judaistic dependence on works was objectionable not merely because it rested on a great untruth, but even more because it subverted the normal relation between God and man. It meant something quite different from the mere general principle that good moral conduct is rewarded and evil conduct punished, and consequently the desire for reward and the fear of punishment are allowed to enter as motives in shaping conduct. In reality it amounted to this: that the Judaistic spirit made itself the end and God the means, gave to itself the glory and to God the part of subserving the interests of this human glory by His moral government; that it led the creature to regard itself as the active and God as the merely passive factor in the determination of eternal destiny; perhaps also that it conceived of God as by nature bound to reward man. It is this profoundly sinful specifically Jewish *αυτοχρησθαι*, against which the religious spirit of Paul rises in protest, and which makes him so uncompromising in his repudiation of the legal system. Inspired by such motives, it becomes to him the absolute antithesis to the very idea of religion. Wishing to contrast the Gospel of grace with this specific embodiment of the forensic principle, he is will-

ing to stake the entire comparison on the one point, Which of the two schemes offers a more effectual safeguard against the cultivation of such detestable pride. "Where then is the glorying? It is excluded. By what manner of law? Of works? Nay: but by a law of faith. We reckon therefore that a man is justified by faith apart from works of law" (Rom. iii. 27, 28). With this in mind he reasons that Abraham cannot have had to glory toward God, not merely because the Scripture bears witness to the contrary, but also because it would have made God the debtor of a boastful man. Similarly in Rom. x. 3 it is the inveterate Jewish pride which will not subject itself to the divine grace, because the latter collides with the love of self, to which Paul ascribes the historic failure of Judaism to attain the true ideal of righteousness. In view of all this it would not be wrong to say, that the cause of the *irreligiousness* of the system of legalism was, in Paul's view, precisely the same as the cause of its impracticableness, viz., the *σάρξ*. If the *ἀδύνατον* of the law be due to the flesh, no less is its tendency to foster *ἀσεβεία* due to the flesh. It is not impossible that the apostle's entire doctrine of the *σάρξ*, in its ethical conception, has a much closer connection with the typical Jewish sins of pride and selfish isolation from God than with the Hellenistic dualism from which it is usually derived. The term *σάρξ* is certainly used with a semi-ethical flavor as descriptive of the Jewish pride of race and glory in self and confidence in creature attainments. This was the form in which sin had first and most prominently come under Paul's observation, and from this to the generalization that all sin is at bottom selfish isolation from and selfish opposition of the creature to the Creator, and therefore *σάρξ* in the most general sense, is not too bold a flight of thought to ascribe to the apostle.

But, be this as it may, we are certainly justified in concluding, that the irreligious operation of the forensic principle in Judaism is attributed by Paul to extraneous causes, and has nothing to do, in his view, with the merit or demerit of the principle itself. Just as little as in the case of the futility of the system does the apostle base his judgment about its irreligious character and tendency on the theological premise, that God is exclusively a Father determined in His actions toward man by the rule of love, and that therefore the conception of man's earning anything by works is inherently unworthy of God. On the contrary, both conclusions rest on a strictly empirical ground, viz., the present sinful condition of human nature. In the entire range of his polemic against the Jewish legalism, therefore, Paul has asserted nothing which can in the least prejudice his right to uphold the

forensic principle of the divine righteousness in its twofold function of rewarding obedience and punishing disobedience, as a supreme and inalienable attribute of the divine nature, something which God cannot deny without denying Himself. Paul's position did not compel him to assert that the endeavor of sinless man to attain to eternal life by works must be productive of an irreligious spirit. The desire for the goal of supreme blessedness can enter as a motive inspiring the pursuit of righteousness, without becoming the sole motive and without religiously debasing man, provided man be normal and perfect from a religious point of view. And on the part of God the exercise of the function of righteousness involved in this, is entirely consistent with a simultaneous exercise of the attribute of love. A forensic treatment of man and a loving treatment of man are not to Paul in any sense mutually exclusive in God. Whether the apostle had explicitly formulated in his mind the conception of the covenant of works or not, it is certain that his strictures on Jewish legalism cannot in the least have interfered with the development of his thought in the direction of such a doctrine.

But not only has Paul ascribed to the intrusion of sinful motives the disabilities under which the forensic system, when at present applied to man, labors; he has also positively upheld the method of gaining eternal life by works as retaining its validity in the abstract, and has spoken of it in terms which affirm its religious dignity. In the second chapter of the Epistle to the Romans this is set forth at considerable length. God will recompense obedience to the law with eternal life (vers. 7, 10); the doers of the law shall be justified (ver. 13); if the uncircumcision keep the ordinances of the law, his uncircumcision shall be reckoned for circumcision, *i.e.*, he shall be treated as entitled to all the privileges of the people of God (ver. 26); the circumcision of the heart, *i.e.*, the inward doing of the law has praise of God (ver. 29). It has been asserted that this whole representation is intended by the apostle to be purely dialectic, in other words, that he employs it not *e mente sua*, but as an *argumentum ad hominem*, placing himself upon the standpoint of the Jewish-Christian or Gentile-Christian reader, in order to show that even from their own standpoint something more and something different was required for justification than what they actually rendered.* Others have thought that in this opening part of the epistle, and in the following chapters, we have to do with successive layers, representing the standpoints successively occupied by Paul himself in chronological order.† The latter view lacks clearness, since it is

* Ritsehl, *Rechtfertigung u. Versöhnung*, second edition, II, pp. 316-318.

† Titius, *Der Paulinismus*, p. 156.

difficult to see how the apostle could formulate a theory, long since abandoned, in terms which apparently speak of it as still valid, without a single word to indicate that at the time of writing the theory in question no longer expressed his actual conviction. But the former view also is, to say the least, one-sided. It seems plain to us that all the statements made by the apostle in the context we are dealing with, can be naturally explained only by admitting that at least two, perhaps three, assumptions underlie them. One of these undoubtedly is the assumption that the Jewish theory can be recognized and made to render dialectic service for the purpose of refuting the Jewish practice. But inasmuch as Paul nowhere says that he recognizes this theory against his own better conviction, but on the contrary speaks of it with a degree of pathos, we are constrained to believe that besides its dialectic value it also possessed to his mind a certain hypothetical value within the limits of his own system—that, discounting the objectionable spirit with which, on their part, it was applied, he found himself at one with the Jews in the recognition of its formal principle. While using the principle as a weapon, Paul is none the less thoroughly in earnest about it; the propositions laid down receive his own assent. If a man were able to satisfy the conditions imposed, he would receive the reward promised. Only, this hypothetical possibility does not *de facto* exist: no man is able to yield the required obedience. Still this does not in the least detract from the supreme importance which the apostle ideally and theologically attaches to it, as a basal principle of God's treatment of His moral creatures. Considered from the point of view of subjective soteriology its value might be *nil*, and yet, theologically considered, it might be of eternal validity and become productive in a new direction of the most far-reaching consequences. Possibly, as a third consideration, there may have lain in the background of the apostle's mind when he wrote this chapter the thought that, even under the economy of the Gospel, the force of the principle of judgment according to works and of reward and punishment is not entirely suspended with reference to the individual believer; though, of course, it can here no longer appear as an independent principle, but only in subordination to the supreme principle of grace. Some of the expressions used seem to point in this direction. But at any rate it is certain that a positive significance is ascribed by the apostle to the law of recompense; that he explicitly recognizes the principle which conditions eternal life on the keeping of the law as a truly divine principle, before which he bows in reverence, because it has the approval of his religious mind as well as of his moral conscience.

From the foregoing it appears that, in order to do justice to Paul, we shall have to distinguish carefully between two kinds of forensic religion: the Judaistic one which he abhorred and rejected, and his own with reference to which he observes, not an attitude of tolerance, as might be expected if it were simply a lingering remnant of the leaven of Judaism, but an attitude of enthusiastic avowal, such as reveals a positive interest of the most spontaneous character. Of these two only the former can be justly characterized as legalism, since this term, by its use to describe the Judaistic position, has acquired distinctively unfavorable associations. The apostle is conscious of the difference between the two, a fact which also plainly excludes his having carried it over as an unconscious inheritance from his own Jewish past. There is a widely current representation which simply takes for granted that the conversion of Paul affected in no wise his conception of the ideal of righteousness itself; that this ideal and the motives giving it value in his mind were the same before and after his acceptance of Christianity; and that what differentiated his later from his former position concerned only the manner in which the ideal was to be realized, his method in this respect having been auto soteric before the conversion, hetero-soteric after it. Such a view of his conversion inevitably becomes misleading in one of two directions. Either it results in ascribing to the pre-Christian Paul the same profoundly religious motives in the pursuit of righteousness by which we know him to have been actuated in his later Christian period, in which case the Pharisee Paul becomes to such an extent idealized as to leave hardly any room for a deep-going conversion; or it results in ascribing to the Christianized Paul a substantial remnant of the Pharisaically-oriented and Pharisaically-inspired law-worship, in which case the conversion also loses the radical, revolutionary character commonly attributed to it. Both of these views lie on the line of naturalism: the former, in so far as it makes the conversion only the emerging into conscious supremacy of purer forces and higher ideals, which had long struggled in Paul's soul with the lower elements of Judaism; the latter, in so far as it assumes that in the centre of the Pauline consciousness the power of legalism was never in principle overcome, that under the disguise of the apostle's new-created Christianity in reality only a metamorphosis of the old Judaism confronts us. In our opinion it is a mistake to believe that the spiritual upheaval attendant upon the event of Damascus changed only Paul's conception as to the attainment of righteousness, while leaving his ideal of righteousness itself intrinsically untouched. It is not necessary to go to the extreme of denying

that Paul was, before his conversion, in any sense, different from the ordinary Jewish zealot for the law, or that the difference which existed predisposed him in any way for his subsequent acceptance of Christianity. Most probably in one point he had actually attained to a more adequate conception of what righteousness was than his fellow-Pharisees. On the one hand, we learn that he had advanced in the Jews' religion beyond many of his own age among his countrymen, being more exceedingly zealous for the traditions of his fathers (Gal. i 14). On the other hand, we know how he had learned to realize that what the law demands is not merely the outward work, but also the inward obedience of the heart (Rom. vii. 7), and in this he may have differed from many of the Pharisees.* Undoubtedly this experimental knowledge of inability to keep the law, based on a true conception of the inwardness of the law, may be considered to have been a preparation for the acceptance of some other method of realizing righteousness. But it by no means follows from this that Paul's ideal of righteousness needed no further revision than it had received in this way. What has been mentioned does not yet touch the heart of the question of righteousness. The perception of the spirituality of the law's demands may have been a great discovery, but a greater discovery remained to be made. Paul had yet to learn that the entire spirit in which he strove to fulfill the law, both inwardly and outwardly, the fundamental motive which inspired his pursuit of righteousness, were radically wrong, because issuing from the flesh, the sinful determination of human nature which makes self instead of God supreme. There is no evidence that Paul made this discovery before the grace of God supernaturally illumined him at his conversion. On the contrary, he himself declares that he had to die unto the law before he could begin to live unto God, and this death unto the law was identical with his crucifixion together with Christ, *i.e.*, was a

* This on the view that in Rom. vii up to the 14th verse Paul gives a description of his own experience before his conversion, in which he had already become painfully aware of the impossibility of internally keeping the law. I may notice here that of late the reference of the passage to the regenerate consciousness has again been advocated by some writers. Cfr. Feine, *Das gesetzesfreie Evangelium des Paulus*, pp. 132-168, who finds in vers. 7-13 the experience of Adam as the typical representative of humanity interpreted from the Christian standpoint, and in vers. 14-25 the experience of the Christian Paul. If this exegesis as to vers. 7-14 were correct, we would obtain in vers. 9, 10, an explicit affirmation of the religious normality of life under the principle of works in a sinless state. Paul would then here affirm that the first Adam "lived" before the commandment, *i.e.*, the prohibition to eat from the tree, came, and that even the commandment was *εις ζωήν* in its ideal intention. The discussion of the merits of this proposed exegesis, however, would lead us too far afield for our present limits.

specifically Christian experience, not something learned by him in his Jewish period (Gal. ii. 19, 20). To say, as Prof. McGiffert does, that, though a Pharisee, Paul was yet a man after Christ's own heart, and that the condemnation which Jesus passed upon the Pharisees as a class could not have been pronounced upon the Pharisee Paul, is, to say the least, extremely misleading.* What Jesus condemned in the Pharisees was not externalism or hypocrisy alone, but also the seeking of righteousness for man's sake rather than for God's. Indeed, the latter was, in his view, the fundamental fault in the Pharisaic character. So far as we can observe, Paul shared this sin with his fellow-Pharisees, and clearly realized that in his conversion the pivot of his religious consciousness had been suddenly wrenched from this to the diametrically opposite position of a God-centred desire for righteousness. Now, this being so, it follows that the apostle must have clearly realized the fundamental difference existing between the Judaistic type of legalism and his own interpretation and application of the forensic principle. In external appearance, indeed, the two were much alike, but, if ever, then here the external appearance was deceptive. What the two had in common was nothing more than their formal structure; in essence they lay as widely apart as the cult of self and true disinterested religion. That the two have been so easily confounded by modern writers is not entirely due, however, to the formal resemblance just pointed out. It is due even more to the habit of overlooking the positive religious interest evinced by Paul in strenuously upholding the forensic scheme. Paradox though it may sound, yet we believe it to be strictly true, that the motive underlying the apostle's championship of grace is at bottom identical with the motive underlying his forensic bent. The two coincide in this, that each is ultimately intended to give free play in the human consciousness to the revelation of what is a fundamental aspect in the character of God. God is righteousness and grace, and the supreme religious interest is that these two attributes shall be embodied and glorified in the experience of man. In its last analysis the forensic trend of thought is in Paul but one of the twin forms in which he gives expression to the supremacy of God in the sphere of religion. Righteousness is to the apostle that ideal sublimate of human conduct through which it serves its highest purpose of revealing the glory of the ethical character of God. The law of recompense exists for God's sake. Its classical expression this has found in the words of Gal. vi. 7, to the effect that, because God is not mocked, a man shall reap whatsoever he

* *The Apostolic Age*, p. 122.

has sown. The principle of retribution finds its ultimate explanation in the interest God has in the apportionment of moral recompense, so that its failure would attack God in His sovereign dignity. From this theocentric motive we can also understand why Paul continues to throw so much emphasis upon the necessity of the accomplishment of the good work which the moral law demands. The apostle would hardly have assented to the notion that the good will is all that is required, that the external embodiment of the will in conduct is of secondary importance. It was not by an anthropocentric idealism but by a theocentric realism that he was controlled in his thought. Precisely because human righteousness subserves the revelation of God's glory, its external embodiment is essential to its complete realization. It is by patience in "*well-doing*," κατ' ὑπομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ, that eternal life can *ex hypothesi* be obtained. Glory, honor and peace are for every one who "*works*" good, τῷ κατεργαζομένῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν (Rom. ii. 7, 10).

Now it is this supreme thirst for the manifestation of the righteousness of God as an essential attribute of his nature, and not a semi-conscious revival of Judaistic legalism, that underlies the Pauline doctrine of justification. Even though the sinner is to be treated on the principle of free love, yet the moral glory of God must be upheld through a forensic transaction in which it shall appear that the δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου both positively and negatively has been fully satisfied. Of course, Paul made much of justification because he was thoroughly alive to the tremendous fact of sin. Sin had to be disposed of before a normal religious relation between God and man could be restored. Still it is a mistake to think that this exhausts the religious significance of the doctrine from Paul's own point of view. The apostle's interest in the question was a broader and more fundamental one. Had there been no sin in the world, even then he would not have been able to conceive of an ideal religious relation between God and man, without a solid substructure of a forensic nature rendering the whole religious process subordinate to the revealed moral excellence of God. It is to the credit of the Reformed theology that it has appreciated this deeper motive of the Pauline doctrine and has given it formal recognition in its conception of the covenant of works. It was enabled to do this because it took its stand theocentrically in the supremacy of the glory of God. While equally strenuous as the Lutheran theology in upholding the soteriological importance of justification, it has gone beyond this in vindicating the purely religious significance of the principle involved, guided in doing this, even more than by exegetical tact,

by that keen sense of the ultimate trend of the apostle's thought which is but the result of the congeniality of its standpoint with his own. From the premises of the Reformed theology and its interpretation of Paul's forensic scheme, the most adequate interpretation in our view it has thus far received, the charge of a krypto-Judaistic element in the doctrine of justification, is entirely unwarranted.

In conclusion, it may be observed that the transfer of the fulfillment of the law from the sinner to Christ at one and the same time safeguards the interests of the divine righteousness and absolutely prevents the intrusion of those sinful motives which, as we have seen, rendered the plan of works impracticable and irreligious in the apostle's estimation. The earthly life of Christ offers the only instance of the working of the scheme under normal conditions, outside of the original state of rectitude. Christ by His perfect obedience was just before God, and on the ground of His being just received eternal life. But in Christ's earthly life Paul undoubtedly found the ideal of religion realized. When Christ obeyed, He cannot have been ignorant in Paul's view of the final glory awaiting Him as the prize of His obedience. The objective causal connection expressed in Rom. v. 18, 19, and Phil. ii. 9. must have found its subjective reflex in the Saviour's consciousness. But the thought of this in no wise detracted from the purity and disinterestedness of his religious attitude toward God. If the vision of His future glory strengthened Him in His suffering and humiliation, it did not for that reason interfere with the other powerful theocentric and altruistic motives by which His obedience was ultimately inspired. It did not lead Him or even tempt Him to that irreligious self-assertion, to that glorying before God in His own attainments, which the apostle recognized as the deepest sin of Judaistic legalism. What He rendered to God was the highest spiritual type of *λογική λατρεία*. The same principle, thus rendered secure in the Saviour by His sinlessness, is rendered secure in respect to the sinner by the demand of faith. For, according to Rom. iv. 20, the innermost essence of faith is that it gives glory to God. And from God's point of view the treatment of Christ on the principle of law-obedience did in no wise interfere with the full outflowing of the divine love toward Christ. God, while acting in the capacity of a judge, at the same time continued to be for Christ and to deal with Christ as a loving Father. The famous passage in Phil. ii contains an incidental expression of this fact. Paul here uses the verb *ἐχαρίσατο* to describe the bestowal by God upon Christ of the name above every name. *Ἐχαρίσατο* means that God bestowed it as a gracious

gift, not, of course, in the specific sense of the word "grace," implying that there was any unworthiness in Christ which God had to overlook, but in the more general sense implying that this was an act in which the graciousness, the kindness of God manifested itself. Righteousness and love, therefore, as coördinated principles of the divine procedure, do not exclude each other. If the former cannot be deduced from the latter, and insofar the two must forever remain separated in our conception, as they were in Paul's conception, nevertheless nothing lay farther from the apostle's thought than to make them antithetical in point of religious value. The interest of religion, just as little as psychology, demands that the one be swallowed up by the other.

It is to be feared that the modern antipathy to Paul's conception of justification, as it finds expression in the charge of Judaism, as well as the neglect into which this doctrine has fallen in the sphere of experimental religion, are but little due to a desire to keep the Protestant doctrine of grace free from every admixture of legalism. The very fact that it is not so much the grace but rather the love of God which is pitted against His righteousness, betrays the true motive of the antagonism. This fact means, first of all, that there is a weakening of the sense of sin. The modern religious subject thirsts for love as such, not in the first place for forgiving, justifying grace. But this in itself is but a symptom of the general abandonment of the theocentric attitude in the present-day religious consciousness. Love is magnified because at bottom God is conceived of as existing for the sake of man. In a religion thus oriented there can be no legitimate place, of course, for a purely forensic justification such as Paul teaches. But it is foolish for that reason to charge the apostle with contradicting himself. His religious consciousness differed from the modern one in that it revolved around the centre, not of man, but of God. The most consistently Pauline theology is that which cultivates not the divine love alone, but seeks supremely the divine glory and thus teaches men to thirst alike for the divine righteousness and the divine love. A theology doing this will not feel the need of apologizing for, but will glory in the forensic character of the apostle's doctrine of justification.

II.

ST. BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX.

MORAL greatness is the leading feature in the life and career of Bernard of Clairvaux. He was the model monk of the Middle Ages, the most lofty personality of his time, and one of the best men of the Christian centuries. He possessed a lively imagination, a rich culture and a heart glowing with love for God and man. Although not free from what now might be called ecclesiastical rigor, he was probably not equaled by any of his contemporaries in services for the Church and man. His impassioned eloquence has seldom, if ever, been excelled in the annals of the pulpit. "In his countenance," according to the contemporary biographer who knew him well, "there shone forth a pureness not of earth but of heaven, and his eyes had the clearness of an angel's and the mildness of a dove's eyes."* There is no spotless saint in this world and Bernard was furthest from claiming perfection, but he came as near the mediæval ideal of ascetic holiness as any man of his century.

In the twelfth century there were at least two other ecclesiastics of the first order of genius, Anselm and Innocent III. The former passed away a few years after it opened. Innocent began his papal reign two years before the century went out. Anselm has preëminence as a profound theological thinker and dialectician. Innocent ruled the world, as pope never ruled it before or since. Between the two falls the activity of Bernard, combining some of the qualities of Anselm and Innocent. He is allied to Anselm, whose *Meditations* give him a high place in the annals of devotional literature. And Bernard was also a statesman, although he did not attain the eminence of Innocent and shrank from the participation in public affairs which were so much to the taste of the great pope. Contemporary with himself was Peter Abaelard, whose brilliant mind won for him enviable fame as a teacher and thinker. But he never won the confidence of his own age, and cannot be compared with Bernard in moral dignity.

With almost equal prominence, Bernard figures in the annals of

* *Vita prima*, Migne's ed. of Bernard's works, Vol. 185, 303.

the papacy, the Crusades, monasticism and mysticism. In the history of mysticism and monasticism, the pulpit and devotional literature, he is easily in the front rank. Twenty years after his death, he was canonized by Alexander III as "shining preëminently in his own person by virtue of sanctity and religion, and in the whole Church by the light of his doctrine and faith."* Pius VII, in 1830, admitted him to the select company of the *Doctors* of the Church. Luther, who ridiculed the Schoolmen as a body, studied Bernard's works, directed thereto by John of Staupitz, and frequently appealed to his words. And Calvin twice in his *Institutes* quotes him with commendation.

Bernard was descended from a noble Burgundian family, and was born 1090. He was one of seven children, six of whom were sons. His mother, Aletha, like Nonna and Monica in the early Church, was a deeply pious woman. At her death, the abbot of St. Benignus, at Dijon, begged her body for his convent. Carried away for a time with enthusiasm for scholastic learning, the young man was overwhelmed, while on a journey, with religious impressions, and entering a chapel, dedicated himself wholly to God. He entered the convent of Citeaux. Two of his brothers followed him at once into the monastic life and the rest some years later. This was in 1113 that Bernard cast in his lot with the Cistercians, and the event proved to be an epoch in the history of that new community. Bernard devoted himself to the severest asceticism, till he was reduced almost to a shadow and his feet so swollen from standing as almost to refuse to sustain his body. In after years he reproached himself for this intemperate self-mortification which, as he thought, unfitted his body for the proper service of the Lord. His spirit triumphed over physical infirmities. He studied the Scriptures and the Fathers. His writings also betray acquaintance with the classics. He quotes from Ovid, Horace and other poets. The works of nature were not beneath his contemplation but furnished him with lessons as well as did books, and he seems to have approached the modern estimate of nature as an aid to spiritual attainment. "You will find," he wrote, "something greater in the woods than in books. Trees and rocks will teach thee what thou canst not hear from human teachers. And dost thou not think thou canst suck honey from the rocks and oil from the hardest stones?"† It is true that one of his biographers says he traveled the whole day alongside the Lake of Geneva, from Geneva to Lausanne, and was so oblivious to his surroundings as to be obliged to inquire in the evening

* The document is given in Migne, Vol. 185, 622 sq.

† Ep. 106, Migne, Vol. 182, 242.

what they had seen on the journey. We are probably justified in this case in ascribing an ascetic purpose to the monkish writer.

Cîteaux was not to be his permanent monastic home, and in 1115, in company with twelve companions, Bernard founded Clairvaux (Clear Valley) in a locality which before had been called Wormwood, and had been the seat of robbers. William of St. Thierry, Bernard's warm friend and biographer, is in doubt whether *vallis absinthialis* came from the amount of wormwood which grew there or from the bitter sufferings sustained by the victims of the robbers. But he does not fail to draw the contrast between the acts of violence for which the place was once notorious and the peace which reigned in it after Bernard and his companions set up their simple house. "Then the hills began to distill sweetness and fields, before sterile, blossomed and became fat under the divine benediction." There is no mediæval description of locality, so far as I know, which suggests so attractive a picture of a abode as the descriptions given by visitors on Bernard at Clairvaux. Here is a paragraph from the description of William, abbot of St. Thierry: "I tarried with him a few days, unworthy as I was, and whichever way I turned my eyes, I marveled and thought I saw a new heaven and a new earth, and also the old pathways of the Egyptian monks, our fathers, marked with the recent footsteps of the men of our time left in them. The golden ages seemed to have returned and revisited the world there at Clairvaux. At the first glance, as you entered, after descending the hill, you could feel that God was in the place; and the silent valley bespoke in the simplicity of its buildings the genuine humility of the poor of Christ dwelling there. The silence of the noon was as the silence of the midnight, broken only by the chants of the choral service and the sound of implements. No one was idle. In the hours not devoted to sleep or prayer, the brethren kept busy with hoe and scythe and axe, tending the wild land and clearing the forest. And although there was such a number in the valley, yet each seemed to be a solitary." The novice, Peter de Roya, the genuineness of whose letter, however, is uncertain, wrote from Clairvaux that "its monks had found a Jacob's ladder. Their song seemed to be little less than angelic and much more than human. It seems to me that I am hardly looking on men when I see them in the gardens with hoe, in the field with forks, rakes and sickles, in the woods with axe, and clad in disordered garments, but that I am looking on a race of fools, without speech and sense, the reproach of mankind. However my reason assures me that their life is with Christ in the heavens."

The monastic ideals of the Middle Ages were wrong. Perhaps it would be better to say the monastic methods were wrong. They involved permanent errors, but we must remember that the best men of the Middle Ages came from the monastery. Anselm, after his elevation to the See of Canterbury, longed to get back to the seclusion of Bec. Otto of Freising was in line with the bishops as a body when he passed upon the monkish life what seems to us to be the most exaggerated eulogy and says, "the monks, like angels, spent their lives in heavenly purity and holiness."* Did not emperors and kings put on the habit of one of the orders when they were dying? Even Frederick II, that great antagonist of the papacy, is said to have died clad in the dress of the Cistercians. If we choose to transfer ourselves back into mediæval times, we should find that then the highest ideal of life in this world was the monastic. There is scarcely a letter of Anselm's extant in which he does not recommend it. Bernard pronounced a renunciation of the vow a returning to the company of the lost and to the realm of blackness and death.† Did he not refuse to see his sister Humblina who was knocking at the convent door? He had insisted upon her taking the veil, and now he refused to see her until she finally sent up the pathetic appeal that she too had a soul for which Christ died. The brother again called upon her to renounce the world and lay aside the luxuries of dress and ornament. What were her household, husband and children compared to the holy life of the convent! Much as our sense of the sacred is shocked by such advice, it is proof of Bernard's reputation for godliness that the sister accepted his counsel and gave herself up to ascetic exercises and in two years, with the consent of her husband, retired to a convent, where she spent the remainder of her days. I do not know that from our standpoint this was quite as reprehensible as the conduct of Francis d'Assisi, who went to the length of stealing from his father to help the priest of St. Damian, and who assisted St. Clara to steal away from her parents' home and against their will take the veil. The monastic ideal was wrong, but in Bernard's day it ruled the religious mind. And to him the convent, with its vigils and mortifications, was only a means to develop the two cardinal virtues of love and humility.‡

Under Bernard, Clairvaux quickly gained a wide fame as one of the best regulated of the houses following the Benedictine rule. Princes, popes and ecclesiastics from far and near visited

* In his *Chronicle*, VII, 35.

† *Ep.* 112, Migne, Vol. 182, 255.

‡ *Ep.* 142, Migne, Vol. 182, 297.

him. There he preached and wrote letters and treatises. From there he went forth on errands of high import to his age. At the time of his death the convent numbered one hundred and sixty offshoots.

His attack upon the conventual establishment of Clugny was born of mistaken zeal and was not to Bernard's credit. Peter the Venerable, one of the attractive religious characters of his time, was abbot of Clugny at the time, and Bernard's friend. Clugny had stood for monastic reform in Europe, but it had grown rich and with riches came modifications of its ascetic rules. Bernard compared the simple life at Citeaux with the laxity and extravagance prevailing at the older house. Not that the brethren of Citeaux had anything to boast of, "with their bellies full of beans and their minds of pride," but the Clugniacs were guilty of self-indulgence in diet, small talk and jocularities. At meals dish was added to dish and eggs were served in many forms and more than one kind of wine was drunk at a sitting. The monks preferred to look on marble rather than to read the Scriptures. Candelabra and altar cloths were elaborate. Bernard had seen one of their number followed by a retinue of sixty horsemen, and having none of the appearance of a pastor of souls. He charged them with taking gifts of castles and villas. And so the complaints go on. Robert, a young kinsman of Bernard, had transferred his allegiance from Citeaux to Clugny, the transition from one convent to another being not a rare thing. Pontius, the abbot of Clugny at the time, refused to give Robert up. Peter the Venerable, on becoming abbot, did so, but the remembrance of the thing, it is suggested, burned in Bernard's memory. However that may be, Peter, in his reply, has no words of recrimination. He tries to explain, as when he declares the castles and villas were doing better service in the hands of the monks than they would do in the hands of rude barons. But he makes no countercharge. He has no lance-point to thrust at Bernard. On the contrary, he called him the shining pillar of the Church. A modification of the rule of St. Benedict, when it was prompted by love, he pronounced proper. He and Bernard, he wrote, belonged to one Master, were soldiers of one King, confessors of one faith. As different paths led to the same land, so different customs and costumes, with one inspiring love, led to the same Jerusalem above the mother of us all. Clugniacs and Cistercians should admonish one another if they discerned errors, for they were heirs of one inheritance and following one command. Let both Bernard and himself remember the words of Augustine—"habere charitatem et fac quicquid vis"—"have love and do what you will." What

could be more admirable? Where shall we go for a finer example of Christian polemics?

Over another question these two men met, and there Bernard took a position far above Peter's and showed himself to be far in advance of his age. It was the treatment of the Jews. Innocent III, in his letters to Alfonzo of Castile, 1205, and the Count of Nevers, affirmed that God intended the Jews should be kept like Cain, the murderer of his brother, to wander about on the earth, designed by their guilt for slavery till the time had come in the last days for their conversion. But those views had been affirmed by theologians before Innocent's day. Peter the Venerable presented the case in the same aspects, and launched a fearful denunciation against the children of Abraham, whom the canon law and councils included in one and the same canon with the Saracens. Writing to the king of France, Louis VII, he said: "What would it profit to fight against enemies of the cross in remote lands, while the wicked Jews who blaspheme Christ and who are much worse than the Saracens go free and unpunished? Much more are the Jews to be hated and execrated than the Saracens, for the latter accept the birth from the Virgin, but the Jews deny it and blaspheme all the Christian mysteries. God does not want them to be exterminated, but intends to keep them like the fratricide Cain, for still more severe torment and disgrace. So the most just severity of God has dealt with the Jews from the time of Christ's passion, and so it will deal with them to the end of the world, for they are accursed and deserve to be."* He counseled that they be spoiled of their ill-gotten gains and the sums be used to resist and overcome the Saracens. The Crusaders were only too quick to act upon this principle in England and on the Continent, on the eve of the first three Crusades. Little would we have expected such sentiments from Peter the Venerable.

Of a very different spirit was Bernard. When the preparations were being made for the second Crusade, and the monk Radulf was inflaming the people along the Rhine into a fever of passion against the Jews, the abbot of Clairvaux set himself with all his might against "the demagogue," as Neander calls him, and the massacres which followed his harangue. Otto of Freising reports that "very many were killed at Mainz, Worms, Spire and other cities." Bernard sent messages to different communities condemning the fiery monk. To the Archbishop of Mainz he wrote, reminding him that the Lord is gracious toward him who returns good for evil. Radulf's doctrine was like that of his master the devil, who had been a murderer from the beginning. "Does not

* *Sic de damnatis damnandisque Judæis*, Ep. IV, 36, Migne, Vol. 189, 365-367.

the Church," he exclaimed, "triumph more fully over the Jews by convincing and converting them from day to day than if she once for all should slay them with the edge of the sword?" Bernard met Radulf face to face, but it required all the reputation he had won for sanctity to allay the turbulence at Mainz. In his humane and Christian sentiments, Bernard was far in advance of his time. It is no wonder that the eminent Jewish historian, Graetz, should call him "a truly holy man, a man of apostolic simplicity of heart and overwhelming eloquence."* In England Grosseteste and his predecessor in the see of Lincoln, Hugh, opposed the bloody violence of the populace against the Jews, but neither of them went as far as Bernard in offering them the protection of justice and Christian charity.

Among the advocates of the Crusades, Bernard takes high rank. They had his full support. As early as 1128 he wrote his famous tract commending the new Order of the Knights of the Temple, "the new soldiery," as he called them, and contributed very largely to their rapid growth in fame and wealth. In regard to the destruction of the Saracens in war, he says: "Christ's soldiers may securely kill, can more securely die. When he dies, it is to his own profit. When he kills, it is to the profit of Christ. When he kills a malefactor, he is not the slayer of men but of evil, and an avenger of Christ." But the slaying of the pagans is only a last measure to prevent the great evil of the wicked ruling over the lot of the righteous. "Not that they should be slain, if they could by any other means be prevented from molesting and lording it over the faithful." Considering the age in which Bernard lived, it would be no more just to condemn him for such sentiments, especially as he had parts of the Old Testament behind him, than it would be to condemn the Puritans because, in 1629, the vessels coming to Salem carried as part of their freight "rundlets of Spanish wine, casks of Malaga and Canary and military accoutrements." It was the second Crusade with which Bernard's name became indissolubly connected. When Edessa, that outer citadel of the Crusaders' possessions in Syria, fell in 1145, the news produced dismay in Europe. It was felt the loss must be retrieved at all hazards. The loss proved to be the beginning of that series of disasters which ended in 1292 with the loss of St. Jean d'Acre, the last spot of Crusading territory beyond the Mediterranean. Bernard became the flaming preacher of the second Crusade, and regarded his success in inducing the Emperor Konrad to take the cross the chief of his miracles. The disastrous failure of the expedition was enough to

* *Geschichte der Juden*, VI, 148, 151.

overwhelm its prophet and preacher with obloquy. Bernard has given us a glimpse into the keen pangs he felt over the sharp detractions that unfortunate undertaking called forth against himself. In his *de consideratione* he pointed to the sins of the Crusaders as the cause of the disaster, and represents God as listening patiently to the sacrilegious charges of the complainants, as He had once listened to the Egyptians, who said "for evil did he bring them forth to slay them in the mountains." He himself was like Moses, who led the people toward the Holy Land and not into it. The Hebrews were stiffnecked. Were not the Crusaders stiffnecked also and unbelieving, who in their hearts looked back and hankered after Europe? Is it any wonder that those who were equally guilty should suffer a like punishment with the Israelites? To the taunt that he had falsely represented himself as having delivered a message from God in preaching the Crusade, he declared the testimony of his conscience was his best reply. Eugenius, too, could answer that taunt by what he had seen and heard. But after all said, it was a great honor to have the same lot with Christ and suffer being unjustly condemned.

Bernard's reputation was coëxtensive with Europe long before the second Crusade. He had done more than any other single individual to secure the general recognition of Innocent II as the rightful pope over his rival, Anacletus II. He met the king of France at Etampes and induced him to pronounce in favor of Innocent. Bent on the same mission, he had interviews with the king of England at Chartres, and the German emperor at Liège. He entertained Innocent at Clairvaux, and accompanied him to Italy. It was on this journey, at Milan, that so profound were the impressions of his personality and miracles that the people fell at his feet and would fain have compelled him to ascend the chair of St. Ambrose. On his third journey to Rome, in 1138, he witnessed the termination of the papal schism. In a famous debate with Peter of Pisa, the representative of Anacletus, he used with skill the figure of the ark for the Church, in which Innocent, all the religious orders and all Europe were found except Anacletus and Roger of Sicily and Peter of Pisa, his two supporters. These three had an ark of their own making, and was it not preposterous to suppose they of all mankind were to be saved and they alone?

But it was in the reign of Eugenius III that Bernard enjoyed his greatest influence in papal affairs. Eugenius had been an inmate of Clairvaux and one of Bernard's special wards. The tract *de consideratione*, which at this pope's request Bernard prepared on the papal office and functions, is unique in literature, and,

upon the whole, one of the most interesting treatises of the Middle Ages. Vacandard calls it "an examination, as it were, of the pope's conscience."* Here Bernard exhorts his spiritual son, whom he must address as "most holy father," and pours out his concern for the welfare of Eugenius' soul and the welfare of the Church under his administration. At the first he sets forth the distractions of the papal court, its endless din of business and legal arbitrament, and calls upon Eugenius to remember that prayer, meditation and the edification of the Church are the important matters for him to devote himself to. Was not Gregory the Great engaged in writing upon Ezekiel at the very moment that Rome was exposed to siege from the barbarians? The supreme pontiff is then called upon to reflect in four directions—upon himself, upon that which is beneath him, upon that which is round about him and upon that which is above him. The things which are beneath the pope are the Church and all men to whom the Gospel must be preached. The things around about him are the cardinals and the entire papal household. The Romans are a bad set, Bernard says, flattering the pontiff for what they can make out of his administration. A man who strives after godliness they look upon as a hypocrite. Under the fourth head, the things above the pope, the author treats the doctrines of God, the incarnation, the two natures of Christ and the doctrine of the angels.

The moral force betrayed on every page of the treatise, which fills eighty compact columns of Migne's edition, gives it a high place. Its chief historical importance lies in its theory of the papacy. Ultramontane and Gallican alike claim it. The late Dr. Reinkens, the esteemed first bishop of the Old Catholics, issued a German translation of the *de consideratione* with copious notes, which interpret Bernard's utterances in favor of the episcopal theory as opposed to the papal autocracy. The notes were written under the feeling engendered by the Vatican Council, 1870, which promulgated the dogma of papal infallibility and sent off Döllinger and the other dissenting Old Catholics. Nowhere in a careful statement does Bernard define what the papacy is. In spite of Bishop Reinkens, the treatise easily makes the impression that Bernard's declarations, taken as a whole, justify the papacy in its most exalted claims of authority. The excerpts which Mirbt† gives in his recent edition of documents bearing on the history of the papacy make for this view. The supreme pontiff, Bernard says, meditating upon himself, should always be mindful that he

* *Vie de St. Bernard*, II, 454.

† Carl Mirbt, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Papstthums*, second edition, 1901.

is greatest only as he chooses to be as a servant. He is a brother of all-loving God, a pattern of righteousness, a defender of the truth, the advocate of the poor, the shelter of the oppressed. But he is also heir of the apostles, the prince of bishops. He is in the line of the primacy of Abel, Abraham, Melchizedek, Moses, Aaron, Samuel and Peter. To him belong the keys. Others are entrusted with single flocks; he is pastor of all the sheep and the pastor of pastors. Even bishops he may exclude from the kingdom and depose. And yet he says, the pope is one of the bishops, not their lord. He is the priest of the Highest, the vicar of Christ, the anointed of the Lord, the God of Pharaoh. Who neglects to hearken unto him may well dread, for he neglects as one who hears the voice of God. The expression "God of Pharaoh" refers to the pope's authority over disobedient princes. In a note upon this passage Bishop Reinkens admits that the ideal presented would demand "qualities well-nigh divine." Bernard distinctly grants the two swords to the pope, who himself draws the spiritual sword and by his wink commands the worldly sword to be unsheathed. No dissent is expressed from the theory of Gregory VII and the bull, *Unam sanctam*, issued a century and a half later by Boniface VIII in his controversy with Philip the Fair. It is true that Bernard says that Eugenius, even after he had become pope, remained a man, vile as the vilest ashes. Change of position effected no change of person. Even David, the king, became a fool. It is true he lays stress upon Peter's apostolic simplicity and poverty. Peter wore no gems and was attended by no bodyguard. Such circumstance he did not regard as necessary to his fulfilling the command to feed Christ's sheep. And in adopting these adornments of outward circumstance "the popes had followed Constantine, not the apostle." Commenting on these statements, Bishop Reinkens affirms that the conception of the worldly power of the pope stands in glaring contrast to the teaching of the curia and many bishops regarding the "Cesaro-pope." But the purpose of the passage and others like it does not seem to be to combat the imperial function of the papacy over the episcopate and temporal sovereigns, but to guard it against abandoning its spiritual obligations.

The predominant feeling of the age was in favor of the assumption of Gregory VII, which was soon to be fought out again between Alexander III and Frederick Barbarossa. The decision which Frederick secured at Roncaglia from the jurists of Bologna, that the emperor held his authority by independent divine right, was a decision of an unofficial body of canonists, and the emperor was obliged at last to submit to the pope. The painters of the

doge's palace knew what they were about when they represented Alexander with his foot on Barbarossa's prostrate form. The scene of Barbarossa's submission at Venice did not include that detail. But the artist in his realistic representation embodied the principle on which Alexander and the hierarchy insisted. It was Bernard's concern in the *de consideratione* to exhort Eugenius to administer his office in the spirit of righteousness and humility, conscious of the exalted function of his office and yet considerate of the just rights of all the bishops, and mindful that as a man, in his individual capacity, he needed the same grace which all Christian people need. Like Nathan and the prophets reminding kings of the divine commands, so Bernard lifted up his voice in the way of exhortation for the promotion of all godly living and administration on the part of the supreme officer of mediæval Christendom.

As a mystical theologian, Bernard likewise occupies a place of assured preëminence. Ritschl and Harnack refuse to give a distinct place to mystic theology in Protestantism. The former called it dilettantism and Harnack* says a mystic who does not become a Roman Catholic is a dilettante. We still hold on to the distinction as indicating a type of theology which lays stress upon the immediate communion of the soul with God, as opposed to a severely intellectual treatment of religion. Some men reach God predominantly through the heart, others through the head. It was because of the mystical element in Bernard that Neander felt so closely in sympathy with him, and it was Neander, the greatest of Bernard's interpreters to the last century, who had for his motto, "It is the heart that makes the theologian"—*pectus facit theologum*.† Anselm combined with the philosophical or scholastic element in his theology the mystical element. It appears in the prayers with which he opens his arguments for the existence of God and in the pious exclamations repeatedly interjected into his theological discussions, as also in the extended devotional matter given in his *Meditations*. Augustine also combined both elements. With Bernard the mystical was the predominant element. He was not a dialectical theologian. He does not belong to the list of the schoolmen. He was a mystic, and his writings are practical, not theoretical: devotional, not metaphysical; homiletic, not argumentative. The theology of Bernard sought by an unquestioning faith to rise to an immediate communion of the soul with God.

* *Dogmengeschichte*, II, 381; Ritschl, *Geschichte des Pietismus*, II, 12.

† The Germans, in disparaging the mystical element, often speak of the *Pektoral theologie*—"The cardiac theology."

In this tendency Clairvaux was allied with the contemporary Paris school of St. Victor. Walter of St. Victor, distinctly opposing scholasticism, called Peter the Lombard, Abaelard, and Gilbert and Peter of Poitiers the four labyrinths of France, and protested that under the inspiration of Aristotle they had treated the ineffable mysteries of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation with scholastic levity. He declared it would have been far more sensible for him to have asked why the Lombard did not appear on earth as an ass than to ask, as the great Summist did, whether God could have become incarnate in female form. With Hugo of St. Victor contemplation is the highest attainment of the Christian soul. His favorite passage is, "The pure in heart shall see God." Bernard says: "God is known so far as He is loved." With him the centre of theology is love, and mysticism is the spontaneous theology of the soul. With the Victorines, Hugo and Richard, it is brought within the limits of exact definition and becomes a scientific system. In Bernard it bursts forth in song. In the monks of St. Victor the warm feeling of the soul is in danger of being chilled by the dialectic statement.

In contrast to the mysticism of Meister Eckart, who died 1327, the theology of Bernard is simple devotion to the person of Christ. Eckart's statements are forever exposing him to the charge of pantheism, though he was no pantheist. Bernard is always looking at the cross. Eckart seeks the loss of self in the ocean of the God's fullness. That "holy teacher," as Tauler and Suso used to call him, defined with metaphysical refinement the pure being of God. Bernard never got beyond the glory of God as it shines in the person of Christ. With him union with God was not reached by a "confusion of natures, but by a concurrence of will."*

Bernard's mystical works are the *Degrees of Humility and Pride*, his treatise on *Loving God*, his sermon on *Conversion* addressed to the clergy and his *Sermons on the Canticles*. He is thoroughly familiar with the Scriptures and almost every other sentence in the *Sermons on the Canticles* is a Scripture text. Prayer and sanctification and not disputation and intellectual analysis are the ways to a knowledge of God. The controlling thought in his treatise on *Loving God* is that God will be known in the measure in which He is loved. Writing to Chancellor Haimerich, who wished to know how God is to be known, he says: "The exciting cause of love to God is God Himself." The gifts of nature are adapted to awaken love. The gifts of the mind are still more

* *Unitas, quam facit non confusio naturarum, sed voluntatum consensio* : *Serm. on Cant.*, LXXI, 7, Migne, 183, 1124.

adapted to that end. But the gifts involved in the revelation of the Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, are infinitely more adapted to awaken love, for God is infinite, measureless.

In the eighty-six homilies on the Song of Solomon, Bernard revels in the tropical imagery of this favorite book of the Middle Ages. Everything is spiritualized. The very words are exuberant allegories. And yet there is not a single low or sensual suggestion in Bernard's treatment. The fancies are extravagant, but always chaste. As for historical and critical comment, he rejects all suggestion of it as unworthy of Holy Scripture and worthy of the Jews. The love of the Shunnamite and her spouse is a figure of Christ and His love for the Church. The book is an epithalamian song which no one can hear who does not love, for the language of love is a barbarous tongue to him who does not love, as Greek is to the barbarian. Christ is the pure lily of the valley, whose perfume permeates faith and whose fairness illuminates the intellect. As the yellow pollen shines through the white petals, even so the gold of His divinity shines through His humanity. Commenting on Cant. I, 6, Bernard says: "I need not ask where makest thou thy flock to rest at noon, when I see my Saviour on the cross. The name of Jesus is like oil which enlightens, nourishes, soothes. It is light, food and medicine. It restores the tried energies, fortifies the virtues, develops good habits and warms chaste affections. Dry is all the food if it is not anointed with this oil, insipid if it is not seasoned with this salt. Jesus is honey in the mouth; melody in the ear, and in the heart joy." Thus he goes on with affluence of figure and language, revolving the same theme over and over, and yet ever fresh and stimulating. The sum of the theology of these famous homilies is expressed in the words, "This is my philosophy, to know Jesus Christ and Him crucified."* Such expressions as those given above, with which the homilies abound, make it very easy to understand how Bernard was the author of the hymns ascribed to him—

Jesus, the very thought of thee
With sweetness fills my breast;
But sweeter far thy face to see
And in thy bosom rest.

As the mystical and scholastic elements, which blended in Anselm, separated in Bernard, so also they parted in Bernard's brilliant contemporary, Abaelard. The difference was this: The mystical element went to the monk of Clairvaux; the scholastic

* *Serm.*, XLIII, 4, Migne, 183, 995.

element to the lecturer of Ste. Genevieve. The practical instinct excluded the scholastic element from Bernard; worldly ambition excluded the mystical element from Abaelard. These two men met face to face, and no meeting of two ecclesiastics of the Middle Ages, so far as I now recall, could have been more suggestive and full of promise for interesting results. For Europe had no living schoolman so keen and famous as Abaelard and no religious personality so imposing as Bernard, and no two men before the public whose fundamental religious instincts and methods were so antagonistic. The famous meeting at Sens, when Abaelard was arraigned for doctrinal errors by Bernard, has often been interpreted greatly to the disparagement of the abbot of Clairvaux, and treated in a way to intensify the sympathy felt for Abaelard. It cannot be regarded as an historical misfortune that these two men met on the open field of controversy and on the floor of ecclesiastical synods. History is most true to herself when she represents men just as they were. She is a poor teacher when she does not take opportunity to reveal their infirmities as well as their virtues.

Abaelard was perhaps endowed as no other man in the Middle Ages with the qualities of an inspiring teacher. But the content of his teaching aroused suspicion. He was a free-lance. He delighted in showing his superiority to other teachers, and one cannot help but feel, in reading his autobiographical work, the *History of My Calamities*, that he is governed more by conceit than by love of the truth. He and Bernard met for the first time at the instance of Innocent II, 1131. Abaelard's first letter to Bernard burned with self-conceit. On a visit to the Paraclete, Bernard had criticised the use of the expression "supersubstantial bread." Abaelard heard of the criticism from Heloise, and was at once ready to break a lance. He wrote to Bernard, pointing out how the version of St. Matthew was to be preferred, and then became sarcastic over certain practices at Clairvaux. It was some years after this that William of St. Thierry brought to Bernard's attention thirteen errors in Abaelard's theology on the Trinity and the person and redemptive work of Christ, and called upon him to proceed against the offender. Bernard visited Abaelard at Paris and sought to secure from him a promise to retract his errors. Abaelard declined, or, to follow other authorities, made a promise and did not keep it. The difference then came to open conflict. It was, of course, to be expected that Abaelard with his fiery temper would resent the interference of another. He requested the Archbishop of Sens for permission to meet Bernard on a festival occasion, which the archbishop had

appointed for the display of relics, and to argue the case. The request amounted to a challenge. The Synod met 1141. Louis VII was present, and probably also Arnold of Brescia, whom Bernard regarded as the legitimate fruit of Abaelard's teaching.

Bernard had been indefatigable in preparing the way for a decision against Abaelard. He summoned the bishops as friends of Christ, whose bride was calling out of the thicket of heresies. He wrote to the cardinals and Innocent II, characterizing Abaelard as a ravenous lion, one of those terms which had been inherited from the early Church as proper designations of heretics. He was like another Goliath crying out defiance against the hosts of Israel, and Arnold of Brescia was standing at his side as his armor-bearer. Before such an antagonist as Abaelard he declared he felt himself like a young stripling, unskilled as he was in dialectics. Nevertheless, he presented the case at the public session. It seems that, before the open meeting of the synod, Bernard met the bishops, presented the case and practically secured their assent to condemnation. This appears from the account given by Abaelard's pupil, Berengar, and from a statement of John of Salisbury in his *Historia Pontificalis*, to the effect that when Gilbert of Poitiers was to be tried, 1148, Bernard attempted to secure a judgment against him in advance of the public sitting, as he had done in the case of Abaelard. Berengar's account of the private sitting represents the discussion as taking place amidst the drinking of wine, but he writes as an extreme partisan, and his shameless charges against Bernard's character are contradicted by every other witness. He had learned well in the school of irreverence from his master.* Deutsch, in his thorough investigation, *Abaelard's Verurtheilung in Sens*, has apparently established beyond question the proceedings of this private sitting. Even Vacandard accepts the evidence, but exonerates Bernard from all guilt. Such private conferences were usual. In his notes to Neander's *Life of Bernard*, Deutsch agrees to the propriety of such conferences, but finds it difficult to excuse Bernard, because in this case he was the accuser and as accuser he appeared among the bishops. The method of trial, it must be remembered, on the Continent even before the time of Innocent III, was largely the inquisitorial, and while, from the standpoint of fair play, an offense seems to have been committed, yet it must not be forgotten that error of doctrine was a new thing in western Europe, and the appearance of heresy filled the minds of churchmen with great alarm. There is no sufficient reason to believe that Bernard

* In the second edition of Hefele's *Hist. of the Councils* is a good characterization of Berengar, Vol. V, 476, sqq.

was actuated by feelings of personal rivalry or animosity, but, on the contrary, that he was moved by a high purpose to conserve the interests of Christendom.

The next day Abaelard appeared before the assembled prelates and other ecclesiastics. Perhaps he felt the case was determined against him beyond the power of change. Perhaps he feared an uprising of the populace, as Otto of Freising says, and Otto had no reason for making anything but a fair statement. It may be possible, as Gaufrid, Bernard's friend and biographer, says, that Abaelard lost his head after Bernard had made his statement. Poole* represents this view, and says that Abaelard was the creature of impulse and his self-confidence swiftly deserted him. However this may be, Abaelard, without attempting to make a defense, appealed his case to Rome. From that moment he was safe until the case had received papal decision. Abaelard had been of service to Innocent, and some of the cardinals were his pupils. He started for Rome, but before he got well on his journey the news came that the decision had gone against him, and in accordance with the recommendation of the synod. Bernard, too, had followed up the case with communications to the pope and cardinals. His letter to Innocent occupies forty columns of Migne's edition. He declared that Abaelard and Arnold were in collusion to perpetrate on the churches of Europe the errors of Arius, Pelagius and Nestorius. He called upon one of the cardinals to defend the womb which had born him and the paps which he had sucked. The zeal of these letters is intemperate and the references to Abaelard's sinuosity are such as we would not tolerate to-day in fair controversy. The only word Abaelard did not know was the word *nescio*, "I do not know." He pretended by reason to understand all truth.

Innocent condemned fourteen articles from Abaelard's writings, and bade him keep silence. It was a death-blow to the unfortunate teacher whose talents had been the talk of Europe. His last hope was gone. Peter the Venerable received him to the shelter of Clugny. He arranged a meeting between the broken man and Bernard. And when Abaelard's earthly days were over, he wrote to Heloise of his penitent bearing and his attention to the exercises of spiritual devotion. And then, in the finest spirit of chivalry, the good abbot sent all that remained of the schoolman to the woman who remained true to him through all his cold indifference to her and all the hard treatment of the world to him.

The judgment upon Bernard for his arraignment of Abaelard will differ according to the theological standpoint of the student,

* Lane-Poole, *Illustrations of the Hist. of Med. Thought*, p. 165.

and not a little according to our readiness to put ourselves back into the Middle Ages, and to breathe its atmosphere. Hausrath, in his vigorous essays, represents Bernard as the shrewd, politic abbot of Clairvaux, skilled in the arts of the world and bent upon the condemnation of Abaelard.* McCabe, in his recent *Life of Abaelard*, also passes a severe judgment. But the other side of the question has strong advocates. Morison, in his *Life of St. Bernard*, speaks of the horror of great darkness which fell upon Bernard when he seemed to see a new era with its dangers and doctrinal perversions. Deutsch, while he cannot speak him free from all personal hostility to Abaelard, yet does not hesitate to pronounce Bernard a man of the highest religious character. Abaelard has been chosen as an apostle of religious honesty and independent thought. But did he not retract again and again? What principles of honor moved him in his relations to Heloise after she had become a mother? No one can read a half-dozen paragraphs of his *History of My Calamities*, and then turn to Bernard's treatise on *Loving God*, without discerning the radical difference between the two men. Abaelard has not a word of repentance, not a regret to offer, for anything he had done. He was the child of misfortune, and he adds recrimination to recrimination. For his teachers he has no good word. Of Anselm of Laon, whose pupil he was, he said that his teaching was of that sort that if any one went to him in uncertainty he returned more uncertain still. He kindled a fire, not to give light, but to fill the house with smoke. As for William of Champeaux, he seems to gloat over having defeated him in the lecture chair and won from him his hearers. Of a restless disposition, he attracted by the brilliance and flash of his words, but did not draw men by the qualities of his heart.

Bernard's sermons are not pieces of logical acumen nor do they give keen analyses of the conscience, but they appeal to the highest motives of the religious nature. Our own brilliant pulpit orator, Richard S. Storrs, said :† "The constant shadow of things eternal is over all his sermons." Bernard's friend and biographer spoke of his discourses as being congruous to the conditions of his hearers. To the rustic people he preached as though he had been brought up in the country, and to all other classes as though he were most carefully studying their occupations. To the erudite he was scholarly, to the plain he was simple. He adapted himself to all, wishing to bring to all the light of Christ. Luther, in his *Table Talk*, pronounced Bernard "superior in his sermons to

* A. Hausrath, *Peter Abaelard*, etc., Leip., 1893, p. 248 seq.

† *Life of St. Bernard*, p. 333.

all the doctors, even to Augustine, because he preaches Christ most excellently.”

The miraculous power of Bernard is so well attested by contemporary accounts that it is difficult to deny it, except on the presumption that all miracles outside of the Scripture are to be discarded as fancies of the imagination. Miracles were frequent in the Middle Ages. The biographer of Boniface, the apostle of Germany, finds it necessary to apologize for not having any miracles to relate of him. But the miracles of St. Bernard are attested as no other mediæval works of power are. The cases given are very numerous. They occurred on Bernard's journeys in Toulouse, and nearer home in France, in Milan and along the Rhine from Basel northward. His friends, William of Thierry, Gaufrid and other contemporaries, relate them in detail. His brothers, the monks Gerard and Guido, agree that he had more than human power. Walter Mapes, the Englishman, not, however, free from credulity, who flourished in the latter years of Bernard's life and later, speaks in the same breath with great admiration of his miracles and his eloquence.* But what is, to say the least, equally important, Bernard himself makes reference to them, and marveled at his miraculous power. Miracles, he said, had been wrought of old by saintly men, and also by deceivers, but he was conscious neither of saintliness nor of fraud. In a letter to the Toulousans, after his visit in their city, he reminded them that the truth had been made manifest in their midst through him, not only in speech but in power. And in writing about the failure of the second Crusade, he appealed to the signs which had accompanied his preaching of that expedition, and which his own shrinking reverence† forbade him to describe. The word he uses is *signa*, the common mediæval term for miracles, and the most obvious interpretation of Bernard's words is that he was alluding to the miracles along the Rhine which we have related in the writings of others. Abaelard and his pupil, Berengar, were exceptions to their age in expressing doubts about the genuineness of contemporary miracles, but they do not charge Bernard by name with being self-deceived or deceiving others. The testimony is certainly remarkable. Morison, a writer of little enthusiasm, no credulity and a large amount of cool, critical common sense, says that “Bernard's miracles are neither to be accepted with credulity nor denied with fury.” Neander recognizes the superior excellence of the testimony, refuses to deny their genuineness, and seeks to explain them

* Wright's edition, I, 24, p. 40.

† *Verecundia*. *De consideratione*, Migne, Vol. 185, 744.

by the conditions of the age and the imposing personality of Bernard. Were it not for the precedent strong presumption against miracles, there are few men whom they would befit so well as Bernard. If the testimony which ascribes miraculous power to Francis d'Assisi is examined, it is found how mean it is compared with the testimony for Bernard's miracles. It was given, for the most part, a number of years after Francis' death; it emphasizes the element of portent and prodigy, an element which is represented in small measure in Bernard's miracles, if it can be said to be represented at all. A legend had grown up around the career of Francis, but in the case of Bernard there are no signs, leaving the question of miracles aside, of anything of that kind.

It is pleasant, in bringing to an end a sketch of this eminent man, to conclude with a further reference to his religious character. He may not have been free from the spirit of rivalry when he made his criticisms upon Clugny. He may not have exhibited all the forbearance in his treatment of Abaelard which the law of the Gospel inculcates, but these things being said, the testimonies of his exalted moral eminence are too weighty to be set aside. Bernard's own writings give the final and abundant proof of his ethical quality.

William of St. Thierry, himself no mean theological writer, retired from his first visit to Clairvaux, feeling that in visiting Bernard's cell he had been at the very altar of God. Joachim of Floris, the monastic prophet of Calabria, praised him in enthusiastic language. The impression upon Hildegard, the prophetess of the Rhine, was the same. In his own memoir of St. Malachy, Bernard put, as has been said, "an image of his own beautiful and ardent soul." No one but a deeply religious character could have written such a life. Malachy, the Irish archbishop, visited Clairvaux twice. Interrupted on a journey to Rome, he stopped the second time at the convent and spent there the last days of his life. "Though he came from the West, he was truly the dayspring on high to us," says Bernard. "With psalms and hymns and spiritual songs we followed our friend on his heavenward journey. He was taken by angels out of our hands. Truly he fell asleep. All eyes were fixed upon him, yet none could say when the spirit took its flight. When he was dead we thought him to be alive; while yet alive we thought him to be dead. The same brightness and serenity were ever visible. Sorrow was changed into joy, faith had triumphed. He has entered into the joy of the Lord, and who am I to make lamentation over him? We pray, O Lord, that he who was our guest may be our leader, that we may reign with Thee and him forever more. Amen."

His sense of personal unworthiness was a controlling element in his religious experience. He relied with confident trust upon the divine grace. In one of his very last letters he begged his friend the abbot of Bonneval to be solicitous in prayer to the Saviour of sinners in his behalf. His last days were not without sorrow. His trusted secretary was found to have betrayed his confidence. And so he passed away in 1153. Deutsch, perhaps the chief living authority on Bernard, says: "Religious warmth (*Genialität*) is the chief thing in his character and among his gifts." Harnack pays this tribute to him, that "he was the religious genius of the twelfth century, the leader of his age in religion."* "Bernard," said Luther, and he was not easily deceived by monkish pretension, "Bernard loved Jesus as much as any one can."† The encomium of the old biographer Alanus is high praise, but probably no man since the apostles has deserved it more: "The majesty of his name was surpassed by his lowliness of heart"‡—

vincebat tamen sublimitatem nominis humilitas cordis.

LANE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

DAVID S. SCHAFF.

* *Dogmengeschichte*, III, 301.

† Bindseil, *Colloquia*, III, 152.

‡ *Vita secunda*, Migne, 185, 493.

III.

THE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF APOLOGETICS.

APOLOGETICS is the science of the rational proofs that Christianity is the supernatural and so the authoritative, the exclusive, the final, in a word, the absolute religion. By the practical importance of apologetics we understand its necessity or its usefulness in conversion and sanctification. Is it helpful in making men Christians and in rendering them better Christians? This is the question.

The inquiry is radically distinct from that as to the theoretic worth of apologetics. It is easy to see how it could be so. The "setting-up exercises" through which the soldier, especially in time of peace, is expected to go daily, are indispensable, if he is to become and continue an able fighter; but he never even thinks of them in battle. The naval officer must be master of the processes by which naval armor is tested, but this knowledge is of no use to him when he is leading his ships in the attack. Precisely so, there is much theological science which is essential as a discipline or necessary as a presupposition, but which cannot be employed in the actual work of bringing men to Christ and developing his life in them.

The difference between the question as to the theoretic worth of apologetics and that as to its practical importance will appear clearly when we contrast the denials to which each inquiry relates.

The question as to the theoretic worth of apologetics has to do with such denials as these: That there is no place for apologetics in the scheme of theological studies, because the reason, which is both its instrument and its court of appeal, is generally and essentially untrustworthy; or because the reason, while ordinarily to be depended on, is incompetent in the sphere of religion; or because the reason, though equal to considering the verities of natural religion, is quite out of relation to the objects and to the exercises of the regenerated consciousness.

On the other hand, the question as to the practical importance of apologetics concerns such denials as these: That Christianity needs no defense; that if it did, the simple proclamation of its

truth would be its best vindication; that apologetics does not resolve so many doubts or answer so many objections as it raises; and that, consequently, even if it be recognized in the theological encyclopædia, there is no place for it in the everyday work of the Christian.

While the practical question is thus a distinct and a very different one from the theoretic inquiry, and while it presupposes it to have been answered in the affirmative, it itself is scarcely less radical and vital. On the one hand, if apologetics bears on conversion and sanctification only indirectly; if, though essential as a discipline for and necessary as a presupposition of theological studies, it is quite out of relation to Christian work and life, then it would better be confined to the curriculum of the theological seminary and be studied afterward only by the professional theologian, or at most by the minister. On the other hand, however, if apologetics is important practically, if it has a place in Christian work and life and in its place is indispensable, then it ought to be recognized as a means of grace, it ought to be generally employed, and especially such a knowledge of it and skill in it ought to be secured among Christians as would issue in its effective use.

I. Such is the office of apologetics. It is important practically no less than theoretically. This follows:

1. From the nature of the case. Thus apologetics sustains a direct relation to conversion. For example, it is often needed to clear the way for the Gospel. It is in response to the truths of the Gospel that conversion takes place. Men turn from sin unto God when and because, and only when and because, they appreciate both the guilt and pollution of their sin and the readiness and sufficiency for salvation from these of God as He has revealed Himself in Christ. Now these truths of the Gospel, as all truths, will, and indeed can, impress us only in accordance with the laws of the mind; and it is a fundamental law of the mind that truth to be appreciated must at least be before the mind as its object. That is, what is never considered cannot be appreciated. This makes it clear how the way of the Gospel can be obstructed and so conversion be prevented by philosophy and "knowledge which is falsely so called." Where these hold possession the truth of Christ is denied a fair chance; if listened for, it could scarcely be heard: and as the apostle says (Rom. x. 17), "belief cometh of hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ."

That this is true of much of the philosophy and science of our own day, as, more or less, of every age, cannot be questioned. "The wisdom of this world" is, as it always has been and always

will be, "at enmity against God." The mind that is under its control cannot receive "the things of the Spirit of God." They are even "foolishness unto it."

This becomes peculiarly clear in the light of the ruling tendencies of modern thought. These are three.

There is, first, the tendency toward naturalism. This would explain the universe and all in it, the spiritual as well as the physical world, as the merely natural result of an indefinitely long and all-embracing process of materialistic evolution. The sole method of this school is the purely observational or scientific one. Darwin and Spencer may be named as its representatives. Any one, however, if familiar with their teaching, must, it would seem, see that it and the Gospel are contradictory and so mutually exclusive. For example, the fall becomes a blessing instead of an evil as soon as it is regarded as a necessary stage in the evolution of the race; it is a fall up: but the Gospel presupposes the evil of the fall; without it, it lacks its occasion. So, too, a supernatural intervention in the course of history is inconceivable, if purely natural evolution must be the law of all things; but the good news of the Gospel is precisely this, that God has supernaturally intervened to save fallen and so lost men. Nor is it otherwise, as regards method. The Bible claims belief on the authority of God, while the school that we are discussing would rule out all evidence save that of the senses. Thus naturalism necessarily excludes the Gospel. It can tolerate neither its controlling ideas nor its method. To consider the Gospel, a mind under the sway of naturalism must first deny itself.

Another tendency of modern thought is pantheism. This would view all things as modes or manifestations of the world-principle or God. It conceives, consequently, of the universe as essentially a spiritual organic development. Its only method is the purely speculative or philosophical one. Its representatives are Hegel and the Caird brothers. Now these, whatever they assert to the contrary, are as antagonistic to the Gospel as are the champions of naturalism. They must destroy the true reality and so the responsibility of the individual; but it is to the individual, and to him primarily as an individual, that the glad tidings of salvation are addressed: and this salvation the Gospel represents as characteristically free and gracious, whereas pantheism must regard it as necessary and natural. So, too, is it with respect to method: the pantheist depends on his own understanding only; the Christian rests absolutely on divine testimony. Thus this tendency also cannot but bar out the Gospel. The disciple of the Cairds may call himself a Christian; but he must

repudiate both the teaching and the method of his master, if he is to follow the Christ of the New Testament. The latter and pantheism, even though it be named and be "idealism," are mutually exclusive.

The third tendency of modern thought is positivism. This would explain nothing. It would banish philosophy in the sense of metaphysics from theology, and it would deny to religion any interest in science. It would make the very ideas of reason but symbols of the unknown and necessarily indeterminable. It would, therefore, regard the earthly life of a merely human Christ as the sole source and standard of Christianity. Its exclusive method, consequently, is the critical or historical one. Its representatives are Ritschl and Harnack. The deliverances of these, however, are as contradictory of the Gospel as are both naturalism and pantheism. It is as essentially the Son of God and not as merely the man Jesus that the New Testament presents Christ; and it teaches that the worth of the facts, both of His life and of His death, is in the truth of the doctrine of redemption. And it is so, too, as regards method. Christianity demands of its recipients, not criticism, but faith; willingness to accept the explanation which its doctrines give of its facts, not the disposition to evacuate these of their divine meaning. Positivism, therefore, leaves no room for the Gospel. He who consistently embraces its principles or follows its method must see in the doctrines of the incarnation and of the cross and of the resurrection only "foolishness." Thus these three great tendencies of modern thought stand in the way of conversion. They contradict the Gospel which alone makes it rational. So long as any one of them holds sway in an intelligent mind the latter cannot seriously consider the Gospel.

And how widely they do hold sway! The appalling fact is that they are almost omnipresent and omnipotent. In these days of rapid communication the speculations of the philosopher become at once the creed of the people. The naturalism of Darwin dominates the masses. The idealism of the Cairds fascinates the thoughtful. The positivism of Ritschl is crowding the Gospel out of even our revival meetings. Hence, on all sides the cry that genuine conversions are becoming uncommon. There is little room in the minds of the twentieth century for the saving truths of Christianity. Foothold and breathing space must be cleared for them if the Gospel is to have its effect.

Now the inquiry is, How is this to be done? God could do it immediately and supernaturally. There is no question as to that. He who does regenerate can as supernaturally eject from

our minds whatever hinders the truths through which he ordinarily prepares the sinner for the new creation, and in response to which "the new man in Christ" "turns unto God with full purpose of and endeavor after new obedience." He has done so. He may again do so. But the question is, Have we the right to expect him to do so? Are we justified in waiting for God to do for us what he has put it into our power to do? We must depend absolutely on the Holy Spirit to quicken the dead souls around us; but has enlightened and sanctified reason nothing to do in overcoming error and thus making way for the truth, in connection with which the Holy Spirit usually acts and only in the light and atmosphere of which can the revived soul live? In a word, as false philosophy is a great and very general hindrance to conversion, must it not be refuted? and are not Christian philosophy and apologetics appointed, because adapted, to do this? Not to use them thus is as presumptuous and wrong as for the sick man to discard medicine. Faith-healing and distrust of apologetics fall under the same condemnation.

Again, apologetics is frequently needed to get a hearing for the Gospel. This may be so even where thought is not under the control of the tendencies that we have been considering. There may be no disposition to listen to the saving truths of Christianity, though the way is open for them so far as false philosophy is concerned. Nor in such cases will the reason usually be an unwillingness to accept what, if received, must be received on divine authority. The reason will rather be a demand for evidence that what is presented has divine authority. Many who would never question the Bible as the Word of God insist that it be proved to them to be the Word of God. Just because they are ready to take it on his authority, they must know that it has his authority.

This is right as well as in accord with the spirit of the age. A State proclamation ought not to be accepted as such without careful examination. For the reason that it claims to be a State proclamation we are bound to discern on it the seal of the State. Not to do so would be to dishonor it. Thus, too, the unreasoning acceptance of the Gospel is unworthy of it. God's proclamation of grace, it demands that we should look for and insist on finding on it God's seal. This, indeed, is its own teaching. The Scriptures never require faith except on the ground of adequate evidence. "If I had not done among them," says our Lord, "the works which none other man did, they had not had sin" (John xv. 24). Could there be a clearer recognition of the principle that faith may not be demanded without proof? The pur-

pose of the miracles was that they should be the divine seal of the divine revelation. This clearly implies that the world has the right to ask, and so the preacher is bound to offer, more than "the witness of the Spirit" to the truth of the Gospel. Let there be no misunderstanding at this point. Undoubtedly, "our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority of the Bible is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts" (Conf. of Faith, Chap. I, Sec. 5). Saving faith can result only from this testimony of the Spirit. This, however, is not all the evidence that the Scriptures, and so the Gospel which they contain, are from God and thus have his authority. "We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellences, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God" (Conf. of Faith, Chap. I, Sec. 5). Now these arguments the world demands. Though only "the witness of the Spirit" by and with the Gospel in our hearts can make us feel its authority as God's proclamation of grace to lost men, more and more do they insist that it shall commend itself as such to their reason before they will even consider it. This demand the preacher of the Gospel, as has been remarked, ought to meet. In so far as he can rightly he should, like St. Paul, "become all things to all men, that he may by all means save some." And he can rightly make use of the rational proofs of Christianity. They are genuine proofs. Though a lower ground of certainty than "the witness of the Spirit," they are a real and, therefore, a legitimate ground. They are also a necessary one. Though we believe the Gospel on the authority of God, we could not feel that it had his authority if its facts could be shown to be unhistorical or its doctrines to be irrational. So long, therefore, as the facts of the Gospel are questioned and its doctrines are ridiculed, Christian evidences and fundamental apologetics, which they presuppose, must be appealed to. That is, "the witness of the Spirit" cannot take the place of the argument from reason any more than it can take the place of "the witness of the Spirit." As "the witness of the Spirit" is essential to true conversion in every case, so the argument from reason, is essential when the Gospel is assailed on grounds of reason. The relation between the two is not only that of a lower to a higher

court. The case is rather thus: If a remedy were offered for a common disease, it would be proper for those afflicted with it to try the remedy on the testimony of those who had taken it, and thus themselves experience its power. Only by such trial, indeed, could they assure themselves absolutely of its efficacy in their own case. If, however, the virtue of the remedy were questioned by many—if, for example, it were said that the cures attributed to it were due, not to it, but to some other cause—then it would be proper for those advocating it to show by chemical or other tests that it was adapted to do what was claimed for it. This would be a right procedure, as well as the only one to secure the impartial consideration and trial of the remedy. Precisely so, when as now and at Athens in St. Paul's day, the Gospel is assailed on grounds of reason, often the sole way as well as an always right way to get a hearing for it is by means of apologetics. In a word, as Prof. H. B. Smith said, "There are places where philosophy can be met only by philosophy."

Once more, it is frequently through the apologetic treatment of the Gospel that "the witness of the Spirit" comes. Apologetics is practically important, not only to clear a way for the Gospel by refuting false science and vain philosophy and so dispelling the poisonous atmosphere which they engender; nor even, as we have just seen, to gain a hearing for the Gospel on the part of the many who feel the force of the rationalistic attacks on its authority and who, therefore, rightly demand the rational vindication of this if they are to attend to it: but also and specially to furnish the means that the Holy Spirit uses in developing our appreciation of its authority.

It is characteristic of the Holy Spirit that He operates in connection with the truth. He does so in sanctification. He is the sanctifier. Yet our Lord prays, "Sanctify them in the truth: thy word is truth" (John xvii. 17). He does so in conversion. Without His help no one could turn from his sins unto God. Yet conversion begins with faith; and "belief cometh of hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ" (Rom. x. 17). Indeed, whenever the Holy Spirit uses an instrument in His action on rational beings that instrument is the truth. Even regeneration, moreover, in which His agency, because creative, must be immediate—even regeneration, save in the case of infants and idiots, takes place, if not as a direct result of the presentation of the truth, yet in association with it. Hence it is that God is said "of his own will to have brought us forth by the word of truth" (James i. 18). Though not the agent of regeneration, it is the atmosphere only in which can one capable of appreciating the

truth be regenerated. It is precisely as in the physical sphere. It was by His own almighty power, and by this only, that our Lord quickened the dead Lazarus; yet even He could not have quickened him as a man of like nature with ourselves save in the atmosphere. Indeed, the Holy Spirit would not be the Spirit of truth did He not thus, in the case of rational beings, invariably operate either by means of the truth or in connection with it. He would be untrue to the nature which He Himself has given to us did He act otherwise. He would contradict Himself. Now as truth is the conformity of what is thought to what is, so if truth is to affect us it must evince itself as truth: its power will depend ultimately on its evidence; the grandest idea will be but a vain imagination until we feel that it images reality. That is, truth, because truth, operates always by means of evidence. This evidence, of course, will vary according to the kind of truth. Scientific truth will reveal itself by the light of facts. Historical truth will reveal itself by the light of testimony. Philosophical truth will reveal itself by the light of pure reason. Intuitive truth will reveal itself by the light of its own nature. Each sort of truth, however, will make its impression by means of its evidence. We may not suppose the truth of the Gospel to be an exception. Of all truth the highest, it will be specially with reference to it that what has just been said will hold. Therefore, as the Holy Spirit always, in the case of rational beings, operates in connection with "the word of truth," so it will be by means of its evidence that He will use it. Otherwise, He would be untrue to the nature of truth. He would deny Himself.

It must be, therefore, that "the witness of the Spirit" "by and with the Word in our hearts," the witness through which and on the ground of which, in the last analysis, we believe savingly on Christ and turn truly to Him—it must be that this witness, as it is testimony to the truth of the Gospel, so it is this because it brings out and causes us to appreciate as well as to understand the evidences of the Gospel. It is not a revelation of new truth: if it were it could not afford evidence; at least, it could not until it had itself been established. It is rather the work of the Holy Spirit on us and in us, whereby He enlightens our minds and renews our hearts and so enables us both to perceive and to feel the evidence of the truth of "the things of Christ" that have been revealed to us in His Word. This, however, implies that some of the evidences—at any rate those inherent in the truth itself—are before the mind. Otherwise, there would be nothing for "the witness of the Spirit" to attest. And thus it is that as "the witness of the Spirit" is the ulti-

mate reason why we accept and obey the Gospel, so it is this by means of and because of "the testimony of the Church, the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellences, the entire perfection thereof," etc. In a word, it is only in connection with the evidences of the Gospel and so of Christianity that "the witness of the Spirit" is given or could be given. Just because he is "the Spirit of truth" will this be so.

Of course, this does not mean that all the evidences must be presented, if there is to be conviction of the truth of the Gospel. One class of evidences appeals to one kind of men; another, to another. Neither does it mean that any class of evidences must be presented avowedly and formally. In a true sense the Gospel is its own evidence. That is, much of its evidence grows out of its very nature, and so is involved in any correct statement of it. When it is merely preached, therefore, the Holy Spirit can and often does direct the minds of the hearers to much of its best evidence, and then, as only he can do, apply this evidence to their hearts. The question, however, arises, Have we the right to leave him to do the former when Christian apologetics is adapted and intended to do it? Because God often does what we can do, does it follow that we are excused from doing what he has qualified us to do? In such cases does not his action become our example? Surely he would not fit us to do what must be done, and what he often does himself, if he did not mean that we should be "fellow-workers" with him. Such, then, is the relation of apologetics to conversion. It should clear the way for the Gospel; it should get a hearing for it; it should fulfill the condition of "the witness of the Spirit" to it. In view of all this can we doubt its practical importance?

This appears as clearly when we consider the relation of apologetics to sanctification. Apologetics makes it possible to meet the first condition of sanctification. If sanctification be true, it must include the whole man. St. Paul beseeches us, "by the mercies of God, to present even our bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is our reasonable service" (Rom. xii. 1). By as much more, then, as our reason is higher, more godlike, than our bodies, ought we to consecrate it. Indeed, St. Paul prays: "And the God of peace sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame, at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thess. v. 23).

So, too, the same apostle describes himself as "bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor. x. 5). Our Lord also gives as the first and great commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy *mind*" (*διανοία*) (St. Matt. xxii. 37). It may not be doubted, therefore, that that only is true sanctification which embraces the intellect or reason. Indeed, the word rendered "mind" in the commandment just cited would seem to refer specially to the understanding or logical faculty.

We can see why this is. All that we are and have must be the lowest statement of our debt to God. Particularly will this be so in view of the fact that He has redeemed us with His own precious blood. "Love so amazing, so divine, demands our souls, our lives, our all." Consequently, whether we put a high or a low value on the reason, we ought to consecrate it to Him. Because and so long as it is a real element of our nature will this be the case.

Now the consecration of a faculty to God implies more than its subjection to the divine law. We do not truly consecrate our bodies, if we do no more than observe the laws of health which God has impressed on them. This is essential, but it is not sufficient. We must also regard our bodies as his instruments. We must use them for all the work of his kingdom that they are capable of performing. We cannot otherwise present them living sacrifices to him. Precisely so, the consecration of our reason may not be merely negative. It may not consist simply in thinking nothing that is displeasing to God. It must be also positive. It is preëminently for service that "every thought should be brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ"; and, as in the case of the body, the service to be rendered is that for which the reason is by nature qualified.

What, then, is this?—To apprehend, to prove, and progressively, if partially, to comprehend "the things of Christ" and even "the deep things of God." That the reason can do this, the consideration of the theoretical questions concerning it should establish; and that this is the service appropriate to it, is self-evident. It would not be reason were it otherwise, any more than the body would be the body were not its functions physical. He, therefore, who does not develop the religion of the head as well as that of the heart fails in so far forth. To that degree his consecration is imperfect; his debt to his Redeemer is unpaid.

Of course, this does not mean that every one must be a skilled apologist: few are so endowed as to be able to be that. Neither does it mean that some have no need of apologetics: all, except

infants and idiots, can and so should appreciate and use certain of the rational proofs of Christianity. As every one ought to love God with all the emotion that he can stimulate, so every one is bound to love him with all the intelligence that he can develop. No more in the sphere of reason than elsewhere does God demand more than we can do with the powers that he has given to us aided by his grace, but in the sphere of reason as much as in every other he requires our utmost effort. Nothing less than this is implied in the consecration that is his due and for which he asks. Hence, Anselm was right when he wrote: "*Negligentia mihi videtur si postquam confirmati sumus in fide non studemus quod credimus intelligere.*" Apologetics must, therefore, be of prime importance. One of its chief offices is to develop our understanding of what we believe; and at least the effort to understand this is implied from the first in true sanctification. Again, apologetics is necessary to the progressiveness of sanctification. Sanctification not only, as we have seen, exercises the intellect, it is very stimulating intellectually. In so far as it is genuine, it cannot fail to be. Nothing is so opposed to mental sanity and vigor as sin; and sanctification, at least in its negative aspect, is the process of overcoming sin. It is, however, with regard to its positive work that the enlarging and ennobling effect of sanctification on the mind becomes most evident. It develops a new and uniquely grand world. "All things are new" to him who by regeneration has been made "a new creature in Christ Jesus," and this new world is continually unfolded as the work of grace goes on. The development of "the kingdom of God" within us transmutes and glorifies all without us. It causes us to see all things in their relation to that kingdom which is from everlasting to everlasting, and which shall become universal. Can the reason grasp so magnificent a conception and not be enlarged and exalted? Beyond this, and more specifically, sanctification opens to us a new book. The man of the world has the Bible; in many cases he reads it; in some he studies it: but its real meaning is "foolishness" unto him; he has not the Spirit of God, and it is only spiritually that it can be discerned. When, however, the Holy Spirit, having regenerated him, proceeds to sanctify him, "the things of Christ" begin to stand out before him in their preciousness and beauty; the Spirit himself interprets to him the "hidden wisdom" of God as he becomes able to bear it. What education can so develop even the mind as instruction in such a book by such a teacher? And then, more specifically yet, sanctification gives us a new God. It brings us into daily and increasing sympathy with Christ; and so it enables us to under-

stand him who, as the eternal Word, is the reason of reason, "the light which lighteth every man, coming into the world." Who does not see that growth in the grace of such a Saviour must result in mental development? He would deny himself were it otherwise. It would be the greatest of all contradictions if we did not find, as we do, that those whom the Spirit of Christ sanctifies are, as never before, "in their right mind."

Now sanctification, inasmuch as it thus stimulates the reason, must yield itself to the reason or be repudiated by it. There is no other alternative. The teacher of logic must himself be logical, or his teaching will be discredited by his pupils just in proportion as they profit by it. Precisely so, the Christian life must approve itself to reason even when not comprehensible by it, or those who accept it will lose their intellectual interest in it. Just because, as nothing else, it has developed them intellectually will this be. Constituted as we are, it could not be otherwise.

To lose intellectual interest, however, in the Christian life means eventually to lose all interest in it. This, too, follows from our very constitution. Sanctification consists in our response to the action of the Holy Spirit on and in our hearts. It proceeds as we coöperate with him. Now we are moved, and, made as we are, we can be moved, to action of any kind only by our judgments or, and more usually, by our judgments and our dispositions. Thus religious activity and, consequently, the progressiveness of sanctification are rooted in reason. Either, and in any case, must be the result of a judgment as to Christ, as to his work for us, as to our relation to him. This judgment, moreover, must continually be growing clearer if we are to persist in following him, and so sanctification itself is to go on. Otherwise, though from force of habit one may strive for a while to live the life of Christ, he will at length lose heart. His reason for sustained activity will be gone; and, essentially rational, man cannot long act without a reason. Nor is it otherwise in the case of the many whose religious life is predominantly emotional, whose growth in grace is rooted in their dispositions, their desires and affections, rather than in their judgments. Every feeling must justify itself to an idea and exists only because of an idea. As Prof. Bowen said, "Feeling is a state of mind consequent on the reception of an idea." One cannot love God unless the idea of God enters into his consciousness, and his love will be strong or weak according as this idea is clear or vague. As Prof. Henry B. Smith remarked, "He who thinks highly feels deeply": and it is only he who thinks highly who can continue to feel deeply; such is the dependence of feeling on thinking, that if one does not think as

highly as he can he will soon have no light for deep feeling. Consequently, as also Prof. James Orr has said, "No mere simplification of a belief has ever conquered, unless the half has burned more brightly than the whole": and nothing could be more significant in this connection than that the men of sustained faith and effort have been those whose faith was full and intelligent. What, then, could be so suicidal as the general tendency of our day to decry apologetics, to banish reason from religion, in the interest of feeling and practical activity? This is to neglect the roots in order to increase and perfect the fruit; and it is all the more suicidal because, as we have seen, sanctification cannot proceed and not stimulate the intellect. It is the kind of fruit which makes the most demand on the roots. In a word, the effect of sanctification is such, and we are so constituted, that its progressiveness is dependent on apologetics, that is, on the developing use of reason in religion.

Once more, such activity is of the very essence of sanctification. Faith is the necessary means of sanctification. We are sanctified by faith as truly as we are justified by faith. As it is through faith that we appropriate the merit of our Saviour's vicarious life and death, on the ground of which we are declared to be just and are treated as if we were righteous, so it is through faith that we receive the grace whereby the Holy Spirit develops within us the already implanted life of Christ. The first movement of the regenerated soul, faith is ever its vital breath. In the most profound sense, "the righteous shall live by faith" (Rom. i. 17). Now faith, both as an act and as a state, is rational. It includes the assent of the head as really as the consent of the heart. Let either be wanting and faith is wanting. But the assent of the head is conviction produced by evidence. Constituted as we are, there is, as we have seen, no other way by which the assent of the head can be secured than by evidence. This may be of various kinds, but whatever its kind, it must commend itself as rational. Otherwise, it would not be evidence. In the case of saving faith we assent to the truths of the Gospel, we receive Christ as our Saviour, on divine testimony. This is their evidence, and it is the highest of all evidence; but even "the witness of the Spirit" in our hearts, on the evidence of which we accept the facts and truths of the Gospel, would not be evidence if true history and sound philosophy and experience rightly interpreted, in a word, if reason, did not harmonize with it. "The Spirit of truth" would deny himself if his testimony did not agree with the truth of things; and it is only as we discern this, and in part through the appreciation of it, that we

can truly and so savingly believe. What is called blind faith, that is, unreasoning faith, is a misnomer; it is superstition, it is not faith. If we would really believe on Christ and so live in him, we must reason; there is no alternative, faith being the essentially rational act or state that it is: and so apologetics, which aims to develop the rational element in faith, must be of high practical importance with reference to sanctification as well as with reference to conversion. Though it can never of itself produce saving faith, such faith can neither exist nor grow unless, in one way or another, it has been active.

2. This conclusion is confirmed by history. Her pages show us that what we have inferred must be the case has been and is the case. Whenever reason has not been given her place in religion, the issue has been evil. For example, preaching at the time of the Reformation was rarely apologetic. The Church was so engrossed in the enunciation of true doctrine as to overlook the need for its rational vindication. Is it not significant that the century following was preëminently the age of Deism and of Pantheism? Again, no spiritual movement promised more than did Pietism. So vigorous was it at first that, as Hurst has said, "Rationalism in Germany without Pietism as its forerunner would have been fatal for centuries." Yet Pietism lacked "a homogeneous race of teachers." Its founder, Spener, had blended reason and faith harmoniously. His successors cast off the former and blindly followed the latter. Hence, as might have been expected, Pietism fell. The good which it had done continued; it itself disappeared.

The historical argument is also positive. Whenever reason has been rightly honored in religion, benefit has resulted. The Roman Empire would scarcely have become a Christian State without the apologies of Justin, of Origen and of Tertullian. To the age of faith which succeeded the time of Augustine no single man contributed so much as did this great Bishop of Hippo, and his grand work was that magnificent effort of reason, *The City of God*. If the divorce of reason and culture was one of the causes of the Deism of the eighteenth century, the defense of Christianity by Butler and Paley and their associates had more to do with the revival of faith with which the next century began; and their defense was altogether on grounds of reason. If but lately the School of Tübingen threatened to banish the supernatural from history and even from the Gospels, the overthrow of its influence was followed by new spiritual life in Germany; and that overthrow was effected by German scholarship.

This historical connection between apologetics and faith be-

comes most significant when we consider the missionary work of the Church. The greatest advance in this is to be observed in those periods in which reason was duly employed in religion. As has been well said, "The age which has been called by eminence the age of the Apologists was also the greatest missionary age of the ancient Church"; and it is the apologist Justin who asserts of the rapid movement of Christianity during the period in which he lived: "There is no people, Greek or barbarian, or of any other race, by whatsoever appellations or manners they may be distinguished, however ignorant of arts or agriculture—whether they dwell in tents or wander around in covered wagons—among whom prayers are not offered in the name of the crucified Jesus to the Father and Creator of all things." The great apologetic work in England during the eighteenth century was accompanied, certainly immediately followed, by the great missionary movement, which from that day to this has been gathering strength and is at this time the most characteristic work of the Church. Just in proportion as the absoluteness of Christianity as the religion of the world has been systematically demonstrated would seem to have been the vigor of the endeavor to propagate it. We have only to turn to history to read the confirmation of Bacon's remark, "A little philosophy leads a man to atheism, but a good deal to religion."

Beyond this we should mark well the importance of apologetics on the mission fields themselves at the present time. The missionary is obliged constantly to draw on it in his conflict with heathendom. Those who are successful in the foreign work acknowledge, almost invariably, their great indebtedness to our science. Not a few of them affirm it to be that one in the theological curriculum to which those who intend to be foreign missionaries should give most attention. In a word, if the practical importance of apologetics is, as we have seen, a direct consequence of the nature of things, so this importance is illustrated and confirmed by history and, perhaps even more, by the experience of our own day.

3. The argument is clinched by the Word of God. This shows infallibly the correctness, both of our inference as to the practical importance of apologetics from the nature of things, and of our interpretation to the same effect of the testimony of history and of our own experience.

Thus the Bible, inasmuch as it is predominantly practical in aim, teaches by its implications and examples the practical importance of apologetics. As Prof. De Witt has said, "It is true that no book in the New Testament can be regarded as formally a

vindication to the human reason of Christianity as the one divinely revealed religion; but that the New Testament both justifies and contains appeals to the reason in defense of Christianity, that it presents the record of the proofs of the divine mission of Jesus urged by Christ and his apostles, no one will deny who has given the subject any reflection. Our Lord himself honored the intelligence of man by the miracles which he wrought in attestation of his claims. He would not have men believe on him without evidence; and that the evidence of miracles exerted, in some cases at least, its appropriate influence appears in the language of the ruler: 'Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher sent from God, for no man can do the miracles which thou doest except God be with him.'"

Moreover, our Saviour, though usually reticent in what related to himself, was copious in express apology in reference to the nature of his mission, and of the kingdom whose advent he proclaimed. Objected to because of their spirituality and universality, it was these aspects of them that he formally defended. He justified them to the reason on the grounds, that Christianity aims at curing moral rather than physical evil; that it believes in the redeemableness of human beings, however sunk in sin and misery; that it thinks the meanest of mankind worth saving; and that it assumes God's attitude toward mankind to be the same as that of Christ. One of the most pointed and weighty questions addressed by him to the men of his day was, "And why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?" (St. Luke xii. 57). Thus for the truth of his claims he who was himself "the truth" appealed directly to the reason of man.

The apostles, likewise, in the first publication of Christianity, were at pains to furnish the evidence of the resurrection of our Lord. It was held to be an indispensable condition of apostleship that one should have seen the risen Jesus and so be able to testify from personal observation as to the fact of the resurrection. The reason was that the apostles recognized that adequate proof ought to be given of the Gospel which they preached. This apologetic spirit characterized the ministry of all of them. The first Christian sermon, that by Peter on the day of Pentecost, was not more a declaration of the Gospel than an apology for Christianity based on the fulfillment of prophecy. When Paul came to Thessalonica he went into the synagogue, and for three Sabbath days reasoned (*διελέγετο*) with them from the Scriptures (Acts xvii. 2). While at Athens he reasoned (*διελέγετο*) in the synagogue with the Jews and the devout persons, and in the market-place every day with them that met him (Acts xvii. 16).

His sermon on Mars' Hill found in the truths of natural religion a basis and introduction for the doctrines of the cross. Thus to the men of Athens the great apostle to the Gentiles preached the Gospel from the point of view of an apologist, showing that Christianity alone answered their longing for the revelation of the Deity, who to them had been an "unknown God." When at Ephesus "he entered into the synagogue and spake boldly for the space of three months, reasoning (arguing, *διαλεγόμενος*) and persuading as to the things concerning the kingdom of God. But when some were hardened and disobedient, speaking evil of the Way before the multitude, he departed from them, and separated the disciples, reasoning (*διαλεγόμενος*) daily in the school of Tyrannus" (Acts xix. 8, 9). Of Paul's Epistle to the Romans it has been well said that it is "encyclopædic in its structure, round and full like the circle of Giotto, and containing all the elements of natural as well as of revealed religion." "The apostle John has told us that the main design of the fourth Gospel is not biographical or expository, but distinctly apologetic. He tells us that Jesus did many other signs in the presence of His disciples which are not written in this book: and he then adds a statement of the principle that controlled his selection of those whose record he has preserved: 'But these are written that ye might *believe* that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through his name.'"

Nor is the New Testament apologetic only in spirit and aim, and never in form. As Prof. A. B. Bruce has observed, "That remarkable writing, the Epistle to the Hebrews, is an elaborate apology for the cross in a twofold aspect: first and chiefly, for the cross which Jesus bore, and, second and subordinately, for the cross that came to Christians in connection with their faith in the Crucified One." Thus at least this epistle is a systematic apology.

It is not only, however, by implication and example that the Bible teaches the practical importance of apologetics. It does this also by explicit statement. For instance, Peter (1 Epis. iii. 15) charges us to "sanctify in our hearts Christ as Lord: being ready always to give answer (*πρὸς ἀπολογία*) to every man that asketh you a reason concerning the hope that is in you, yet with meekness and fear." These words are not a little significant. Literally translated they are, "being ready always for an apology to every one that asketh a reason," etc. The connection between the clauses indicates that if we do sanctify Christ in our hearts as Lord, that is, if we do practically regard him as such in view of all our adversaries, we shall show it by preparing ourselves to

vindicate rationally his truth and our faith and hope against all who gainsay them. It is to be noticed, moreover, that this charge is not given to ministers only or specially. It is addressed to Christians generally. In the apostle's view no man can be the believer that he ought to be save as he is qualified to be an apologist of his faith. Even more striking is Paul's prayer for all who are in Christ (*Vid.* Eph. iii. 14-19). His petition for them is that, "being rooted and grounded in love, they may be strong to apprehend (*καταλαμβάνειν*) with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know (*γινώσκειν*) the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that they may be filled unto all the fullness of God." The former of these two verbs, especially in view of its employment in the middle voice, refers distinctively to the mental powers, to the comprehension and reasoned knowledge through them of essentials. The latter further specifies the practical knowledge arising from religious experience. What the apostle really prays for is that we may come measurably to understand the love of Christ for us and so may have a deeper and richer experience of it. Need more be said to vindicate the practical importance of Apologetics? It is rooted in the nature of the Christian life. It is illustrated in and confirmed by history. It is asserted as well as implied in the Word of God. If not indispensable to Christian experience, apologetic activity is represented by the Holy Spirit, the author of all Christian experience, as in order to the intimacy of such experience.

II. What, then, are the true functions of apologetics? What should it do, if it is to realize its practical importance?

1. It should qualify the believer to vindicate Christianity against all assaults. This does not mean that it should place in his hands the weapons with which to repel each one of the attacks of unbelief. Such is the conception that many, perhaps most, have of apologetics. They regard it as if it were a great armory. In their view, the Christian has only to go to it to find at once the particular answer that he needs whenever in any way the hope that is in him is denied. No mistake could be greater.

The attacks on our faith are too numerous and especially are too various. "It is true," as Prof. H. B. Smith has said, "that the questions under debate are ever essentially the same: for God and man and the universe remain essentially the same from age to age; and the questions are ultimately about them and their relations. But it is not true that the form of the conflict or its weapons remain or can remain the same; these change with the changes of age and nations and philosophies just as much and as

surely as do the armaments of war." Hence, the weapons of yesterday are out of date to-day. The *Analogy* of Butler, well-nigh perfect though it is for its specific end, does not meet the most pressing issues now. The battle is no longer with deism, as when the great Bishop of Durham wrote. The objections that we must answer are, as we have seen, those raised by Darwin and Spencer, by Hegel and Bauer, by Ritschl and Harnack; and these are new, at least in form. Indeed, these questions themselves differ from day to day. No two Ritschlians present the same front. The idealism of Edward Caird calls for a keener blade than did Hegel's, if its pantheism is to be laid bare. It is vain any longer to combat naturalism on the ground of the inadequacy of natural selection, for Mr. Spencer himself is conceding that. The function of apologetics, therefore, cannot be to furnish the believer with ready-made weapons. It is to enable him to make for himself those which he may require. Our science is to be regarded as a school in the construction of arms rather than as an armory. Its procedure is not determined by casual attacks on Christianity at particular times: but it infers from the inmost nature of Christianity what classes of attacks on itself are in general possible; what false principles are at the basis of these; and what answers to them may be derived from the essential constitution of our religion. Thus, though it may not give even one specific answer, it should qualify the believer himself to prepare the answer to every challenge of his hope.

This, however, does not mean that the answer will be in any case an absolute one. Christianity is a religion based on facts. In a profound sense "the fact of Christ" is Christianity. It is and is what it is because he is and is what he is. Paul emphasized this when he wrote: "If Christ hath not been raised, then is our preaching vain, your faith also is vain" (1 Cor. xv. 14). But a fact cannot be demonstrated. It may be certainly true; it cannot be shown to be necessarily so. Doubt concerning it may be most unreasonable, but it will always be metaphysically possible. You are sure of your own individuality; you cannot divest yourself of the consciousness of it: nevertheless, you cannot prove it; and the millions of India to-day affirm it to be an illusion. One cannot think and not admit that, if there be a triangle, its angles must equal two right angles; but even if one sees and touches a triangle, there is room for the objection that the senses are untrustworthy. Hence, apologetics may not be expected to vindicate Christianity absolutely. You can show that one who sets aside the testimony to the resurrection must rule out all testimony as to anything, but you cannot prove even such

procedure to be metaphysically impossible. This peculiarity needs to be emphasized. Diverse kinds of truth have different criteria, and we have no right to expect in the domain of facts the demonstration that we properly demand in the sphere of necessary truth.

Indeed, it would in this case be most unfortunate were we to obtain it. If apologetics could so answer the objections to Christianity as to render the possibility of further objections inconceivable, this would only make the Christian life impossible. That is essentially a life of faith, and faith is ruled out by demonstration. It can no more breathe the atmosphere of this than it can take root save in the soil of evidence.

What, however, is meant by the vindication of our religion against all assaults is that the positions whence these proceed be shown to involve more serious difficulties than does Christianity. It is supernatural and so cannot be absolutely vindicated. It must ever be metaphysically possible that the supernatural, because supernatural, might be contranatural and irrational. But, on the other hand, the objections to Christianity are based on the contranatural, and so the contradictory and impossible. This, of course, though not an absolute vindication, is a sufficient answer. For example, the theistic view of the world with its doctrine of creation must be admitted to have its difficulties. We cannot explain creation *de nihilo*. The material cause is wanting. On the other side, however, all the objections to theism must fall back ultimately on the assumptions, that the material of the world was nothing; that its method was chance; and that in it all there was no purpose. The efficient cause and the final cause are lacking as well as the material cause. That is, chance working upon nothing made the universe. "This," however, as Mr. Ballard has well remarked (*Miracles of Unbelief*, p. 55), "is such a stupendous and absolute violation of all we know to be natural and rational that all the difficulties of theism and all the miracles of Christianity together are literally as nothing compared with it." In this way and to this extent should apologetics meet the objections of unbelief. It should counteract the so common tendency to evade or ignore them. It should prompt to their immediate and fearless examination. It should show that at the bar of reason and with the weapons of reason Christianity can put all her adversaries to confusion.

2. The function of apologetics is also positive. It cannot realize its practical importance, if it confines itself simply to answering the objections to our religion. It is not enough to prove that these are contranatural and so must be irrational, whereas

Christianity is supernatural and so may be rational. The most useful function of apologetics is to rationalize, so to speak, the supernatural. It should show that the Supernatural, though above reason, is congruous with it. Supernatural revelation and reason do not proceed along different lines, but along one and the same line. The difference between them is that supernatural revelation goes much farther. The difficulty, therefore, is not that reason cannot apprehend supernatural revelation: it does do so; it reads it in its own language just so far as it can read it at all. The difficulty is that reason cannot comprehend supernatural revelation; though of the same kind with it, the latter is too large to be grasped by it; supernatural revelation is written in the language of reason, but there is far more of it than reason can read and much even of what it does read it cannot appreciate. In a word, our embarrassment in the case arises from the finiteness of our reason and not from the irrationality of the supernatural. To show this is truly to vindicate our religion, and it should be done in three respects.

First, with reference to the historical facts of Christianity. Take, for example, the resurrection of our Saviour. This, according to apostolic teaching, is the foundation of our faith and hope. It is, however, clearly supernatural and incomprehensible. No man can understand "the working of the strength of God's might which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead." As to its power and method, the resurrection is a mystery; it is above reason. But it does not follow from this that it is out of all relation to reason. On the contrary, reason can prove the fact of it. Reason can show, that no event in history rests on testimony so good as that for the resurrection of our Saviour; that if the reality of this event be denied, all the records of the past must, logically, be discredited; that if Christ did not rise from the dead, then the fact of the Christian Church and the power of Christianity for moral regeneration, than which no facts are more certain and conspicuous, become, not mysteries, but manifest contradictions and thus impossibilities. That is, apologetics can show that the fact of the resurrection is demanded by other unquestioned facts, if they are not to become utterly unreasonable. But note the bearing of this on the nature of the power and method of the resurrection. The reasonableness of these, though not evinced, is at once proved. That, the reality of which reason herself requires, must be essentially rational even if above reason. Otherwise reason would stultify herself, which is impossible. This does not mean that the evil and so the irrational cannot exist or cannot be proved to exist. It does mean that that

must be reasonable whose existence is proved by reason's own demand for it.

Secondly, with reference to the eternal truths of Christianity. These truths or doctrines are the divine interpretations of her facts. Though too deep for reason to fathom, they are not of a nature such that reason cannot investigate them. On the contrary, apologetics can and should bring out their congruity with reason in various ways. For example, this appears in that the doctrines of our faith really do interpret its facts. Often they go far in explaining them. Thus in the light of them the facts are seen to be at least possible. Take the fact of the creation. Do what we will, we must, the universe being self-evidently dependent, assume that it was created and that it was created out of nothing. This, however, is a conception that reason refuses. That something should of itself come out of nothing is a contradiction; and unbelieving science would herself recognize this, did she not decline to think whenever the question of origin arises. But in theism we have the suggestion of the solution. The mind can admit the conception of creation out of nothing in view of the absoluteness of the Creator. We can endure the absence of a material cause inasmuch as there is an efficient cause, and this is the self-existent absolute One. Why should he not "call the things that are not, as though they were?" How any being can do this, we cannot explain; but that the Absolute Being can do it, no one can rationally deny. Does not this indicate the reasonableness of the doctrine of God? At least such a doctrine is presupposed by the certain fact of the creation.

But apologetics can and should do much more than this. It can often show the truth of the facts of Christianity to be, to a considerable degree, comprehensible. Take the nature of God as revelation portrays it. He is a social being. He must be, for we are made in his image. God, however, has existed eternally, whereas rational creatures and, indeed, the universe were created in time. For ages upon ages, therefore, God existed alone. But how could this be and he be blessed, if he is essentially a social being? This is the question which Unitarianism is bound to answer and cannot answer. The mystery of the Trinity, however, removes this particular difficulty. In the persons of the Godhead we see how God could exist alone and yet not be lonely. Does not this evince, at least so far forth, the congruity of the doctrine of the Trinity with reason? Only that which is itself reasonable can thus meet a demand of reason. And this is not all. The "philosophical aspect" which, as Prof. H. B. Smith says, can be discerned in the case of every doctrine of Christianity, proves that

the doctrine, even in those aspects of it that are above reason, is still rational. This is so because the philosophical aspect of every Christian doctrine belongs to its very significance. It is not a foreign element, in the doctrine but not of it. It arises out of the essential nature or meaning of the doctrine. Thus it is that God exists as three real persons—it is precisely this that explains how he can be the social being that he is. Now what is rational in its essential nature, so far as we can understand it, must be rational throughout; for that nature cannot but be the same throughout. If a child can appreciate some of the aspects of the declaration of our national independence, he is bound to believe that he could appreciate them all if he knew enough: because they are all aspects of the same fact they cannot differ in kind, but in degree only: if the lower are essentially appreciable, so also must be the higher.

Thirdly, apologetics can and should show that it is precisely because Christianity is incomprehensible that it is reasonable. Could it be comprehended throughout it would, in view of its claims, be irrational and, indeed, impossible. By its own statement it is supernatural because from heaven and of God. How, then, could it be understood by human reason? The supernatural would be no longer supernatural if it could be expressed in terms of the natural. Thus the incomprehensibility of Christianity is the sign of its truth; and so in bringing out this incomprehensibility, as apologetics must do in every attempt to rationalize Christianity, apologetics does but present the final and, in view of all that has gone before, the convincing proof of its essential reasonableness. To be reasonable, "the way and the life and the truth" of him who is "God manifest in the flesh," as in some of its aspects, as we have just seen, it must be open to human reason, so in others it must be above it. This is the necessity of the case. Hence, apologetics should rationalize our faith. It should counteract the very general tendency to regard it as out of all relation to reason and so to be held blindly. It should dispose us to its constant and diligent study. It should show that even when we cannot understand it itself, we can always understand why it should be held; and that not the least reason why it should be held is that it is above our reason. Such, then, are the functions of apologetics. If it is to realize its practical importance, it must vindicate Christianity both negatively and positively. It must refute the false principles that underlie the prevalent objections to it by showing that these involve far greater difficulties than even those that may appear to embarrass our religion. As one has well said, "In removing the Christian

mole-hill, there is of necessity created an agnostic mountain." Then, positively, apologetics must rationalize Christianity, by showing that its facts, while mysterious, are so bound up with the system of admitted facts that the latter cannot be real and the former not be; by bringing out "the philosophical aspect" of every one of the doctrines of our faith; and by pointing out that the mystery in which both the facts and the doctrines of our religion terminate is the cloud of glory which by veiling indicates both the presence and the nature of him who is the Reason of reason.

III. In closing, let us consider very briefly how the so important functions of apologetics may best be performed.

1. Its negative office would seem to call for such a change in our Church services as would allow of frequent public meetings for the free discussion, by means of question and answer, of the objections to Christianity. This requirement is ably presented by Mr. Ballard in his chapter on "The Attitude of the Christian Church" in his *Miracles of Unbelief*, probably the strongest as well as the most striking of recent works on the evidences of our religion. According to Mr. Ballard, a chief reason, perhaps the chief reason, for the slow progress of the Gospel is that public opportunity is rarely, if ever, given for the expression and the answering of the intellectual difficulties concerning Christianity that exist antecedently in the minds of many, and that the preaching of the Gospel, however faithful and often just because faithful, is almost sure to suggest to more. These difficulties, it is true, are generally dealt with in books. But then most persons need to be directed to the works adapted to their particular cases; to not a few these are inaccessible; many, if they had them, would still require a personal teacher. Besides this, the desire for light is seldom so strong as the sense of difficulty. Therefore, if light be not afforded at once, the difficulty prevails; he who might have been a sincere inquirer becomes a sullen objector. His difficulties increase and propagate. What is worse, they engender the feeling that the Church either cannot resolve them or does not care to do so. To this way of thinking Mr. Ballard believes to be due the facts that in modern "Christian" England there are four men absent for every one present at Sunday services; and that in London, certainly one of the most church-going cities of the world, we have four millions of human beings unassociated with any Christian Church. The masses despise what they call "pulpit logic" and often stigmatize the pulpit, sometimes not untruly if unkindly, as a "Edward's castle."

The remedy for this deplorable condition is, of course, the

removal of the offense. The decency and order of public worship would prevent the permission of challenges and even of questions while it was in progress. But might not a meeting be held invariably immediately after the service for all such as had perplexities to present or objections to raise? These would commonly be similar, so that the answer to one would be the answer to many. The easier and the more general could be disposed of first. The obstinate objector could then be dealt with at length and when few persons remained. The details of the plan may not now be set forth, and they would vary in every case. The plan, however, would seem to be practical; and in view of the demand for it, ought it not to be adopted? It has always been in operation on the foreign field, and it is not a little significant that there the growth of the Church has been many times more rapid than at home. Nor would the benefits of such a method be confined to the resolution of intellectual difficulties. It is essentially the method of Spener. So good a movement as Pietism was when at its best was made possible by just such meetings as we are advocating.

2. The positive office of apologetics would seem to call for preaching that itself appeals to the reason. It should do this by its method. By this it is not meant that human reason should be presented as the source or the ground or the measure of religious truth. To regard it as all or as any one of these is rationalism. The Gospel is from God: we receive it on His authority, and we accept it in so far as he has revealed it, whether we do or do not comprehend it. Nevertheless, because God is the Reason of reason, his message must have its rational aspect, and we shall both bring out its divinity and consequent truth and commend it to ourselves by evincing its reasonableness. Hence, the facts of Christianity should be set forth, not only in their supernatural isolation because uniqueness, but also in their historical relations; the crucifixion, for example, as the centre of human history no less than the consummation of God's plan of redemption. So, too, the doctrines of our religion, while they should be preached as divine and, therefore, true declarations, should also be proclaimed as evincing their divinity and truth through their harmony with reason; the incarnation, for instance, as a mystery of God and yet as manifesting its origin specially in being the rational answer to the deepest need of man. That is, as there should be more doctrinal preaching, so doctrinal apologetics should enter more largely into doctrinal preaching.

Preaching should appeal to reason also by its subject-matter. The proofs of our religion should be frequently and fully set forth.

This should be done positively, not as refuting objections, but as confirming what the preacher assumes to be believed. Indeed, nothing is more foolish than for the preacher to raise objections. It is quite enough for him to afford the opportunity for their presentation in the after-meeting already referred to and to discuss and answer them then. The truth of Christianity may, however, be established without even suggesting objections and in such a way that, were they existing, they would be ruled out. Thus the argument from prophecy, the argument from the self-consistency of Christianity, the argument from its early diffusion, the argument from its historic effects, the argument from its power of recuperation and of self-development and of assimilation, the argument from the comparison of it with all other religions, the argument from its unique excellence as a system of truth or a philosophy, the argument from the character and from the resurrection of Christ—any one of these arguments, not to mention others, may be presented without apparent apologetic purpose and in a spirit the opposite of what the apologetic spirit is popularly conceived to be, but with such true because positive apologetic effect as often to render negative apologetics unnecessary.

Of course, the objection arises that the plan proposed would require an abler ministry than we have. Yes, it would. To conduct "in meekness and fear" such meetings as have been described would require grace that not many possess, but not what "the God of all grace" does not have and is not ready to give. It would call also for intellectual preparation such as few of our students or ministers aspire to. It would not be consistent with a college course devoted, as so often under our elective system, to almost all studies except those of high disciplinary value; nor with the so common comparative indifference to the more fundamental and, therefore, apparently less practical subjects of the seminary curriculum; nor with the so frequent neglect on the part of our more active pastors of severe and independent theological study. It might demand the addition of another year of required preparation. It might necessitate the liberal endowment of fellowships for theological research. It might call for the exercise of much more wisdom and firmness on the part of Presbyteries in rejecting candidates who seem to be lacking in any of the three indispensable qualifications of the ministry—godliness, common sense and aptness to teach.

Yet all these difficulties do not constitute even one real objection to the plan that this paper has proposed and that it has described, though most imperfectly. It is worked successfully on

the foreign field. It is urgently demanded here at home. Who, then, may say that God would not have us put it into operation or could not give us the power and wisdom to make it succeed? If it be the fact, as the latest census would seem to prove, that at last the Church of our country is failing to keep pace with the increase of our population, does not this emphasize the need of a different kind of evangelism, of a more general recognition of the practical importance of apologetics, and of a return to what we have seen was so often and so characteristically the method of our Lord and of his apostles? So long as man is the rational animal and religion is the most rational of all his concerns, it cannot be that Christianity can be established by bare assertions, however strong; by mere appeals, however fervid; by confused teaching, however earnest: it must be that the noble science which aims to set forth the rational side and so the proof of our religion will ever be of exceedingly practical because of fundamental importance. Just because living Christianity is the result of the work of "the Spirit of truth," and ultimately of this alone, Christianity must be made manifest as truth to the correlate of truth; and the correlate of truth is the reason.

PRINCETON.

WM. BRENTON GREENE, JR.

IV.

THE NEW ERA IN EVANGELISM.

THE Church has entered upon a new era in evangelism. It is well characterized in the expression "Pastoral Evangelism," and more particularly defined in the following words of Rev. J. Wilbur Chapman, D.D.: "While we believe there is always a place for the evangelist, and never a better place than to-day, yet we are sure that the majority of pastors must do their own evangelistic work." It is the purpose of this article to inquire concerning this new era, as to its origin, its meaning, and its probable outcome.

I. *The Origin.*

There was, to begin with, a certain sentiment—it can scarcely be called a theory—which had obtained in the Church, that the pastor was not intended to be nor expected to be distinctively a soul-winner. And this sentiment was not altogether unreasonable, because the pastor is not primarily a soul-winner, and is not so represented in the New Testament. His first duty is to the flock of God, as one of its under shepherds.

We properly discriminate between the chief duty of the ministry and the chief duty of the Church. The first duty of the Church, as such, is to the perishing world; the first duty of the ministry is to the membership of the Church. If each be observed in due proportion the largest progress will be made; and if the pastor's first duty is faithfully discharged, the first duty of his people will not be neglected.

But this never meant that the duty of the pastor ended with his believing congregation. Far from it. It only stated an order of precedence. It no more meant that the pastor was to slight the unsaved than it means that a father is to slight his children because his first duty is to his wife. Indeed, the saved and unsaved are so involved in all that affects the growth of the Redeemer's kingdom that no pastor can do his full duty to believers who is not zealous for the salvation of unbelievers.

This imperfect conception of the pastoral work was not deliberately formulated and practiced, so that the ministry coolly abandoned all efforts at aggressive evangelism. But whether it was

formulated or not, it was, certainly adopted to a very considerable extent. Preaching became more and more circumscribed. Pastoral work became more and more self-centred. Ministers were distinctly charged with neglecting the so-called "masses," and had too little to plead in reply. Evangelism became with the majority of them a lost art. The Church was compelled to grow largely out of itself by natural increase, rather than by gains from the outlying world, and we were threatened with spiritual dearth and stagnation.

Then it happened in the good providence of God that a certain class of men appeared, both as a protest against this state of affairs and corrective of it. Not unnaturally these men came from the ranks, and there began the era of *Lay Evangelism*.

It was first of all a protest. The first meaning of it, if it had been given voice, was the earnest cry of the consecrated laity to the mistaken clergy: "If you will not go out after these perishing people, *we will*"; and we may well thank God for it with all our hearts. Out of this laymen's movement have come some of the most pronounced religious features of the present day. Much of the splendid lay activity of the age came out of it, enriching many a sphere of religious endeavor. More devotion to the Bible as the personal guide of life came out of it. A more natural spirit and manner in the religious life came out of it. It had also a yet broader influence. It turned the attention of the entire Church to the members of that large class which Mr. Moody was accustomed to call "The Tin-bucket Brigade," upon whom we seemed to be losing our hold, and many an effort now organized in their behalf is largely due to its influence. And beyond all else, it was the means of winning a multitude of precious souls to the Master.

And yet the Church was never heartily satisfied with lay evangelism. Some of our most devoted ministers held that there was no explanation and no excuse for it except as the divine rebuke of a negligent Church. Others accepted it in part and attempted to distinguish between this evangelist and that. But very few, if any, accepted it without reservation.

During the era of its adoption many thoughtful and kindly criticisms of its principles and methods appeared in the periodicals of the Church, notably the *Princeton Review*. In the number of this *Review* for July, 1878, Prof. W. G. Blaikie wrote from Scotland for the benefit of American readers an admirable article on "Methods of Home Evangelization," in which he reviewed the principal methods by which it had been attempted to recover the lapsed populations of his own land. This article, however, was

virtually a plea for a better system of evangelism than that which was then so popular. In the course of it he introduces the following remarks: "The 'Free Lance' is a very useful soldier, so long as he works in harmony with the general sentiment and common sense of the Christian community. But he can hardly be taken into account as contributing in any considerable degree to the evangelization of the whole community. Nor would it be wise to encourage indefinitely this form of philanthropy. Interesting as an exception, it would be undesirable as a rule. Home evangelization is undoubtedly, in the first instance, the duty of the Christian Church in its Church capacity. Individuals are not so dependent on the good will of the Church Catholic, and are more liable to be guided by crotchets or individual impulses. We may welcome the labors of all good men working by themselves, without having any special favor for that form of Christian activity."

In the *Princeton Review* for April, 1877, appears a very fine article on "Evangelists and Lay-Exhorters," by the Rev. J. M. P. Otts, D.D., being in part a review of Headley's *Evangelists in the Church*. In this article the author discusses the evangelist's office as set forth in the New Testament and exercised in the history of the Church, and then proceeds to deal with lay evangelism in vigorous terms. Extended quotations might be given to illustrate that judgment of which Dr. Otts was a worthy representative; but space permits only a few characteristic sentences: "There are many in these modern days called evangelists who are not evangelists in any Scriptural or true sense of the word. They are merely peripatetic and irregular preachers who oftentimes run before they are sent and come before they are wanted. They have no constitutional place in the Church."

Mr. Moody, of course, was the first of the lay evangelists of this period—first in time, character and influence. And the whole Protestant Church on both sides of the sea believed in him. Who will deny that he was a veritable providential agent, "called of God as was Aaron," qualified by divine discipline and sent upon a peculiar mission? Whatever may be said of his co-laborers, something else and something more must be said of their great leader. They are often classed with Moody, but Moody out-classed them all. Nay; he was not, strictly speaking, in the same class. He was in a class by himself. This is particularly emphasized in the way in which Moody was led into evangelism. It was of no set purpose or predetermined plan, as it was with many who followed him. On his first visit to England, when introduced to an audience in Exeter Hall as "'Reverend' Mr.

Moody," he arose and said, "I'm not the 'Reverend' Mr. Moody at all. I'm plain Dwight L. Moody, a Sunday-school worker!" Yet Mr. Moody in part created and in part inspired a system which will always be associated with his name. He himself declined ordination, and so encouraged others, who had no such discipline as he, to preach the Holy Gospel without any ecclesiastical sanction or control. He organized a Church with no denominational affiliations and contributing little to the broad benevolences of the Church at large. He founded schools for the training of men and women to follow in the same line of independent thought and labor. So that the author of this article has been accustomed to say, "I believe in Moody, but not in Moodyism."

Dr. Otts, in the article to which we have referred, made substantially the same distinction twenty-five years ago. He claimed that Mr. Moody was "constructively ordained to the work of an evangelist by the general consent and approval of the ordained ministry of the Holy Catholic Church." But Dr. Otts adds: "We have come into collision with men who claimed to be followers of Mr. Moody, but who evidently neither knew him nor were known of him. They are like Mr. Moody only in the one point, that each one of them runs around with a Bagster Bible in hand."

Mr. Moody, however, was chiefly responsible for Moodyism; and Moodyism, unlike Moody, was a strange conglomeration of the most diverse qualities. It meant much that was intensely earnest, vital and evangelical; but it meant much also that was crude, mistaken and divisive. It often meant the disparagement of the regular ministry and of those peculiar ordinances of organized religion which the ministry is commissioned to administer. Consequently it meant the incoming of a host professing to be teachers who had no true call to such an office, who despised theological education, who neither were nor would be ordained even if they could have been, who seemed to think it gave them standing both with God and men to parade their lack of theological education and even conceal the name of their denomination, if indeed they belonged to any. Their judgment was expressed in the words of one who publicly declared that he had entered a theological seminary, but felt compelled to leave it for the good of his soul! He has since left the Evangelical Church—perhaps for the same reason.

It is admitted that there were skillful and useful men among these lay evangelists; but the system which they represented was sadly at fault in its very first principles. Apart from the evangel-

ists themselves there were certain features of the system which became, after a time, burdensome, to say the least. These were what may be called the spectacular features. The condition—usually an inviolable one—that there should be union services in order to insure a crowd; the confining of effort to the cities and large towns for a similar reason, to the utter neglect of many a small and destitute village where the Gospel was seldom if ever proclaimed; the sinking of all ministerial personality and authority in abject submission to the will and word of the evangelist; the stultifying of experience and training; the imposing choir with its wretched but “catchy” music and all the nameless paraphernalia, furnished and maintained at excessive cost—such were some of the more conspicuous features in the evangelism out of which we are now emerging.

The system was accepted, as perhaps it should have been. It was not a perfect system; but it was the best that offered. We knew we were not reaching and saving the souls about us as we might and as we should have done; and we welcomed those who came in the Saviour’s name to help us. We would do so again under similar circumstances and plead the Saviour’s own rebuke of the apostle John, when John forbade one to cast out devils in Jesus’ name because he followed not in their company.

But in course of time the defects of the system began to involve its decay. Mr. Moody himself seemed to realize this. He certainly greatly modified his methods in his later years. The churches which he had abandoned for the immense tabernacles of his early campaigns were again utilized almost exclusively, and the ministers whom he had at first (to say the least) belittled were the more and more called to his aid.

Perhaps the most significant sentence in the entire volume of W. R. Moody’s *Life* of his father is in these words: “In his later years he worked more in harmony with the ministers,” and, as we know, he called fewer laymen and more ministers to his aid. So it came to pass that Mr. Moody’s chief adviser and assistant at the time of his death was an ordained clergyman, and when Mr. Moody passed away this clergyman became the recognized leader in American evangelism. Still later the control of Mr. Moody’s school passed into the hands of another ordained minister imported from abroad. Thus the situation assumed an entirely new aspect and a new era dawned upon our religious world.

II. *Such, then, appears to be the origin of the present movement. What then of its meaning?*

Mr. Moody has no successor. His influence will indeed abide.

His schools will no doubt be operated for some time upon the principles which he established, and some attempt will be made to perpetuate his methods; but Moodyism is a thing of the past. The new movement is a positive reaction. It is Moodyism turned upside down. It is true that there are still lay evangelists, and, what is still better, there are hosts of laymen engaged in soul-winning who do not wish to be regarded as "evangelists." This latter, as has already been noted, is to a great extent the fruit of Mr. Moody's labors. But lay evangelists are no longer to the fore. The evangelistic leaders are ordained ministers, and under their wise direction other ministers are learning to "do their own evangelistic work." Pastors assist pastors, as they did in the days before lay evangelism occupied the field; Presbyteries appoint evangelistic committees and hold evangelistic conferences, while the whole great movement is controlled by the highest courts of the Church.

The first and best meaning of all this is a return to the true, Scriptural understanding of the evangelistic office. It is only within the past generation that a broad distinction has been drawn between the pastor and the evangelist. Indeed, the word "evangelist" as we have been employing it, is a positive misnomer, unknown to our Presbyterian nomenclature. "Pastor" and "evangelist" do not represent two distinct offices, but rather separate functions of one and the same office. The pastor has always been an evangelist. It was never otherwise in apostolic days. They who were appointed to feed the flock of God were expected to add to its numbers. The bishop was also an ambassador for Christ. Edification and conversion went hand in hand. And so it continued to be until the advent of Moodyism upset our theories. Baxter, Chalmers, Newman Hall and Spurgeon—these names are but illustrations of the one indivisible vocation in the exercise of its twofold work. What an unspeakable blessing it will be to the Church if the present movement shall indeed mean this! and if the divisive influence of lay evangelism shall be corrected! It will be a wonderful inversion.

There was little place in Moodyism for pastoral evangelism—it was no distinctive part of the system. The pastors were never organized for such work as this; they were never organized at all, except in a way, in preparation for a brief revival season. When lay evangelism entered its protest against the neglect of systematic soul-winning on the part of the clergy, it did little to correct the evil which it deplored. Indeed, there is reason to think that it actually increased it. Because it was not only a virtual reflection upon ordination, which tended to discredit it;

but its methods served to paralyze the pastoral evangelism which might otherwise have been undertaken. Evangelism became the prerogative of the few, and was represented as an exceptional endowment. It became also the work of the infrequent season and the unusual opportunity. It was not set forth emphatically as the bounden and continuous privilege of every preacher of the Gospel.

It is true that Mr. Moody held for a while, in one period of his career, evangelistic conferences, with the view of stimulating the Churches to nobler endeavor. But there was no specific attempt at the development of an evangelistic pastorate and no distinct training of ministers in evangelistic methods. On the contrary, there was the very reverse—the systematic training of laymen, who were never to be anything more than laymen, and that only by means of short and very incomplete courses of study, and the intruding of such into the place of the accredited teacher of doctrine and morals and into the work which the pastor should have been encouraged to habitually undertake. Upon this system, therefore, the systematic work of soul-winning must await the coming of the evangelist and must be abandoned when he took his departure.

But how changed already is the situation! There is already a return to the proper conception and the proper method of the ministerial office. Evangelism and the pastorate, joined together of God, have been reunited, and may God forbid that they should ever again be put asunder.

III. *We reach, then, the third and most important division of the subject and inquire concerning the probable outcome.*

If we have indeed returned substantially to the Scriptural method, may we not safely prophesy a large and glorious outcome? Given the right means, may we not certainly expect the proportionate blessing? Assuredly.

It is true that everything depends upon the Divine Spirit; that all effort is fruitless without His gracious operation. This, we might almost say, is more than true. It is so profoundly and emphatically true that at times it amounts to the veriest platitude.

We say it by rote; we trust to it too blindly. We often act as though everything depended upon the Divine Spirit, even to the supply of that for which we ourselves are fully responsible. We seem to expect the Saviour not only to raise the dead, but first also Himself to take away the stone that seals the sepulchre.

It is true, indeed, that Paul may plant and Apollos water, while God must give the increase; but it is equally true that Paul or

some one else must plant and plant good seed at that ; and water also, at the right time and in the right way, or God will not give the increase. There is a planting and a watering that God will not do for us : but, on the other hand, God is pledged to the increase if the previous conditions be fulfilled.

The operations of the Divine Spirit are ordinary and extraordinary. Sometimes His power is exhibited in a mighty work of grace, to all appearance independent of human effort. But He invariably works also with all those whose labors He can consistently bless. Every minister in the Church may win souls, and win them in considerable numbers, who will go about it in the right way : and to wait upon the Divine Spirit, as we sometimes do, is simply an attempt to cover our own inefficiency. " Bring ye all the tithes into the storehouse," said the Lord of Hosts by the mouth of Malachi. Income and outcome are proportionate.

So, though we may have returned substantially to the Scriptural method, there are yet certain conditions to be met before we can be sure of the outcome. Some of these are self-evident—they need not be mentioned. There are some others which may be briefly discussed.

1. If there is to be any large and gracious outcome to the present movement, it seems imperative that our pastors make such a readjustment of their usual occupations as shall give them more opportunity for the cultivation of things distinctly spiritual. This is needed in their own lives to begin with, and then in their parishes.

The ministry of to-day, particularly the city ministry, has been crowded into the condition of Martha of Bethany, " cumbered about much serving," so that it gets with Mary to the Master's feet all too seldom. If there is one sentiment above all others which we ought to lay to heart in this connection, it is that expressed in one of our most beautiful Gospel songs :

" Take time to be holy,
Speak oft with thy God."

And many of us will answer, " Alas, true ! But I am not able to take the time. My engagements are more than I can meet. I keep the vineyards of others ; my own vineyard I cannot keep." There must be some change effected in all this by some means. We ministers have had too much to do with semi-secular affairs and too many duties have been devolved upon us that ought to rest on others' shoulders. Schools, hospitals, benevolent societies, church buildings and even mission boards, not to mention political and commercial concerns—these have turned us aside

from spiritual work and culture. It is reported of the late Dr. Purves, then a pastor in Pittsburg, that on one occasion, referring to the multitude of his special engagements, he remarked humorously but pathetically, that "his pastoral cares seriously interfered with his regular business." This has been all too true. Many a pastor's regular business has been outside his pastorate.

Of course the pastor will have much to do outside his pastorate. He ought to be interested in every good work, and surely the Church at large, with its great agencies, and even the general public, has some claim upon his time. But he ought not to forget that his is a spiritual office—to use a good old English expression, "the cure of souls." When the minister is in any way led away from this, to become a mere "man of affairs," he loses caste and influence. He is not distinguished from others as he should be. The change tells upon his life, his language, his very countenance; and it is not remarked of him as the Shunammite remarked of Elisha when she said to her husband: "Behold, I perceive that this is an holy man of God that passeth by us continually."

If pastors are to do "their own evangelistic work," they must draw out of other work which does not properly belong to them. Let it be committed to pious laymen who are not charged with the spiritual responsibilities which lie upon pastors' souls—elders, deacons and others whose offices are not magnified as they should be. If the laymen, in the present reaction, are to retire from the preacher's place, let the preachers retire from the layman's place. Let them be brave enough to imitate the apostles of old who, when even the distribution of alms interfered with their more spiritual labors, relinquished it to others. Let them find some way of saying, "It is not reason that we should leave the Word of God and serve tables. Wherefore, brethren, look ye out (seven) men of honest report whom we may appoint over this business; but we will give ourselves continually to prayer and to the ministry of the Word." If pastoral evangelism is to be realized, the pastor must be in the world less and in the closet more. There must be more of the monk about him. Yes; for while monasticism developed some of the most egregious errors, it was far from wrong in its fundamental principle that the religious life is developed chiefly through private meditation and private prayer; and ministers should have—they must have—more of these. They must give themselves continually to prayer and to that ministry of God's holy Word which follows it. Here is the great lack which they must supply in order to supply the first condition. They must "take time to be holy."

2. The second condition is the cultivation of the evangelistic style of address in preaching, and of those methods that are associated with it, in order to win souls.

Was it unjust or uncharitable to remark in the opening of this article that evangelism has become with the vast majority of ministers a lost art? If it is not true, how comes it that our Assembly's Committee have been able to find so few who possess it? Sermonizing has become too discursive and rhetorical. Preaching has degenerated into the mere discussion of some sacred theme.

In order, then, to large and gracious outcome from the present movement there must be more evangelism in the pulpit. And there certainly will be if the first condition be fulfilled. If the minister takes time to be holy, the effect will appear in every sermon he delivers.

3. The third condition is personal work. There must not only be more evangelism in the pulpit, but there must be more evangelism out of the pulpit. Something like the old-fashioned pastoral visitation must be revived, but with such changes in method as shall adapt it to these times. If there is to be any large and gracious outcome from this present movement there must be house-to-house and man-to-man evangelism. Without this, what can we expect our preaching to accomplish? Shall we be evangelists only in the pulpit? In that event pastoral evangelism becomes little else than mere professionalism. Suppose every pastor in the Church were to register a solemn vow that at least once a day he would urge the claims of the Saviour upon some unrepentant soul, what would it mean in connection with pulpit evangelism and as supplementary thereto? But this is exactly what Pastoral Evangelism means, and nothing short of this—else the expression is a huge mistake, a fallacy, almost a travesty.

4. In order to complete Pastoral Evangelism and the consequent blessing the pastor must be more independent of external agencies. There must come down upon our ministry some mighty vital influence, like electricity in the physical world, to overcome the sad paralysis which Lay Evangelism has promoted. Our watchword must mean to us all that it implies: "Pastors must do their own evangelistic work." While it is manifestly true, as Dr. Chapman says, that "there is always a place for the evangelist," it is yet nothing but a reproach to us that there is so large and imperative a place for him in so many congregations. The Evangelistic Committee reported to the Assembly that it had received over 682 applications for evangelists. This may be taken as indicative of an awakened condition in the Church, and as such we rejoice in it. But it is not on that account wholly to

our credit. In a thoroughly healthy spiritual condition of the Church this would be just 682 applications too many. If any pastor finds that he cannot reach the unsaved about him, then for Christ's sake let him send for an evangelist; but the average Presbyterian pastor, with his elders and his consecrated people, ought to be able to meet any spiritual exigency—except, perhaps, for such occasional assistance as neighboring ministers might render.

Toward such a condition, then, let us labor and pray. Thank God that we have some pastors in our own beloved Church who have gone so far beyond others in their knowledge and zeal and their deep devotion to soul-winning that we may call upon them to instruct and stimulate us, arouse our churches and show us how to address ourselves to the unsaved about us. But we will thank God even more heartily when we shall have reached that condition in which the services of such, though always most welcome, shall not be always necessary. Such conditions being met in the new era of evangelism, we foresee some things which it will accomplish of utmost importance.

It will mightily increase our candidates for the ministry, a matter of special concern at the present time, because, whatever may be the various causes of decline in the number of candidates, one reason certainly is that many a pious young man has honestly believed that he could do as much, or more, good out of the ministry as in it. The only answer to this is for the present ministry to do more good—more real good—good that saves and sanctifies. Pastoral Evangelism, if it prevails, will answer the objection; soul-winning will win soul-winners also, and our halls of sacred learning will be filled again. For, after all, there is nothing that is positively and permanently attractive in the ministerial office to earnest young men whose hearts the Spirit of God has touched compared to the sure opportunity of leading their sinning and dying fellow-men to the cross of the Crucified.

Another thing that will be accomplished will be a final settlement of that stupendous fallacy which is expressed in the phrase "The Salvation of Society." The salvation of men and women, younger and older, will settle that question. There was little talk about the salvation of society until we had become lax in our salvation of individuals, and when we abandon all our wretched attempts to save men by wholesale and begin again to imitate the Saviour as He talked with a single woman by Jacob's well, and a single man who came to Him by night; when we begin again to go after the single sheep which has strayed from the fold, and to hunt for the single precious piece of money which has

been lost from the hand, there will be less talk about the salvation of society because it will be in process of accomplishment.

And much more may be in the outcome. We know not; God knoweth. Let us hope and pray that in the deepest, broadest sense the old prophecy may be fulfilled for all who minister about holy things: "He shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver: and he shall purify the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord an offering in righteousness."

PITTSBURGH.

DAVID R. BREED.

BABYLON AND ISRAEL: A COMPARISON OF THEIR LEADING IDEAS BASED UPON THEIR VOCABULARIES.*

ON the 26th of January of this year, Prof. Friedrich Delitzsch, of Berlin University, delivered an address in the Sing-Akademie of Berlin on "Babylon and the Bible," on behalf of the German Society for the Exploration of Babylonian Antiquities. At the request of the Emperor the address was delivered again in the palace of Potsdam.

It is not too much to say that it has caused a sensation in Germany. The twelfth thousand has now been published, and the number of replies and the importance of the opponents have scarcely ever been surpassed.

Before I was aware of Prof. Delitzsch's address, it had been my intention to make my opening discourse upon the light thrown upon the Old Testament by the Babylonian monuments, as a kind of review of the new edition of Schrader's *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*. This intention has been changed slightly by the reading of Prof. Delitzsch's dissertation and of the replies to it by Profs. Barth, Strack, König and Oettli-Greifswald; and I have determined to enlarge the scope of preparation by making a complete comparison of the vocabularies of the Hebrew and Babylonian and by comparing them in all important particulars with the vocabularies of the Syriac and Arabic languages. The results of this investigation I shall present to you under four heads: (1) Man and His Natural Surroundings; (2) Laws and Institutions; (3) Literature and Traditions; (4) Religious Ideas.

Before entering upon the statement of results, let me premise that there are four great groups of Semitic languages, which may be classified according to the time of their literary development; Babylonian, Hebrew, Aramaic and Arabic. Words which are of the same radicals, or of radicals which have

* This article was delivered as an address at the opening of the ninety-first session of the Presbyterian Theological Seminary at Princeton, September 18, 1902.

changed according to certain fixed rules (corresponding to Grimm's laws in Indo-European), and which in addition have the same, or a derived, or similar meaning, may be taken as having belonged to the primitive Semitic language; unless it can be shown historically or linguistically that one has taken over the root or the meaning of another. The language which varies most from the agreement found in the other three will have wandered farthest from the primitive Semitic, or will have severed connection first from the primitive family. The two languages which agree most closely will have continued the longest in the closest relations. Now, some philologists have taught that among these four groups, Babylonian and Hebrew are most closely allied in vocabulary, and some have insinuated that this close alliance implies the derivation of Hebrew ideas and vocabulary from the Babylonian.

In looking at the list of vocables used to express the same ideas in the different Semitic dialects, I was surprised to find that the current views of the relations of the different groups did not correspond with the facts. You will yourselves notice, when I come to make more detailed statements, that the Hebrew and Aramaic are much more similar in root and meaning than either is like the Babylonian, and although I have not finished my comparison with the Arabic along all the lines, it is my present conviction that the same will be found true of it—*i.e.*, that it is more closely connected with the Hebrew and Aramaic than with the Babylonian. I did not depend for this assertion on special lists of vocables. I have gone to the trouble of counting all the roots and vocables beginning with the letter *r* (one of the letters which change most infrequently in the Semitic dialects) which occur in Hebrew, Aramaic and Babylonian, up to the word רַבָּ, with the result that I find the agreements between the Hebrew and Aramaic to be fifty-six per cent., against twenty-nine per cent. between Hebrew and Babylonian.

My second premise is that the nations or races which predominate over the thought and persons of others, influence the ideas and language of the subject peoples in such a marked way as to leave no doubt of this influence in the mind of the student of language. If Babylonian influenced the Hebrew in the degree which some claim, we should expect to find that the specific Babylonian ideas, and these ideas as embodied in recognizable forms of words, have been adopted by the Hebrews. Let me illustrate and enforce this point.

If we open the Syriac chronicle of Joshua the Stylite at any part, we shall find that the vocabulary is marked by foreign words, mostly proper and official names and names of things.

These words determine for us the age of the chronicle, and also the breadth and depth and direction of the influence which was exerted upon the Edessene Syrians from without. In this book most of the proper names are Greek, Latin and Persian, as are also most of the names of government and military officials. The ecclesiastical officers have almost altogether Greek names: Greek also are the words *hostage*, *statue of the emperor*, *the military turtle*, *ark*, *granary*, *aqueduct*, *air*, *litre*, *corner*, *treasurer*, *price*, *public bath*, *basilica*, *xenodochium*, *park*, *eparchy*, *province*, *hamlet*, *paper*, *porch*, *public walk*, *lights*, *tapers*, *censers*, *candles*, *theatres*, *dancers*, *fools*, *lewd behavior*, *drinking cup*, *fight with wild beasts*, *clergy*, *stole*, *cabbage*, *mallows*, *dog's grass*, and others. Latin are *modius*, *nummus*, *dux*, *bucellatum*, *castrum*, *comes*, *legiones*, *ossa*, *pretorium* and *palatium*. Hebrew are *Hosanna*, *tebel*, *kabh*. The names of the months and perhaps some other words are Babylonian.

What is true of the chronicle of Joshua is true, also, of the Syriac Dictionary in general. Every word on page 18 of Brockelmann's Syrian Dictionary is Greek or Persian, and there is not a page of the whole dictionary which does not contain a foreign word. These words are mostly Greek and Persian, with a slight admixture of Latin, Arabic and even Sanscrit. When you look at MacLean's Dictionary of Modern Syriac, you will find that the character of the vocabulary has changed; the words are no longer predominantly Greek and Latin, but Turkish, Arabic and Kurdish. The Greek and Latin words have been largely driven out of popular usage. The whole history of the Syriac language for 1500 years thus illustrates the changes due to the dominance of foreign government and ideas.

What is true of Syriac in so great measure is true of other languages in greater or less degree. According to the late Dr. Samuel Kellogg, nine-tenths of the vocabulary of modern Persian are words of Arabic origin. Engelmann has a glossary of Spanish and Portuguese derived from the Arabic. Sanders has a German *Fremdwörterbuch* in two large volumes. The English language, while predominantly Anglo-Saxon, Latin and French, has traces of Celtic, Arabic, Spanish, Dutch, Greek, German, Hebrew and American-Indian; and, in short, of almost every language of the earth with whose people the English have been brought into contact.

Now the Hebrew, no less than other languages, was subject to this influx of new vocables under the influence of new ideas. It cannot be denied that some Hebrew words have been derived from the Egyptian. For example, כִּי, "kind," of the first

chapter of Genesis, seems to be certainly of Egyptian origin. There is no Semitic root that will account for it, and the Coptic word *μνε* has "genus," "species," as its ordinary meaning.

Again, we can scarcely believe that it is chance merely which caused the word **הֵיכֶל**, "great house, palace or temple," to be used neither in the Pentateuch, Joshua, nor Judges. We can account best for its appearance in 1 Samuel, to denote the great house at Shiloh, through the influence of the great king, Tiglath Pileser I, who lived about 1100 B.C., and pushed his conquests and his influence as far as the Mediterranean. The same may be said of the word **בָּחָה**, "governor," which first occurs in 1 Kings x. 15; and of the word **סִנָּן**, "vice-priest" or "vice-governor," which was introduced into Biblical Aramaic and later Hebrew and corresponds to the Babylonian *shaknu*, "one who takes the place of another."

After these premises, we advance to the body of our discourse, and shall proceed, in the first place, to examine the vocabulary of the four great languages, as it affects man and his surroundings. The word for body, **פֶּנֶךְ**, occurs in all but Arabic; **נֶפֶשׁ** occurs in all; **נִשְׁמָה** in all but Babylonian; **רוּחַ**, in the good sense of *spirit*, in Hebrew, Arabic and Syriac; in the sense of *spook* in Babylonian. The following are the same in all: head, hair, beard, eye, flesh, nose, ear, heart, rib, tooth, tongue, hollow of the hand, lip. Hand, foot, leg and finger are the same in Hebrew, Arabic and Syriac, but differ in Babylonian. The word for skin is the same in Babylonian, Aramaic and Arabic, but differs in Hebrew. The word for thumb, or big toe, is the same in Hebrew, Arabic and Babylonian. The word for skull is the same in Hebrew and Babylonian.

The general word for clothing oneself, **לָבַשׁ**, is the same in all four languages, and each has derivatives from this root to denote articles of clothing. But this is the only verb common to the four: the Hebrew poetical word **עָטָה** being found, besides, in Syriac only.

The word for shoe and the verb for putting on shoes are the same in all but Arabic.

There is no common word for cap, or hat, trousers, stockings or coat. The nearest to a common word is **כְּרִי**, "shirt," though the kind of garment meant in Babylonian is doubtful, and in Arabic it means "veil."

The word **בַּיִת** for house is found in all four; and with a slight variation of meaning, **מִשְׁכָּן**, "tabernacle." Every house had

an opening, פֶּתַח, with the same name in all four; but Hebrew and Babylonian alone close it with a דֶּלֶת, and *ṭ ṭ* is found in Babylonian and Arabic alone, and is probably of non-Semitic origin. There is no common word for window or carpet.

The occupations of the men were farming and herding, the names for seed and feed being the same in all four languages. The word for garden is the same in all. The river that waters the garden is the same in all but Syriac, where the word occurs but with a different meaning. Tree is the same in all but Arabic, where the corresponding word means "stick." Vegetables, or greens, are the same in all except that the Arabic refers rather to grass for beasts. There is no common word for flower. The words for wheat and onion are the same in Hebrew, Arabic and Syriac; and they have a common word for barley in Hebrew and Syriac. A common word does not occur for smith. There is a word common to the Hebrew, Babylonian and Syriac which is used for smelting gold, silver and copper, and perhaps iron; and in Arabic a derivative of the same root means pure silver, copper or lead. The words for silver and lead (or tin) are common to all; iron to all but Arabic; gold varies. All the words for baking and cooking vary, the Babylonian having the same as the Hebrew and Syriac for "bake" or "cook," in general. They all used the same word for riding upon animals; and the word for chariot is the same in Hebrew, Syriac and Arabic. In Babylonian, it is formed from the same root, but with a different preformative. There is no common word for plough or plough-share.

The domestic animals owned by the primitive Semites were cattle, for which we have the common generic word בָּקָר and also common words for ox, steer, young cow and calf. Common to all, also, are the words for mule, ass, horse, sheep, ram, goat and dog. They all knew the gazelle, hare, wolf, bear, eagle or vulture, raven and fly; but not the fox and lion by the same name, though they all had names for both. The Hebrew and Babylonian had the same word for turtle-dove and the same word for one kind of owl; the Hebrew, Babylonian and Arabic denoted two different kinds of moth by the same words.*

Looking at the actions of man, we find that they had common words for lying down and for sleeping. The word for rising is the same in Hebrew, Arabic and Syriac; the words for standing and washing are the same in Hebrew, Arabic and Babylonian; and the word for sitting is the same in Hebrew, Syriac and Babylonian.

* See further in Delitzsch, *Assyrische Thiernamen*.

In regard to the senses, we find that "to smell" is the same in Hebrew, Arabic and Syriac; "to smell bad" is the same in Hebrew and Babylonian, and with the added sense of "evil, unfortunate," is the same in all four languages. טוֹב "to smell good" and "be good," is found in all four; as is also כַּיֵּשֶׁם, "to smell good, be pleasing, smile."

There is no common word for touch or taste.

They all have the same word, שָׁמַע, "to hear."

In regard to seeing, there is the greatest possible variety. The Hebrew רָאָה is the common word in Arabic also. The Hebrew poetical word חָזָה is the ordinary word in Syriac. Neither is found in Babylonian, but in their place we have *amāru*, which in the others means "to say" or "command," and *baru*, which in Hebrew and Syriac means "create."

"To eat" is the same in all, and שָׁקָה, "to drink," while שָׁתָה is found in all but Arabic. The words for water and the word שָׁכַר, "wine" (or an equivalent from the same root), are found in all. There is no common word for saying, speaking, reading, etc. The Hebrew אָמַר, "to say," is the same in Syriac, but in Arabic means "to command," and in Babylonian, "to see." דִּבֶּר, "to speak," is in this sense peculiar to the Hebrew; in Babylonian the ordinary words are *dabābu* and *zakāru*; in Arabic, كَلَّمَ and كَلَمَ.

The word "to call" or "to read" is the same in Hebrew, Arabic and Syriac, but does not occur in Babylonian, where we have *nabu* instead. "To know" is the same in Hebrew, Syriac, Ethiopie and Babylonian, but Arabic has a different word. "To be wise" is the same in Hebrew, Arabic and Syriac; in Babylonian the word occurs but seldom, and means "to understand." "To remember" is the same in Hebrew, Arabic and Syriac, but differs in Babylonian.

Passing on from man in his physical make-up and surroundings, let us glance at the laws of the Babylonians and Hebrews, especially as they are illustrated by language. Here let me premise that many laws are the same substantially in all society, being necessary to the very constitution and existence of the same. Spencer has brought this out very clearly in his *Data of Ethics*, and the Apostle Paul endorses it in his doctrine of the law of God written in the heart.

The fact, therefore, that the Babylonians had the sixth, seventh and eighth commandments in much the same form as the Hebrews does not prove that the one nation derived these laws from the

other. Besides, the characteristic laws of the Ten Commandments are the first four and not the last six. Looking, then, at the last six commandments of the Decalogue philologically, what reason is there for supposing that the Hebrews derived these commandments from the Babylonians? None whatever, as the following facts will prove.

The nearest to a common word for "kill" in the Semitic languages is **קָטַל**. It occurs in all except the Babylonian. The only word from a root "to kill," which is the same in Babylonian and Hebrew, is *zibu*, i.e., **זָבַח** "sacrifice."* The nearest to a general word for stealing is **גָּנַב**, which occurs in all but Babylonian.† The Babylonian does not possess the Hebrew words for fornication and adultery. **זָנָה** and **נָאֵף** do not occur at all: and **זָנָה** has in Babylonian the meaning "to be angry." The Babylonian does not possess the characteristic word of the tenth commandment **חָמַד**, "to covet."

In a country where children were sold, or released from filial duties in accordance with the laws of adoption, we would not expect to find, nor do we find, the fifth commandment in its Old Testament sanctity.

As to the fourth commandment, the word *sabattu* certainly occurs in a calendar; but in this calendar not only the seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first and twenty-eighth days of the month are called *sabattu*, but also the nineteenth. Prof. Barth claims that it is doubtful whether this calendar of Sabbaths affects all the months of the years, or merely the intercalary months.‡

It is not stated in the calendar that any but the king and the physician were to keep these Sabbaths. The old opinion that this day is called in the Babylonian "a day of rest for the heart" is now generally given up; and the phrase *nûh libbi* is taken to mean "placating the heart of God." However, notice that this word occurs in Syriac and Arabic, as well as in Hebrew and Babylonian. It was, therefore, probably a primitive Semitic

* The verb from which this is derived had not been found, when Delitzsch published his Dictionary. Two examples have since come to light. They are both found in the Assurnasirpal inscription of I Raw. iii. 85 and 89. These are both doubtful examples, however, since it is necessary to give to the last sign the unusual reading *bî*, or *bē*, instead of the usual reading *bat*, in order to read *azbe*, instead of *asbat*, as was formerly universally done.

† May not the primary meaning of this root be "to remove," "to lead at the side?" See Lane's Arabic Dictionary, *in loco*, and compare the Hebrew of Job xxi. 18, xxvii. 20.

‡ My colleague, Prof. Davis, informs me, however, that he has himself examined the original of this calendar, and that there is no doubt whatever that the Sabbath days are to be found in all the months of the year. My own reading of the published documents leads me to the same conclusion.

word. Notice, further, that both the verb שָׁבַת and the noun שַׁבָּת are of frequent occurrence in Hebrew; while only two places can be cited by Delitzsch in his dictionary in which the verb occurs, and both of these in syllabaries. In one of these places it is said to be the synonym of *gamáru*, "to complete, or destroy," and it is on this single word that he bases his opinion that *shabátu* means "feiern," "to keep a festival." Now, according to Delitzsch and Meissner, *gamáru* means "vollkommen machen," "fertig sein" (*i. e.*, to make perfect, be ready); and neither in their dictionaries gives it the meaning of "feiern." In his comment on the second syllabary Delitzsch does not even suggest a meaning for the verb.*

The noun is found in the calendar above mentioned. Delitzsch says truly that here the days are characterized as those on which no work could be done: "the king shall not change his coat, nor ascend his chariot, nor sacrifice, nor speak judgment, nor eat roast or boiled meat. Moreover, the physician should not lay his hand on the sick." Notice, none but the king and physician are here specifically mentioned as bound to observe this day. Notice, secondly, that not every seventh day, but the seventh, fourteenth, nineteenth, twenty-first and twenty-eighth days of the month are to be observed. Finally, applying the test of history to this law, we find that as a matter of fact the seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first and twenty-eighth days were not observed by Babylonians as days of cessation from labor.

Prof. Lotz examined over five hundred tablets, and came to this conclusion. I have extended this line of investigation so as to cover 2554 Babylonian contract tablets, with the following results: Of all the days in the month, the twenty-first enjoys the distinction of having had the most contracts written upon it, to wit, 180, or more than seven per cent.; the fourteenth also is above the average, having eighty-eight, where the average is eighty-five. The seventh and twenty-eighth have five-eighths and six-eighths of the average due to them, one having fifty-four and the other sixty-seven. The nineteenth alone shows up as a true day of rest. Only eight out of 2554 tablets are dated the nineteenth of the month, less than one-tenth per cent. of the average. This nineteenth was a fast rather than a feast day. Although a Sabbath, it was not a day of joy like the Hebrew Sabbath, but more like the day of atonement. In conclusion, we may sum up by saying

* He states simply that there is found "ein verbum *shabátu* in mannigfacher Anwendung auch K. 4359, Obv. 20-23." According to Meissner's Supplement, we should also compare ZA. 4274 and 829-18, 4159, Col. I, 24, where "Ud mit der Aussprache u = sha-bat-tum gesetzt wird."

that there was probably a primitive Semitic day called Sabbath, which the Babylonians and the Hebrews each developed along different lines. The fact of their both having had a Sabbath corresponds with the record of Genesis. The fact of their different character shows that the one was not derived from the other, though they came from the same original institution. The first commandments are, of course, absolutely contrary to Babylonian ideas, since the religion of the Babylonians was practically, if not essentially, polytheistic and iconodulistic.

Passing over the civil laws, which, so far as known from the monuments, are largely laws of property, we shall next look at the names of governmental officials. Next to the names of articles of commerce, terms having to do with government are among the most readily transmissible from one language to another. The catalogues of the official names in Daniel and in the New Testament illustrate this fact of ready transmission, also such English names as emperor, duke, marquis, baron, chancellor, president, governor, senator, secretary, *et al.* Now what evidence is there that the Babylonians transmitted their governmental vocabulary to the Hebrews? None whatever, except the פַּחָה mentioned above. In Hebrew the supreme ruler is מֶלֶךְ, and the second in authority is the שָׂר; whereas in Babylonian exactly the reverse is the case. נְסִיךְ is the one Hebrew word for ruler which is certainly found in Babylonian.*

What is true of rulers is equally true of judges. The unusual Hebrew word **דִּין** is the only term common to Babylonian and Hebrew. Sartenu and sakkaltu are not found in Hebrew; **שָׁפַט** and **קָצַן** are not found in Babylonian.

The words for decrees and laws, also, differ almost *in toto*, and there is no linguistic evidence whatsoever, except that mentioned above, of a governmental influence exerted by the Assyrians and Babylonians over the Hebrews.

The same is true of the prophets, those men who stood so near to the rulers of Israel, the power behind the throne. It is note-

* The other Hebrew words for ruler, מַשֵּׁל, מְנַיִם, מְנַשֵּׂא, מְנַיִם, מְנַיִם, are not found in Babylonian. On the other hand, the Babylonian words for ruler—*kalu*, *kaniku*, *nagiru*, *asharidu*, *gugallu*, *guzallu*, *etillu*, *labuttu*, *shapiru*, *shapsu*, *latunu*, *lammutanu*, *lulimu*, *rabitsu*, *gisgallu* and *kepu*—are not to be met with in Hebrew. Sharish, which Delitzsch gives as the possible reading of the signs *nin-sag* in Assurnasirabal I, 92, is not accepted by Peiser in his translation in the *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*. In fact, the reading of the signs is very doubtful, as one can see by looking at the text in *W. A. I.*, Vol. I, p. 19. If, however, we read with Delitzsch, we would have here a possible equivalent of the Hebrew word סָרִישׁ, *eunuch*.

worthy that neither **נְבִיא** nor **חֹזֶה** occurs in Babylonian, although the root of the first named is found in common use. On the other hand, the Babylonian words for seer—*baru*, *sha'ilu*, *âshipu*, *âsû*, *mashmashu*, *mushshakku*, *shabru*, and *mûdê terte*—are not found in Hebrew. Beside this evidence from the language, we may place that from the historical documents recorded on the monuments. These show that the seers of Babylon neither claimed the high prerogatives nor executed the lofty functions of the mighty Hebrew prophets. The records of Babylon and Assyria fail to show a single writer, a single speaker, a single preacher of righteousness and holiness, let alone any one who can compare with an Elijah, an Amos, or an Isaiah.

But coming still more closely to the centre of the Hebrew religion, let us look at their words for priest and worship. The Hebrew knows but one word for priest, **כֹּהֵן**, and but one for a false priest, **כֹּהֵן עֶמְלִי**—according to Baudissin, a word manifestly derived from the Aramaic.

The Arabic and the Aramaic agree with the Hebrew in the use of **כֹּהֵן**, though the two former may both have derived it from the last named. But the Babylonian employs neither of these words, though it has an almost unlimited variety of hitherto unclassified terms for different kinds of priests, such as *kalu*, *shangu*, *shalu*, *pashishu*, *shaknu*, *ramku*, *shangamachchu*, *lagaru*, *nisakku*, *shukkallu*, *machchu*, *surmachchu*, *surru*, and *musharbidu*. Not one of these names is ever found, in the sense of priest at least, in Hebrew, Aramaic or Arabic.

Nor is much more evidence of connection between the religious systems of the two peoples to be derived from their names for the offerings. Prof. Jastrow, in his most interesting and learned work on the religions of Babylonia and Assyria, gives the impression that here at least the Hebrews were largely influenced by the Babylonians.* But the fact that the same things are found in two religious systems is no proof that one system has derived this particular thing from the other. For notice, first, that wherever you have sacrifice you will almost certainly have distinctions between clean and unclean animals—that is, between those which are proper for sacrifice and those which are not proper. Secondly, you will almost always find some offerings daily or continuous, and others occasional or festal. And thirdly, these sacrifices will

* The people, he says, had but little share in sacrifices, and "in this respect the cult of the Hebrews, which has so many points in common with the Babylonian ritual as to justify the hypothesis that the details of sacrificial regulations in the priestly code are largely derived from the practice in Babylonian temples, was more democratic" (see *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 668).

be made to placate the gods for forgiveness of sins, or for confer-
ence of favor. Now, these and all other general characteristics
of sacrifice, which are found alike in the Hebrew and Babylonian
systems, will not prove that one of those systems derived from the
other. If the distinctions, names, seasons and purposes of the
sacrifices were the same, the argument would be strong and con-
vincing that one had either derived from the other, or that they had
sprung from a common source. Let us consider here the evidence
of the language. זָבַח, the word for something slaughtered, occurs
in Babylonian, though the verb has not yet been certainly found.
Both noun and verb are common in Hebrew, Arabic and Ara-
maic. קָרַב, the generic word for offering in Hebrew, Arabic and
Aramaic, and its derivative, קָרְבָן, are found but seldom in
Babylonian.* The Babylonians recognized apparently a free-will
offering,† but they have no חֲטָאת, or sin offering; no אֲשָם, or
trespass offering; no נֶדֶר, or vow offering; no תּוֹדָה, or thank
offering; no תְּרוּמָה or תְּנוּפָה, heave or wave offering; no מִנְחָה,
or meal offering. Most of their sacrifices consist of libations of
oil, or water, or wine. The names of the sacrifices whose roots
are found in some form in both Hebrew and Babylonian are
עֹלָה, נֶדֶבָה and נֶסֶךְ. The names of the sacrifices in Hebrew
which are not found in Babylonian are נֶדֶר, אֲשָם, חֲטָאת, שְׁלֵם.
תְּמוֹרָה and מִנְחָה, תְּנוּפָה, תְּרוּמָה, תּוֹדָה. The names of sacrifices
found in Babylonian and not in Hebrew are pirkêti, kutrinnu,
ginû, niķu, sarku, mashshakku, sattukku and taklimu.

Their religious festivals, also, differed in name and, so far as
we know, in design. There is no חֲגֻג, or pilgrim festival, among
the Babylonians, a word and a thing so familiar to the Hebrews
and the Arabs. There is no evidence of a feast of tabernacles,
nor of a day of atonement. It has lately been asserted, it is true,
that the word *pashâchu*, corresponding to the Hebrew פֶּסַח, has
been found in Babylonian as the name of a feast. To this I would
answer, (1) that the meaning of *pashâhu* does not suit any of the
meanings commonly attributed in the dictionaries and versions to
the Hebrew root פֶּסַח; (2) the transliteration of the Samekh in
Syriac and Arabic by Tsodhe would lead us to expect a similar letter

* Kurbannu, from כָּרַב, "to be gracious," is met with in a sacrificial sense. Delitzsch in his dictionary gives no example of the religious usage of קָרַב; but Meissner in his "Supplement" gives two examples. One is from K. 168, Rs. 16, and reads *ina pân parakki ginû lukarrib*, "let him bring the offering before the adytum." The other is from Craig's *Religious Texts* and is used in connection with *zibi*, "sacrifices."

† They called this offering *nidbu*, or *nindabu*. It will be noted that both of these forms differ from the Hebrew, though the root is the same.

in Babylonian, unless, as is possible, both the Syriac and Arabic words are derived directly by borrowing from either the Hebrew or Greek.* Thirdly, even granting that *pashachu* is the name of a feast and that the פֶּסַח was originally the same, what does it prove? Simply that a feast, so called, was in existence before the Hebrews went out from Ur of the Chaldees. Or, perhaps, that the feast, the פֶּסַח, which they asked permission of Pharaoh to celebrate in the wilderness to Jehovah was a פֶּסַח. But it does not disprove that the festival of the Passover, as it was instituted by Moses and celebrated in later times, was in view of and in commemoration of the passing over of the angel of death and the salvation of the Israelites in Egypt. The *Pascha* of the Syrians and of the Arab Christians is in memory of the death of Jesus, not of the delivery of the Jews from Egypt. Its purpose is different. Its observances are different. And there is no more reason why Moses should not have changed the observance and purpose of an old festival of the primitive Semites while keeping the name, than there is for the Lord's not having changed the name of the Jewish Passover while changing its purpose and observance.

But I must pass on from the festivals, from the laws and institutions, and omitting the discussion of the literature and traditions of the Hebrews, we come next to the religious ideas *par excellence*.†

* You could scarcely find a more difficult root for which to determine the comparative Semitic equivalent than the Babylonian *pashâchu*. For Babylonian *sh* may correspond to Hebrew Samekh, Sin or Shin. The Hebrew Samekh may correspond to Arabic Sin, Shin or Sad; Hebrew Sin, to Arabic Sin or Shin; and Hebrew Shin, to Arabic Sin, Shin or Tha. Further, the Babylonian rough breathing represents four signs in Arabic; so that there might be sixteen different roots in Arabic, any one of which might correspond to the Babylonian *pashâchu*. As a matter of fact, ten roots are found in Arabic, any one of which might correspond to the Babylonian, but no one of which has a proper meaning. In like manner the Hebrew has four roots, aside from homonyms; but no one of these has a meaning equivalent to that of the verb *pashachu*, "to recuperate, or heal." Neither of the three Syriac roots which would phonetically correspond to the Babylonian *pashachu* has a corresponding meaning. The Syriac ܦܫܚ "to be glad" cannot be phonetically connected with it, and besides the meaning is not the same. As far as I can make out, after examining all the words in the dictionaries the Syriac Tsodhe nowhere else represents a Babylonian *sh*. It is true that in this particular case, the Syriac Todhe stands for a Hebrew Samekh. Only once elsewhere does this occur, to wit, in the Hebrew ܦܫܚ, "divination." Here, it is probable that one of the two languages took over the word from the other, since it is not found in either Babylonian or Arabic. As for ܦܫܚ in Syriac, the same may have been the case; or, more probably, the Syrians have derived the word from the Greek πᾶσχα. There are four other words in Brockelmann's Syriac Dictionary derived from the Greek in which Sigma is transliterated by Tsodhe.

† Let me merely remark in passing, that Prof. Delitzsch's remarks on *Tiamat* do not commend themselves as philologically just. The root which will best account

On the doctrines of God, sin, grace, pardon, salvation, faith, the Messiah, the kingdom, what evidence is there that the Babylonians influenced the Hebrews? What does philology teach us? Of the Hebrew words for sin, none but the word חטא is found in Babylonian; and this is a primitive Semitic root. All the other Hebrew words for sin are absent from the Babylonian.* And on the other hand, all the other Babylonian words are absent from the Hebrew.† Of the words for grace, חנן and רחם are found in all four languages, but neither חסר nor רצון occurs even in root in Babylonian.‡

Of the words for pardon, only one occurs in a moral sense in Babylonian.§

for יהוה is found in Hebrew only. The verb יהוה can scarcely be a denominative verb, for that would most probably have the form יהוה. Besides, the form יהוה would be the ordinary Semitic form *taf'âl* or *tif'âl*.

* That is, נלוה, תהלה, זכה, פשע, רשע, עון.

† To wit, annu, arnu, egu, shertu.

‡ The latter is found with slight variations of form and meaning in both Syriac and Arabic. The former root means "to envy" in Arabic, and "to revile" in Syriac. According to Brockelmann, the noun חקדא in Syriac means not merely "ignominia," but "clementia."

§ These words are רבא and כבך, קלח, נשא, כפר, כרה. All of these, except the last, occur in Babylonian, but not in a moral sense except כפר. The examples given in Zimmern's *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Babylonischen Religion*, page 92, leave no room for doubt that this last verb is found in the Babylonian in the sense of atone. On account of the importance of this question, I shall translate a part of his evidence. "*Kuppuru* shows itself in all the places in which it occurs as a technical expression for specific action, which the *asipu* (i.e., the inchanter, or priest) performs on persons, as, for example, on the king and on the sick, and on lifeless objects, such as a house. The original meaning of *kupûru* seems to be 'to wash away,' which lies, also, at the basis of the Syriac כפר. Compare the legend of Ereskigal, line 82, Rev. 20: *dimtasa ikappar*, 'he wipes away their tears.' From this it comes to mean in the Piel, 'to blot out,' and as a special expression of the expiatory ritual, 'to expiate, to atone for' (sühnen). There can be no doubt that this *kuppuru* of the Babylonian expiatory ritual is the same as the כפר of the Old Testament, as a technical designation in the language of the priests for 'to atone for.' The best example of this use that Zimmern gives is to be found in No. 26, col. II, lines 1-3, of his *Beiträge*. Zimmern transliterates as follows: (1) urizu tanakkis-ma sarra tu-kap-par arki-su (2) tak-pi-ra-a-ti eb-bi-e-ti sarra tu-dap-par (3) kima tak-pi-ra-a-ti tuq-te-it-tu-u ana hâhi tu-se-sa. This means: "A lamb shalt thou slaughter to atone for the king. Then shalt thou atone for the king with pure offerings. When thou hast finished the offerings, bring them out at the door." To these facts Zimmerer adds the following conjectures: "From factual grounds (aus sachlichen Gründen), it is scarcely thinkable that this same technical designation among the Babylonians and Hebrews rests upon an original relationship. Rather are we necessitated to accept here, also, a borrowing of the word on the part of the Hebrews, especially in its specific technical meaning. But such linguistic borrowing points further to a factual influencing." Prof. Zimmern claims further, in a note, that the Syriac derives the use of the word in the sense of atone either from the Hebrew or directly from the Babylonian; and that the Arabic, in

The great word that clears the guilty, **צָרַק**, is found in Babylonian only in one proper name and once in the Tel-el-Amarua letters.

The verb **קָרַשׁ** is found in Delitzsch only once, and its meaning is not defined. Two derivatives occur in the sense of *hierodoule*. The adjective *ḵuddushu* is found several times in the sense of *pure*. According to Meissner, the verb occurs once in the sense of purify.*

The word "saviour," so precious to us in its English form of Jesus, never presents itself on the monuments; nor does **מָשַׁח**, "to anoint," nor its derivative, **מְשִׁיחַ**. Nor does the doctrine of salvation through a redeemer, nor of an anointed servant of God, appear on the tablets of Babylon. Nor is there any such thing as predictive prophecy, as distinguished from fortune-telling or soothsaying, nor a doctrine of the kingdom of God.

Not one of the usual Hebrew words for faith occurs in Babylonian, except **חָסָה**, "to flee for refuge," once or twice in its literal sense. In Babylonian the common words for "to trust" are *rahāṣu* and *takālu*, the latter occurring frequently in the noun form *tukultu*, "trust, reliance."†

like manner, derives from the Syriac. In another note, he affirms that **כַּפַּר** and *kuppuru* may also be formally connected, since in **כָּרַת** and **תָּוַךְ** also the form speaks in favor of borrowing. One might be excused for asking how Dr. Zimmern can prove this latter statement. Are **כָּרַת** and **שָׁכַת** also derived from the Babylonian? Is not **תָּוַךְ** of the same form as **תָּוַךְ**? And is there not a sufficiently large number of nouns with prefixed Tau in Hebrew to justify the supposition, that these may be a residuum from primitive Semitic, without compelling us to the conclusion that they must have been taken over in form or in meaning, or in both, from the Babylonian? Further, the use of the Hebrew **כָּרַת**, "to cut" in connection with **כָּרַת**, in conjunction with the facts with reference to the blood covenant, as narrated by Dr. Henry Clay Trumbull and Henry M. Stanley, would lead us to believe rather that **כָּרַת** was derived from, or connected with, **כָּרַח** "to cut" than from *baru* "to see." Again, one would like to know what documentary evidence there is in proof of these various assertions as to derivation in the case of *kapāru*? Why could the need and the fact of atonement not have been a primitive idea among the Semites? It may be remarked, that in all the examples of the use of *kuppuru* given in the *Beiträge*, the verb governs the object, even when a person, in the accusative; whereas in Hebrew, the person for whom the atonement is made is always preceded by a preposition.

* To wit, in Nab. Bez., Col. I, 32: *tebibtishu nkaddishma*, seinen Glanz reinigte ich. It is found also in line 77 of the second *Shurpu* inscription published in Zimmern's *Beiträge*.

† In the four languages, the words for believe and trust may be thus arranged :

Hebrew.....	אָמֵן	[חָקַה, בָּטַח]	
Assyrian.....			תָּכַל, רָחַן
Syriac.....	יִתְבֵּן	[כָּבַר, אֲשַׁתַּר]	תָּכַל
Biblical Aramaic.....	יִתְבֵּן		רָחַן
Arabic.....	אָמֵן	[يَعْبُد, عَقَد]	הָכַל

When we come to the doctrine of God, we find that the two systems of religion and the two vocabularies are at antipodes. Elohim, which in its singular form is the usual word for God in Syriac and Arabic, does not occur in Babylonian. The word *ilu*, the word for god in Babylonian, is used comparatively seldom by the Hebrew writers, and then “usually poetically, or with attributives, or of heathen gods.” It never is found in Syriac or Arabic, except when borrowed from the Hebrew, either directly or indirectly. An attempt has been made by Prof. Delitzsch to show that the Hebrews derived their specific name for God, *i.e.*, Jehovah, from the Babylonians. The proof is this: On three tablets in the British Museum, dated in the time of Hammurabi, Prof. Delitzsch reads the name of Ja-ah-ve-ilu, or Ja-hu-um-ilu; that is, as he renders it, “Jehovah is God.” Prof. Barth, in a reply to Delitzsch, assails this interpretation, affirming that the name is connected rather with a name for God made known by some of the old Phenician monuments. He would transliterate by Heth instead of He, and translate “Jachu is God,” or “May God give life.”* We think that Prof. Delitzsch is more likely correct here, because the Assyrians and Babylonians nearly always, if not always, transliterate the Heth of Hebrew proper names by the

It will be seen from this table, that the only derivations suggested by the words are of the Aramaic and Arabic אָמֵן from the Hebrew; of רָחַץ from the Babylonian; and possibly of תָּכַל also, from the Babylonian. The only place that רָחַץ occurs in Biblical Aramaic is in Daniel in an edict of Nebuchadnezzar. The word does not occur in this sense in Biblical Hebrew, and as the root is not found in Syriac, it might be claimed with plausibility that the Aramaic had taken over the word from the Babylonian. If the תָּכַל of Psalm cxix. 95 be taken from תָּכַל instead of כָּלָה, we would find the root תָּכַל in all four languages; but according to the usual derivation of the word, there is no common word for faith or trust.

* It is true that this sign which Delitzsch takes to have been the equivalent of the Hebrew He may also represent the Hebrew Heth. For example, חָבֵשׁ, חָבֵר, חָנַךְ (in all of which the Heth stands for the smooth Heth in Arabic) are in Babylonian *abāru*, *abāshu*, *agāru*; and חָלָף, חָלָץ are *abāku*, *alāku*. But the Babylonian rough-breathing sign may also stand for that Heth which represents the smooth Heth in Arabic, *e.g.*, in חָבֵס and חָרַס. Furthermore, in proper names which are transliterated into Assyrian and Babylonian out of the Hebrew, ה is either not represented at all, or is represented by the sign which occurs here, *e.g.*, יְהוֹאִי is Ja-u-a, יְהוֹדָה is Ja-u-da-ai; whereas Heth is almost everywhere transliterated by the rough sign in Assyrian and Babylonian. For example, in חֲזָהָל, חֲזָקָה, חֲנִינָה, חֲתָנָה, חֲזָקִי, חֲזָקִי, the Heth is transliterated by the rough-breathing sign; although in all of these the Heth stands for the smooth Heth in Arabic. All of these examples go to show that if חֵה were transliterated into Assyrian or Babylonian, the Heth would be represented by the rough sign, whereas in חֵה the first He would be represented by the smooth sign, or by nothing. All of which goes to prove Prof. Delitzsch's contention as against Prof. Barth.

sign of the rough-breathing, and the He by the smooth-breathing sign, which is found here. But notice that whether Prof. Delitzsch or Prof. Barth be correct, it was the Babylonian which derived from the Hebrew and not the Hebrew from the Babylonian. For the Babylonian has neither the verb *הָיָה*, "to be," nor the verb *חָיָה*, "to live," nor any derivative of either. Their word "to live" is *balātu*, which we have preserved in our English Bibles in the proper name Merodach-Baladan. Their words for "to be" are *nabû* and *zakâru*, with the noun *shuma*, and *ishû* and *bashû*.* So that if we take Delitzsch's interpretation of the signs as correct, we have the Hebrew name for God, Jehovah, existing in the time of Abraham. This would agree with the history of Abraham as recorded in Genesis, but would overthrow the long-held theory that the name Jehovah was first revealed to Moses at the burning bush. If the common interpretation of Ex. iii. 15, 16, and vi. 3 be given up, what might not happen to the divisive theories of the Pentateuch?

Let me call your attention, before I close, to a very important consideration in estimating the influence of ancient Babylon upon the children of Israel. The fact that the stories of the creation and the flood, the existence of angels and of a Sabbath, the use of sacrifices and of the name Jehovah, are found on the monuments to characterize the age of Abraham, does not invalidate the Scriptures, but rather confirms them. The remarkable thing is that we find so many of the names and institutions of Genesis and so few of Exodus and Leviticus. As you recall the testimony that I have presented to you, could you have possibly expected stronger confirmation of the close pre-Mosaic relations of Babylon and Israel and of the later confirmed and continuous estrangement and hostility between the two?

You will notice, too, that I have not shirked the difficult questions that have been raised concerning the relations existing between the ancient Hebrews and the Babylonians. I have collected a vast mass of further materials along every line of thought and action, which were known to the ancient Hebrews and Babylonians, so far as they have been gathered into their respective dictionaries. These I have in large measure classified, but time would forbid to mention more at this time. Nor do I deem it necessary, for I presume that it would not change your judgment on the merits of the case.

Before closing I cannot refrain from calling the attention of this audience to that long line of opposition between the religions and

*The Arabic and Syriac have the same word as the Hebrew for "to live," and the Syriac, but not the Arabic, for "to be."

the policy of the Hebrews and Babylonians, which extends from the time when Abraham was called out of Ur of the Chaldees, to leave his country and his kindred, until in the Apocalypse and the later Jewish literature Babylon became the height and front of the offending against the kingdom of the God of Israel. All through that extended and extensive literature of the ancient Hebrews, all through those long annals of the Assyrians and Babylonians, wherever the Hebrews and the Assyrio-Babylonians were brought into contact, it was by way of opposition. The only exceptions were in the cases of some weakling, Jehovah-distrusting kings. But with these exceptions, prophets and kings and poets emphasize and reiterate the antagonism, essential and eternal, existing between the worship of Jehovah and the worship of the idols of Babylon. And when the children of Israel had been carried away to the rich plains of Babylon, so beautiful, so vast, was it as a Greek patriot to the Athens of his dreams, or a Scotsman to his "ain countrie?" Not thus. But they wept when "they remembered Zion." "How shall we sing the Lord's songs in a strange land?" Not thus does the Catholic pilgrim sing when he treads the streets of papal Rome and stands in awe beneath the dome of St. Peter's. Not thus does the Arab Hadji pray when he bows within the sacred precincts of the Kaaba. But thus has every Jew throughout the ages, the record of whose thoughts and feelings has been preserved to us; and thus does every child of Abraham, according to the promise, feel—that not to Babylon, the golden city, the mother of science and arts and commerce and of idolatry and harlotries and sorceries, do we look for the springs of our religion and the hope of our salvation, but to Jerusalem, the golden, the city of the great King.

PRINCETON.

ROBERT DICK WILSON.

VI.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE COLLEGE.

I.

From the School of Tyrannus to the Present.

IN the record of the Acts of the Apostles we are told concerning the labors of Paul at Ephesus, that "when divers were hardened, and believed not, but spake evil of that way before the multitude, he departed from them, and separated the disciples, disputing" (new version, *reasoning*) "daily in the school of one Tyrannus, and this continued by the space of two years; so that all they that dwelt in Asia heard the word of the Lord Jesus, both Jews and Greeks." This is the first instance, so far as we know, of the coming of Christianity into close relations with a higher institution of learning. On its face the record seems clearly to indicate that at Ephesus there was a man by the name of Tyrannus, who kept one of those schools for rhetoric or philosophy, or both, which were then common wherever there was a considerable Grecian population. This man had a room, or it may be a building, suitable for his work, and consequently adapted for Paul's teaching and preaching. The fact that Tyrannus allowed his schoolroom to be used for two years by the apostle, affords considerable warrant for the belief that he was himself a Christian. At any rate, here for so long a time Paul carried on his work, not exclusively among the students, but we may be confident, not without reaching a considerable number of them.

At once the vista of the continuation of this relation between Christianity and the College, during the eighteen hundred and fifty years which have since elapsed, rises before us. We think, for instance, of the famous Catechetical School of Alexandria, with such men as Origen at its head, where the whole of science then known to the Western world was taught and where all of Grecian culture was cherished; and yet so as to make the entire instruction subservient to Christianity. Later by some centuries, as we take our bird's-eye view, we recognize the cloister Schools at Yarrow and at Wearmouth and at York, in England. In the

eighth century, the Emperor Charlemagne opens his Palace School at Aachen, calls Alcuin over from York to be its Principal; and so starts the stream which by and by widens out into the Universities of the Middle Ages. The Capitulary of Charles, which is regarded as the first general charter of education, opens with these memorable words:—"Charles, by the grace of God, King of the Franks and of the Lombards, and Patrician of the Romans, to Bangwulf, abbot, and to his whole congregation and the faithful committed to his charge: Be it known to your devotion, pleasing to God, that in conjunction with our faithful, we have judged it to be of utility, that in the bishoprics and monasteries committed by Christ's favor to our charge, care should be taken that there shall not only be a regular manner of life and one conformable to holy religion, but also to the study of letters, each to teach and learn them according to his ability and the divine assistance." Charles is one of the few men to whom history has permanently awarded the name of Great, and for nothing does he deserve it more than for his attitude toward Christian education, and the agencies which he instituted to promote it.

Next we cross the gloomy expanse of the Dark Ages, during which the chief seats of learning were among the Moslems, at Bagdad, Bosra, Kufa, at Cordova and Granada. In the Christian world, so much of education as survived in spite of the irruption of the northern barbarians and the general dissolution of society, was found in the monasteries and about the churches. At length, still under the leadership of Christianity, such as it then was, the European Universities—Paris, and Bologna, and Oxford—emerge and draw to themselves a vast host of miscellaneous pupils. Scholasticism was their prevailing atmosphere; and scholasticism was essentially an attempt to marry Aristotle and the religion of Christ. The great teachers, Albertus Magnus, and Roger Bacon, and Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventura, were ecclesiastics. In fact, the students themselves were regarded as so far of the church officials that they had many of the exceptional privileges of the clergy. All intelligent people know something of the closeness with which the leading Reformers were identified with the Universities—Wickliff with Oxford; Huss and Jerome with Prague; and Luther and Melancthon with Wittenberg.

As we hurry on we come in sight of our own times and of our own land. Harvard originated in the gift of a Nonconformist clergyman, whose name it still bears. It was at the instance of James Blair, the ecclesiastical head of the Province of Virginia, that William and Mary College was founded. Bancroft tell us that "Yale owes its birth to ten worthy fathers" (clergymen),

“ who in 1700 assembled at Branford, and each one laying a few volumes on the table, said ‘ I give these books for the founding of a college in this colony.’ ” In like manner all the older of the higher institutions of learning in this country were called into being by the Church or its representatives. To-day, according to the census of 1900, there are 480 of such schools; and of these not one in a score had its origin otherwise than with men and women who avowedly were seeking in this way to promote Christianity in alliance with learning. They in an overwhelming majority of cases were born of Christianity, and of the Church, not indirectly, but directly. Nor should we forget, in this age of Missions, that wherever the Gospel goes, just so soon as it gets a foothold its representatives plant a college—Robert at Constantinople, Beirut in Syria, Assiout in Egypt, and so, all round the world. Is there any other agency besides Christianity doing a similar work, in lands that are not evangelized, and that are not under some sort of Western suzerainty? All this is so familiar to Christian people that it seems superfluous to tell it. Yet when so much is said in certain quarters in an *ex parte* attempt to make it appear that Christianity, and its clergy especially, have stood in the way of higher learning, and particularly of science, and when it is so warmly urged in some quarters that we ought entirely to divorce Christianity from any close connection with colleges considered as to their organization, it is worth while to open the pages of history and thus to recall to mind this great story of the two as they hand in hand have marched together down through all the Christian centuries.

II.

What the College has been to Christianity.

This rapid glance at the history is enough to show that the college is the child of Christianity. But it also reveals the immense helps which such institutions have been to Christianity. The man who in apostolic days did most to spread the Gospel, and to organize the churches, and to develop the doctrines of the Gospel was the gift of an institution of learning in which, not the New Testament, but its forerunner, the Old Testament, had the place of preëminence in the curriculum. At the feet of Gamaliel Paul was educated, and after what the spirit of God did for him, by that school chiefly he was prepared for his great mission. It was at Oxford and at Prague and at Wittenberg that the Reformation had its beginning, or its centres of influence. Down at the haystack near Williams College, the American Board of Commis-

sioners for Foreign Missions, which has done so much to evangelize the dark places of the earth, had its origin. What would the Church of England have been without Oxford and Cambridge; or the Churches of Scotland without the Universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow and St. Andrews; or the Presbyterian Churches of the United States without Princeton, and Washington and Jefferson, and other colleges standing in the like relations to those bodies? The Catalogue of Princeton Theological Seminary for the year 1901-2 shows a total enrollment of 137. Of these not more than ten came from other than colleges in which Christianity is in open and avowed alliance with the institutions. At McCormick Theological Seminary the enrollment was 112; and of these all but six came from distinctively Christian colleges. The same proportions are maintained in all the theological schools of all the evangelical Churches of this country. The small college over which the writer has presided now for almost a quarter of a century has to-day in the theological seminaries of the Presbyterian Church almost as many students as the total in these Seminaries from institutions that are not distinctly Christian, and this has been true for all the time of his presidency, and long before.

This reveals the source from which the ministry continues to be supplied. It would be a serious mistake and a great pity for any one to infer from such facts that our Christian colleges are to be regarded chiefly as training schools for the ministry. Not a few of them were founded with more or less special regard to this part of their work. To help to supply the churches with ministers who are competent for this noble service always ought to be kept conspicuously in mind in the management of them. If in the struggle for existence and the competition for students it has been somewhat obscured, may not this account in part for the measure of indifference with which so many of the churches seem to regard their own institutions? At the same time there never was a period in the history of any one of them when it is likely that a majority of the students thought of entering the ministry. These colleges have done just as much for raising up laymen who have been at once broad-minded, intelligent, and thoroughly disciplined, and also earnest followers of Christ and efficient laborers for Him. Even on missionary soil the Christian college is planted, not merely to provide men who are native there and equipped to carry the Gospel to their own people, but also to furnish leaders in every important walk of life, who will stand for what is good and true and pure, according to the teachings of the Scriptures. We establish Robert College on the Bosphorus, and free Bulgaria

emerges from the débris left by the oppression of the unspeakable Turk. We establish Beirut College in Syria, and its uplifting power is felt wherever the Arabic language is understood, far away in the remote parts of Africa, as well as in Western Asia.

It is a notable fact that in Christian countries, there are almost or altogether no positively anti-Christian higher institutions of learning. But as to the manner in which the religion of the Gospel is treated in them there is a very wide diversity. In this country, as to this, we may place at one extreme those institutions which are held to sustain such relation to the State that all very distinctive Christian teaching or worship must be regarded as outside their province. The utmost they can do, we sometimes are told, is to tolerate and encourage such instruction and worship when volunteered under proper conditions. We have no warrant for classing these schools as of necessity "godless" or anti-Christian, or even wholly unchristian. As to their religious condition, they differ widely from each other, and especially according to the temper of the men who have most immediately to do with their management. Perhaps it would not be unjust or uncharitable to say broadly of them as a class that as to an adequate recognition of Christianity they are seriously defective. It is impossible under such conditions for them to do for the religious side of the lives of their students all that is desirable or that would be practicable under better conditions. At the other extreme, we may recognize the class of institutions in which there is a required attendance at worship, and upon distinctively Christian teaching; and between these two extremes lie several gradations.

The question of denominational control, direct or indirect, is not of so much importance in the discussion of this subject that it needs to be considered at any great length. Whether a particular college is best under control of some body of Christian people organized as a church depends on circumstances. Certainly many of those which have done noble service for higher education and for Christianity would never have been born, and could not have survived, if behind them had not been the support of a denomination of Christians. Most of the flings which have been too current in certain quarters concerning "sectarian" colleges are unwarranted. A sectarian college would seem to mean one in which the machinery is used to propagate the distinctive tenets of some minor division of the Christian Church. Something of this sort may be true of certain Roman Catholic institutions, and possibly of one here and there that flies the flag of Protestantism. These, however, are the exceptions, and rare as such. As a rule, in these colleges it would be difficult to ascertain from their con-

duct whether they are most nearly allied to Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, or Methodists. To meet with an almost ideal of practical broad-minded but orthodox Christianity one needs only to take his place in one of these denominational colleges. Equally baseless is the fiction, so frequently assumed as if it were an unquestioned fact, that colleges of this type in the selection of their teaching corps make denominationalism the first consideration, and competency for the work to be done secondary to this. To select a man for the Chair of Latin, or of Chemistry, or any other of the ordinary branches of a college curriculum, first of all because he is a Presbyterian would be both absurd and monstrously wrong. But if anything of this sort occurs it is a secret that remains to be revealed. Who can produce a case? As to competence, the Faculties of the better of the institutions of this country that may fairly be regarded as controlled by a particular denomination may well be willing for comparison of themselves alongside of any others that may be brought forward. So long as this remains true, the fact that in a Presbyterian college a Presbyterian scholar, who is fit for the place of a professor, is likely to have the preference over another who does not seem to be better equipped and who lacks this peculiarity, does not amount to a matter to be insisted upon as a serious defect. Indeed, it will be discovered that in the selection of professors in colleges that are the least Christian, the choice between men who are in a general way equally qualified often turns ultimately on considerations of minor importance, to which it would be just as fair to raise objections. That the denominational control of colleges is wholly without drawbacks is a position that cannot be sustained. Most of these are parallel to those which lie against the separation of Protestants into branches. But such control, with whatever defects it may be attended, is immensely to be preferred to the entire withdrawal of colleges from positive Christian influence; and so long as it is maintained with as wholesome results as have so long been produced, we may well be content to have it continued.

III.

The Atmosphere of a Christian College.

As to Christianity in a college, the most important thing is the prevalence of a certain atmosphere. To create and perpetuate this there must be agencies. These, however, except as to a few general influences, need not be the same in all cases. The vital thing is not whether attendance at chapel or at church shall be compulsory or voluntary, or whether some form of doctrine shall

be a text-book in the required curriculum. Matters of that sort should be left to each institution to determine for itself in view of its own conditions. Concerning the means, the thing of chief importance is for it to be practically recognized that some agencies that are suitable and adequate are indispensable. A college cannot otherwise have the right atmosphere.

Before we proceed to consider the agencies, let us ask what are some of the chief characteristics of this atmosphere? Whatever may be its constituent elements, it can exist only in connection with an intelligent acquaintance with the facts and principles set forth in the Scriptures. Consequently if students come up to college in ignorance of these, as unfortunately they often do, and as they themselves frequently acknowledge, then it is vital that they in some suitable way be instructed. This might be urged as a necessity from a lower point of view—that of a liberal education. To hold that a liberal education involves a good acquaintance with English literature, but not with the Bible, is an absurdity. But let this necessity here be pressed for the higher reason that the religion of the Gospel rests immediately on the teaching of the Scriptures, and that it cannot flourish anywhere except in connection with an adequate acquaintance with them. This is a postulate that can be assumed. Further, there must be, in order to a right religious atmosphere, a strong prevailing conviction on the part of Faculty and students that religion, as set forth in the Gospel, is of more importance than anything else in life—in other words, that it ought to have the first and chief place in our thoughts, feelings and efforts—far above scholarship, or success in any mere worldly undertaking either then or in after years. Along with this ought to go a conviction equally strong and all-pervading, that the highest type of man is the genuine and well-developed Christian—that is, that the more nearly we are like Christ, the more closely we approach the perfection of our being: that Christianity in its unrestrained working in a human life means manliness and womanliness of the best and fullest type. In such an atmosphere there must also be the conviction that Christian service is the noblest work to which one can aspire; that to labor for the salvation of men here and hereafter and for the promotion of the moral and spiritual good of others, according to the principles inculcated in the Scriptures, not forgetting to minister to their lower needs in the temper of Christ—that to do this, either in the ranks of the ministry or as consecrated laymen, along with whatever occupation one follows, is something in elevation out of sight of comparison with money-getting or political place and power, or distinction won by the advancement of science or art or learning even of the highest sort.

This is not offered as an exhaustive description even of the leading elements that must be present in the atmosphere of a college where Christianity has its rightful place, yet they are a part at least of what is indispensable. Along with these there are some matters of secondary importance to which we ought not to close our eyes. One is that we are living at a period when almost every feature of the Gospel is under discussion, not excepting the origin and authority of the Scriptures; and even whether we can be sure there is a God, and if there is, whether He can be known by us. It is an age of religious questioning. Nor is it possible that this spirit of the times should not find its way into our higher institutions of learning. The undergraduate feels its influence profoundly, although as a rule he may not be competent to enter into the merits of most of its discussions. Under these circumstances it is of vital importance that the prevailing temper of those who instruct these young minds should be such as to win, and keep the confidence of their pupils, and to be able wisely to guide them through the bewilderment with which they are threatened, into sure and safe convictions. There is, therefore, need of a spirit of open-mindedness, that concedes that there is such a thing as a progress in the unfolding from age to age of Christian truth, and that to refuse to listen to the evidences of such advance is contrary to our duty, according to the specific command of Scripture, to prove all things and to hold fast to that which is good. Along with this ought to be a spirit of sanity that does not occupy itself with every new surmise put forth by some pretentious theorist concerning the Bible or theology, and thus lift into prominence that which otherwise would speedily die and be forgotten. Sound-mindedness is just as important as open-mindedness in dealing with these matters.

One other thing at present, because of existing conditions, is of the utmost importance in a college on the part of those who are set over the students as instructors. This is that the men and the women of the Faculties be themselves anchored and substantially at rest as to the great leading facts and principles of the Gospel. We must not take the position that when a professor in a college is confronted with one of the new religious problems of which our age is so prolific, if he cannot at once see his way to the right decision he is disqualified thereby for his general work. This would be in effect to deny the right of investigation, and to stultify the claim to open-mindedness. But he does owe it to himself and to those over whom he exercises so potent an influence to drift temporarily as little as possible, and if, as to vital truths of the Gospel, in due time he cannot again reach waters

where he can anchor along with his brethren, then to find a place and a work outside of a professedly Christian college. This is not the verdict of bigotry; it is only what honesty requires. Fidelity to the body of students demands it; for one instructor, especially if he be a man of ability, who is adrift or worse as to the essentials of Christianity, can do a world of harm by his example, though he scrupulously avoid speech on the subject.

IV.

Some Important Agencies.

Such an atmosphere makes a Christian college, and nothing else is sufficient to do it. Yet this atmosphere does not arise by spontaneous generation. Among others, three great agencies are essential to its production. First and foremost must be the kind of men who are at the head of the respective colleges. Dr. McCosh, in his autobiography, tells at considerable length of his religious work at Princeton, and comprehends the attitude of himself and of the college in these two sentences: "From the beginning Princeton has been a religious college, professedly and really." "We are not ashamed, neither professors nor students, of the Gospel of Jesus Christ." His leadership had much to do with the religious awakenings that occurred under his administration, and with the healthy religious atmosphere that generally prevailed in the institution. Mark Hopkins, no doubt, was a great teacher in the classroom and a wise administrator of college affairs, but he was at his greatest in the pulpit of Williams College on the Sabbath, and especially in his baccalaureates, in which, as his biographer tells us, "he seemed to gather up and concentrate his greatness, and to become an incarnation of the highest ideal of a wise teacher." To these men the religious atmosphere of their respective colleges owed as much as to any other human source.

We are sometimes told that in this twentieth century we have entered upon a period when conditions are so changed that such men as McCosh and Hopkins are no longer best suited for the presidency of our colleges; that these officials ought first of all to be men of business, and familiar with the world of affairs. Let us concede the importance of such qualifications, though at the same time it is yet to be seen that either McCosh or Hopkins were lacking on that side of their characters. Let us concede, too, that it is not indispensable that a college that is thoroughly Christian should have a minister of the Gospel at its head. Still this does not signify that because a man is a clergyman he is thereby in the least disqualified for the office. Whether minister

or layman, it is indispensable to the existence of a right religious atmosphere that the presidents of our colleges be themselves living epistles of the truth as it is in Christ, known and read of every student who comes into contact with them. The same ought to hold good of all who are associated with them in the Faculties.

As to the agencies, next to this in importance may be placed the tone of the ordinary teaching, so far as it can legitimately have a bearing on religion. No instructor should go out of his way to lug in by the ears even the things of the Gospel without regard to propriety. Yet any teacher whose soul is saturated with vital Christianity will find suitable opportunities from day to day, without the slightest deviation from the appropriate work of his Chair, to drop a word for his Master, or silently to exert an influence for Him. Of Prof. James Dwight Dana, of Yale, than whom that University in its long history has had no more distinguished scientist, his biographer, ex-President Gilman, of Johns Hopkins, and now the head of the New Carnegie Institute at Washington, says: "No one was ever admitted to his intimacy, on shipboard or on land, as a visitor to his family or as a correspondent, without discovering the simplicity, the honesty and the beauty of his Christian character. . . . Striking illustrations might be given of the light which was shed by his steady adherence under adverse circumstances to the essentials of Christianity, and by his outspoken words, while his life was devoted to the fearless discovery of nature and the defense of scientific truth." Such a man also was Joseph Henry, the great Princeton professor and the first head of the Smithsonian Institute. He never lowered the flag of science because, for the time, there seemed to be some disharmony between it and the teaching of certain interpreters of the Bible, yet he always was a man of faith and of prayer and of consecration to his Master's service, and known as such by all who came into contact with him in his classroom or elsewhere. Any one who is familiar with life in college knows what a tremendous influence teachers of this type exert upon the tone of an institution. It is hard for infidelity to survive in their society. Vice is ashamed in their presence. Other things being at all equal the preference in the selection of teachers ought always to be given to men of this sort, over those who have only a good moral character and the professional qualifications demanded in a specified Chair.

Still a third agency that is indispensable is direct, positive Christian instruction. There are higher institutions of learning whose administrators claim that they cannot introduce any such

teaching into their curricula, except as a complete optional. If this is really so, then the more's the pity. No German gymnasium, though it in its work corresponds with that done in the lower classes of our colleges, finds itself in such a predicament. No great public school in England entertains this notion. Neither Oxford nor Cambridge follows this rule. None of our American colleges until recently imagined themselves to be shut up to such a course of procedure. If in any case now the necessity exists, then there is an imperative need for special voluntary effort to supply the defect, for defect it is, and of the most serious character. A Christian atmosphere cannot be created and maintained without solid religious instruction. There never was a time when, or a place where, sound religion did not rest, if it existed at all, on intelligence as to its facts and doctrines. To-day, solid, wise and opportune teaching of this sort is needed in every college, not only because of defective home training, but also because of the ferment and the discussion of those great matters now current, and especially on account of the tremendous force with which the tendency of thought is running away from the Church and the Sabbath, and from Christianity itself, except in some vague invertebrate form, and toward that which has to do only with the business and pleasure of life here and now. Just how as to details in each case this want is to be best supplied must vary according to the circumstances of each college. Somehow it must be met, if Christianity takes in these institutions the place to which it is entitled.

It is worth while to ask whether the Presbyterian Church has not fallen asleep as to a large portion of the colleges that are more or less under her direct or indirect control. These lie in the great "Middle West." Large wealth has come to Princeton, and for other colleges east of the Ohio river the outlook is hopeful for moderate endowment. A Board has been constituted specially to care for the younger and feebler colleges of the newer States and Territories. But the colleges of the Middle West, on which the Church just now has to draw for a great portion of its candidates for the ministry and of its educated laymen, are left to beg their way as they may, and to be overshadowed by other institutions at whose command vast sums of money are placed. It is hard even to get a hearing for their cause by many of our stronger churches and our wealthier individuals. Is it not time for the Church to awake out of sleep as to this great matter?

VII.

JACOBUS DE VORAGINE AND THE GOLDEN LEGEND.*

THE publication of two new French translations of the Golden Legend within the year reminds of the fact that there have also been at least two reprints of Caxton's English translation of this work within a few years and shows that the famous book is far from dead. Indeed, it may be said to be coming to life again. One of the most popular, if not the most popular book of the Middle Ages, extant in more than half a thousand manuscripts and more than one hundred and fifty editions and translations made during the first century of printing, it seemed suddenly, after three centuries of unparalleled popularity, in the Reformation times, to have died a sudden death at the hands of Wicelius, Cano, Vives, Launoi and other critics. They denied the work historical merit, style, devotional value or any merit whatever. They scoffed at the title "Golden," which the common consent of thousands of readers had added to the original title, and they reviled the author as a man with "mouth of iron and heart of lead." The Roman Catholics allowed themselves too readily to fear and become ashamed of the work, and the joint result of Reformed vehemence and Catholic timorousness was, if not to kill, at least to bury alive the work. For three centuries only a slight movement now and then showed that there was any life left. In the middle of the nineteenth century there was a slight spasm manifested in the edition of Graesse, the translation by Brunet and some few other signs. For the last ten years there have been signs of something like a real revival, which seems now likely to restore the book, not to its old popularity, for times have changed, but to a certain well-deserved fame on account of its real merits and its extraordinary influence on the history of culture.

* *La Légende Dorée de Jacques de Voragine, nouvellement traduite en français, avec introduction, notices, notes et recherches sur les sources, par L'Abbé J.-B. M. Roze, Chanoine honoraire de la cathédrale d'Amiens. Paris: Rouveyre, 1902, 3 v., 8vo.*

Le Bienheureux Jacques de Voragine. La Légende Dorée, traduite du Latin d'après les plus anciens manuscrits, avec une Introduction, des Notes, et un Index alphabétique, par Teodor de Wyzewa. Paris: Perrin, 1902, p. XVIII, 748, 8vo.

It is a remarkable thing how little is known about the author of this work, and almost more remarkable how little of what is known is generally known.

Voragine (or Varagine, as he always and correctly writes himself), besides being the writer of the Golden Legend, was one of the most attractive preachers of his time, and his sermons, for centuries after his death, were almost as popular as the Legend, if one may judge from the number of the existing manuscripts and the fact that they too became known as "Golden." In an age celebrated for its scholastic learning (he was born about the same year as Thomas Aquinas), he was so distinguished for his erudition that he was known as "the theologian" *par excellence*—"Jacobus the theologian." He was, moreover, distinguished as an administrator, receiving unprecedented honors for many years among the Dominicans of his own province and being trusted with several special missions by the Pope before he became Archbishop of Genoa. In this latter office his executive career was most creditable. Above all, he was so famous for his holiness, his self-abnegation and his kindness to the poor (and that in a century which produced Saint Francis, Saint Dominic and Saint Louis) that he was, so to speak, elected Saint by popular acclamation and began almost immediately after his death to be worshiped, as he is in Genoa to-day, as "the peacemaker."

In spite of all these claims to distinction there is almost no literature about the man. The encyclopædias and biographical dictionaries mention him, there is a little in general and local Church histories, a little more in the histories of the Dominicans, there are a few monographs on the Golden Legend, some rather meagre introductions and three brief lives in Italian by Anfossi (1816), Spotorno (1823) and Pelazza (1867). The three Italian monographs, together with the scholarly account in Quetif-Echard's *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, practically exhaust the literature, and of these all three of the lives are so little known that even so much as a trace of them is seldom found in the scanty modern literature. They are, in fact, so rare that the British Museum has only Anfossi and the Bodleian not one. Quetif-Echard is therefore the chief and generally the only source of modern accounts of Voragine, and even this is somewhat rare and expensive.

In view of the dearth of literature upon the Golden Legend and its author, the introductions to these translations of Roze and Wyzewa take on a certain importance, although neither is very pretentious. That of Roze is confined to a rather successful vindication of the Golden Legend, while that of Wyzewa treats not

only of the work itself, but tells "the little that I know" about the author.

The little that Wyzewa knows is little indeed. There is at best not much known of the events of Voragine's life, and much of this little Wyzewa seems to have miraculously escaped knowing. In spite of this, however, Wyzewa's slight narrative is welcome as furnishing a source to which one who wishes a little general idea of who Voragine was can be referred. It has the main well-known facts, and is written with sympathy, although the sympathy leads rather to rhetoric than to research. Yet there is some pretension to research as well. The author at least visited Varazze, and he makes much of a certain manuscript of Voragine's *Chronicle of Genoa* which he consulted at the municipal library in Genoa, but in general the things that he saw serve rather to emphasize what he has missed than to contribute anything to the subject.

Voragine was born at Varazze about 1228, entered the Dominican Convent at Genoa in 1244, was made head of the Dominicans of Lombardy in 1267, became archbishop in 1292, and died in 1298. He wrote the *Golden Legend*, a *History of Genoa*, various sermons and sundry other works.

All this Wyzewa knows and not very much more. At Varazze he saw the statue of Voragine on the City Hall, but he seems not to have seen the paintings of Voragine in the Dominican Church, in the Cathedral, in the Municipio and at Casanuova. He notes the artisans building fishing-boats, "like those which the father of the author of the *Golden Legend* perhaps fashioned," but if he had seen the manuscript chronicle of Accenelli in the Dominican Convent there, or one of several works by the accomplished local historian, the Avv. G. B. Fazio, or had conversed even with some of the natives, he would have learned that Voragine's father was not a shipbuilder, but a farmer, and Voragine was born not in the shore village, but three or four miles back on the hills in the village of Casanuova.

At Genoa Wyzewa studied in the Beriana Library, but he seems not to have found any one of the three lives of Voragine, copies of all of which are to be found in one or another of the Genoese libraries, nor did he find the interesting material in the public (not the Archiepiscopal) archives. He sought traces of Voragine, and came to the conclusion that "one may seek in vain in all the city of Genoa the least trace of his memory." He knows that his body had been buried in the Convent Church, rather than the Cathedral; "but the Church of Saint Dominic was demolished some years ago, and among the relics which are preserved at the

Academy of Fine Arts and at the White Palace, I have vainly sought a vestige of the sepulture of Voragine."

But the trouble is not with the relics. If he had only looked in the Church of Santa Maria di Castello, the present Church of the Dominicans, he would have found the very bones of the Saint, as well as an effigy, a statue and a painting of him. He would doubtless have received, also, from some of the brethren various little tracts, published on the occasion of the "translation of his holy relics" in 1885, or of the sixth centenary of his death in 1898. Both of these tracts tell of the transfer of the relics in 1798, when the other church was destroyed, to this church, where they were first placed "under the altar of Saint Paul," and removed again in 1885 to the altar of "S. Rosa da Lima" in the same church.

It is true that the Genoese fall far short of giving Voragine the public honor which is his due from them. Even at the Cathedral his altar was taken down "during some necessary repairs," as it is said, some years ago, and has never been replaced. His portrait is stored away in some lumber room, and is only to be seen with great difficulty, if at all. It seems almost as if they were in some way ashamed of the man. It is true also, curiously enough, that although there are in various libraries in Genoa at least thirteen manuscripts of Voragine's history of Genoa, there does not appear to be in any of the great libraries a single manuscript of the Golden Legend, or of those other popular works, manuscripts of which are scattered throughout all the rest of Europe by the thousand. On the other hand, however, he is worshiped by the people at the Church of Santa Maria, and is "specially invoked in the case of private or domestic quarrels."

The origin of this worship is the picturesque and admirable act of Voragine in uniting Guelfs and Ghibellines in 1295, an account of which Wyzewa quotes from a "magnificent and venerable" manuscript of Voragine's own chronicle in the Municipal Library of Genoa. This is a favorite subject of several of the portraits of Voragine, in which he is represented as throwing himself between the combatants. Voragine is also remembered in Genoa for his self-denying benevolence which, according to Wyzewa, he carried to the end, prohibiting an expensive funeral in order that what it would cost might be given to the poor.

But whatever may be said of Voragine's administrative ability, of his benevolence, his learning or his other literary work, it is still true that it is the Golden Legend which is his chief title to fame.

This work consists of 182, more or less, short chapters on all the saints and festivals in the Church calendar, according to the

Dominican use, beginning with the Advent and ending with the Dedication of Churches. There is a prologue to the whole and the individual chapters, so far as they relate to the saints, have each its own prologue in the form of a short etymology of the saint's name. Finally, a short history of Lombardy is added to the chapter on Pelagius, and this misplaced bit of rather mediocre history often gives title to the whole work as the *Historia Lombardica*.

The contents of the various codices and editions of the work vary greatly. The Venetian Codex Lat. 354 contains but seventy-four chapters, and Vatican Lat. 1224 is of similar type, but these are undoubtedly abridgments. The Milan Codex Ambrosianus A E XII, 27, omits eighty-four of the original chapters, but adds nine others. A very common and early type (*e.g.*, Brit. Mus. add. 14,089, Munich, 9506*) omits from the ordinary list Sophia, Timotheus, Fabianus, Apollonia, Bonifacius and Elisabeth. The Italian translation (*cf.* Florence, Riccardianus, 1254) was founded on something like this text. On the other hand, many manuscripts and most editions add more or less—Codex A E XIV, of the Brera Library in Milan, adds twenty-four; the Ed. Venice, 1482, adds twenty-six; that of 1484 adds thirty-five; that of Basil. 1490, adds thirty-nine; that of Venice, 1516, adds nine, etc. etc.

The text of the Golden Legend as it stands in Graesse's edition probably represents nearly the state of the case, the first 182 chapters printed in a large type representing the text as it stood in the days of Voragine, the additional chapters in fine print representing additions by other hands. It is possible that criticism will finally subtract some, but is not likely to add any to the 182. Wyzewa says that the legends of Saint Francis and Saint Elisabeth are not found in the MSS., but although Elisabeth is omitted from a large fraction of the, say, two hundred manuscripts examined, Saint Francis is in all save the very shortest forms. The final decision as to the real contents of the work as published by Voragine waits on a much more thorough study of the manuscripts than has ever yet been made, but it will not probably vary far from the 182 chapters.

The chapters themselves are, for the most part, chains of miracles, and give to the whole work the aspect of a collection of anecdotes, rather than of systematic biography. The work is not, in fact, a "Lives of the Saints," as it is described in some manuscripts, but rather, as it is usually called, "Readings on the Saints" (for *Legenda*, of course, meant not "Legends," but "Readings"), and since it includes other festivals than strict saint

days, a more exact title still would be "Readings on the Church Festivals" or "Daily Readings for the Christian Year."

The whole work is preceded by a prologue, giving the real plan of work. It treats of the divisions of the Church year. All human history, he says, is divided into four periods—the times of Deviation, Renovation, Reconciliation and Peregrination. The time of Deviation = Adam to Moses = Septuagesima to Easter; the time of Renovation = Moses to Christ = Advent to Christmas; the time of Reconciliation, "when through Christ we were reconciled with God" = time of Christ = Easter to Whitsunday, and the time of our Pilgrimage = our present life = Whitsunday to Advent.

"It is according to this division of the four parts of the ecclesiastical year," he says, "that we proceed to the study of the various festivals, beginning with Advent, which opens the period of Renovation."

The first two chapters are on the Advent and on Saint Andrew. An analysis of these chapters gives an excellent idea of the scope of the work and the variety of treatment.

Under Advent he treats, first, four kinds of Advents of our Lord—in the flesh, in the spirit, in death and in the Judgment. Then in detail he treats, first, of His coming in the flesh, the occasion and motives, of which seven are given, then of the coming for judgment. Under this latter head he treats of (1) the circumstances which precede the Judgment: The signs (fifteen subdivisions), Antichrist (four subdivisions) and the Great Conflagration: (2) The circumstances which accompany the Judgment: The Judge, the accusers (three subdivisions), the witnesses (three subdivisions) and the sentence (three subdivisions).

The chapter on Saint Andrew runs: Calling of Saint Andrew; he delivers Saint Matthew; he miraculously saves a young man from a house on fire; he delivers a woman; by his prayers he obtains the deliverance of an old man; drives out seven demons; brings to life forty sailors; goes to Achaia: is questioned by Egeus, his defense, punishment, burial; bishop preserved from temptation by him: miraculous punishment of a prefect.

Each of these chapters is a fair type of its class. In neither case is the aim historical or biographical, as it is often mistakenly supposed, on account of the frequent description of the work as "Lives of the Saints." The aim is devotional, not historical or critical, and what is more, it is intended chiefly for popular devotion. It is, in short, an artistic, rather than a scientific product, and is to be judged as such.

The etymologies which precede the chapters on the saints are

also to be judged in the same way. They are generally fantastic to the last degree, so much so that Wyzewa omits them altogether from his translation—*e.g.*, the two which Wyzewa quotes as provoking a smile are Agatha, from *Agios* = sacred, and *Theos* = God, *i.e.*, God's saint, or else from *Ago* = speaking, and *Thau* = perfection = the perfect speaker; and Antony, from *Ana* = above, and *tenens* = holding—which is at least mixed etymology!

These are fair samples, but it must be remembered that the purpose of the derivation is not at all a critical or historical one. The writer seeks simply to discover some allegorical or even punning turn which may express the character of the saint. This allegorical way of interpreting words was quite in accord with the spirit of the time (and of a tendency in all times), as well as with Voragine's own practice in a large class of his sermons, which are, if possible, more fantastically allegorical than even the etymologies themselves. The purpose is, therefore, descriptive rather than critical, and solemn attempts to discuss the historicity of the anecdotes of the saints, or their scientific value, seems to argue a certain lack of critical ability, not to say of humor, on the part of the critic himself.

The work was written after, and not immediately after, 1249. In the *Historia Lombardica* Voragine ends the account with the deposition and death of Frederick II (1250), and says that at the time of writing the throne is "still vacant," which seems to indicate that some time has elapsed since it was vacated. On the other hand, it was not written later than 1265, for there is extant a manuscript said to be written in this year. Wyzewa puts the date of composition at 1255, on the ground that the election of Pope Alexander IV is not mentioned, but this argument from silence is always inconclusive and is especially so in the case of Voragine, who omits so much. Still, the very large number of thirteenth-century manuscripts and their wide distribution favor an early date, and if, as there is some reason to think, Voragine had already undertaken his great cycle of sermons as early as 1259, it is fair to suppose that he had already finished this. It may be safe to say, therefore, at least that it is probably the first of the writings of Voragine, and that it was probably first published somewhere about 1255 to 1258.

It is impossible to say at present with certainty whether the work was finished at the time when it was first published or, as there is some reason to believe, that it was revised and added to more than once during the forty years between its first publication and his death. It is certain only that the many additions outside Graesse's corpus of 132 are by other and, for the most part, later

hands. These 182 chapters, of which Elisabeth and the five other omissions of the B. M. 14,089 type are under special suspicion, form the work with which we have to do when we speak of Voragine's Golden Legend.

The significant facts in the life-history of the Golden Legend are its immediate rise into popularity, the long maintenance of this popularity, its immediate and total eclipse in Reformation times and the modest revival of popularity in the nineteenth century.

Its sudden popularity is evidenced by the large number of thirteenth-century manuscripts. The examination of some two hundred manuscripts of the work shows between thirty and forty which may be assigned to Voragine's lifetime. There are no less than three dated manuscripts of it at Munich alone, and one of these is as early as 1282. An examination of various catalogues of manuscripts not personally seen shows the same proportion of early copies, and altogether it is quite within bounds to say that there are more than one hundred manuscripts extant which date from the thirteenth century, *i.e.*, from Voragine's lifetime. These manuscripts were scattered all over France and Germany as well as Italy, and the dated ones indicate that the work had achieved this general international popularity before 1282, and probably before 1265. The sudden and great world popularity which the work thus achieved within a few years is comparable in our own days only to the success of such works as *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and *Ben Hur*.

But more remarkable still than the immediate success is the lasting popularity of the work. For comparison with this one must turn to *Robinson Crusoe* and the *Pilgrim's Progress*; indeed the *Pilgrim's Progress* furnishes, in more respects than one, the best analogy with this work. That a book after two hundred years of undiminished popularity, shown by the more than half a thousand existing manuscripts, should, on the invention of printing, and for more than fifty years after, have averaged two editions each year, is much more significant than the circulation of one hundred thousand copies of a new novel in a year nowadays.

Some of the reasons for this popularity and its continuance lie near at hand. Something is to be said for the suitability of the theme to the spirit of the time. It often happens that a book by touching precisely the theme which is uppermost in men's minds, gets a large hearing chiefly from this fact. This was true of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

It is true also of the Golden Legend that it was fitted to its time, the time of the rise of monastic orders and widespread popular

worship of the saints, and that this state of things continued during the whole time of the book's great popularity. It doubtless therefore owed much to its theme, but this is not the whole matter. There were, as Roze remarks, many other Lives of the Saints, but they were not popular as that of Voragine was, although some of them had a modest success. Moreover, mere timeliness is not enough to account for either the depth or the length of its popularity. If it were a question of sudden and short popularity it might be, but when a book is popular for three hundred years, the reason must lie in some kind of real excellence—it is popular because it deserves to be on some ground.

Roze finds the whole secret of the popularity of the Golden Legend in one single quality—its naiveté, which is essentially a quality of style. The one thing that other Lives of the Saints lack, he says, is just this naturalness.

There is doubtless more or less truth in this. The work is, in fact, marked by that sincerity, naturalness and freedom from pose which always charms in literature or in life. This ingenuousness of the author is, moreover, the ingenuousness of a man of learning, of vivid and often poetic imagination, of deep sympathy with both man and brute, a hero worshiper in a modern sense and a man of unflagging enthusiasm for both the human and the super-human. The simple, unaffected, sincere discourse of a man of this sort is naturally interesting, however much it may be hampered by the material which he is using and the need of incorporating, at times, the very words of the writers from whom he quotes. Whether or not this be the sole secret of the popularity of the Golden Legend, it is certain that it forms a large element in the ease, and it may perhaps contain the heart if not the sum of the matter.

If the matter be looked at from the point of view of the question why Voragine succeeded when other hagiographers failed, it may be said that it was because he knew his subject better, he knew his audience better, and he knew his business better.

The Abbé Roze has analyzed the sources used by Voragine and finds that he refers to no less than one hundred and thirty writers. This is not surprising in the man who, in later days, was said to be so familiar with the works of Augustine that he could repeat them all by heart, who showed a very ready quoting familiarity with a wide range of the Latin classical writers, and whose familiarity with Scripture is so intimate that his discourses fairly rain proof-texts. He was, whatever else may be said of him, therefore, a man thoroughly familiar with his sources.

Farther than this, he is not only familiar with but faithful to

these sources. The major part of Voragine's tales are, as so unimpeachable a critic as Bollandus declares, in full accord with the sources. Farther still, he uses his sources, in a way, critically. He frequently introduces his stories by "It is said," or in some other way disclaims any responsibility for the truthfulness of the account. It may be said, therefore, that the author's erudition is extensive, faithful and, for the time, not uncritical. It may be added that this knowledge is at his very finger tips. As in all his works, he is so saturated with his material that the apposite thing comes forth spontaneously at the right moment.

Beyond his excellent mastery of material, another secret of the popularity of the book is to be found in the fact that Voragine knew his audience. He was, in the first place, a man in touch with all classes of people from the most scholarly to the most ignorant. This is a striking fact which the student of his works can hardly fail to notice. His books range from the most scholastic, barren and iatricate in style, divided under headings and subheadings and sub-subheadings to a point where it is hardly possible to keep the logical order in one's mind by any effort of attention, down to the very plainest and simplest statement of the most simple truths. A single volume of his sermons will contain sermons in several different styles, from the most scholastic, through the most allegorical to the plainest sermon, full of illustration, touched with humor and its applications couched in the simplest and clearest terms. This is true also of the *Golden Legend*, where, however, the scholastic is at its least and the plain and simple at its greatest, precisely because it was intended for the people. The keynote of Voragine's life is indeed not learning, learned as he was, but service.

His sympathy with the common people is shown in his whole pastoral life, in many of his works, and especially in the fact that he was one of the very earliest to teach and use the vernacular. It is even said by Sixtus Senensis that he was the first to translate the Scriptures into Italian, and, although much disputed, this is hardly disproved. Whether he did this or not, it is certain that he was unusually in touch with the feeling of the common people, and this fact alone is almost enough to explain the popularity of the *Golden Legend*. His popularity is because he was himself truly popular.

And then he knew his art. It must be confessed that his style has been weighed by competent critics and found wanting. Even such admirers as Ellis and Wyzewa and Bollandus confess some lack in this regard, and if by style is meant the simple question of Latinity, no doubt the charge is true. The Latin is more or less

rude, though hardly more so than was natural at the time. It was the "honest Latin of the sacristy," as Wyzewa calls it, better suited for popular instruction perhaps than the Latin of that disciple of the elegant Erasmus who so fiercely presses the charge against it, but yet, beyond a question, more or less barbarous. Rude as it is and if it is, in Voragine's hands it is at least vigorous and effective.

It is true, also, that in the Golden Legend there are at points, and especially in the chapters on other topics than the saints, traces of the scholastic and allegorical style which appears also in some of his sermons and scholarly works, and it may be that it is to these that Ellis refers when he speaks of it as appearing "on a first reading as more or less rugged or obscure."

In trying to explain or apologize for these deficiencies of style, Roze rather overruns himself in his zeal to prove these all the fault of the authors from whom Voragine has compiled, and seems, in effect, to reduce the whole to a mere compilation. It is certain that Voragine did make large use of his sources, and it is possible, even, that he had a short earlier work of the same general character with his own, which he filled out. It is true, also, that in some places he reproduces the exact language of his sources, while it happens very frequently that a whole passage is at least condensed from a single source. A mere compilation, however, it is not, and Wyzewa is right in insisting that the work as a whole bears the impress of a single personality. It may be added that there are few parts, including even the pure condensations from sources, which do not bear the impress of this personality.

But if there are certain defects of style, and whatever the reasons for them, there are enough compensating elements of art to take the curse away and help account for the popularity.

In the first place, even the compilation, where it is compilation, is done with excellent art. Mere translation may be made an art, but condensation is capable of a most admirable display of art. To take large crude masses and present them in a brief form, in such a way that they shall make a more vivid impression than in their lengthened form, is of the essence of literary art of the highest character, and this is what Voragine does continually. Farther than this, Voragine not only arranges his material into an artistic whole, following the Church year, and carrying out a purpose of providing certain suitable reading for each saint's day, but he constantly shapes his material so as to produce striking effects.

The simplicity and sincerity of his style have already been spoken of, and these surely are of the very essence of good style,

as are also the flexibility and appropriateness in the use of words, the strong imagination and the poetic feeling which are characteristic of him. Add to these (what may have been unconscious art) the constant appeal to those emotions which the history of literature has shown to unfailingly respond to every skillful touch—the love of the marvelous and of the unexpected, hero worship, the spirit of endurance, self-sacrifice, charity, forgiveness—and there is a combination of artistic excellences sufficient to account for more than a modest success.

The question naturally arises why a book with such admirable qualities should ever have suffered eclipse. It probably never would have done so if times had not changed so radically. The work of Voragine is the quintessence of pre-Reformation Catholicism. It breathes the spirit of Saint Francis and Saint Dominic, of devout worship of the saints and of the Mother of God, and of the ascetic devotion. On the other hand, it is full of demons and magic, temptation and rescue. The Reformation being essentially Protestant, the quintessence of Catholicism naturally called forth the quintessence of protest. The bitterness of attack was proportioned to the popularity of the book.

The centre of bitterness was undoubtedly the worship of the saints and of the Virgin and the miracles ascribed to them, but the points of attack ranged over the whole field. The attack on the historical value of the work is, as has been suggested, almost as far afield as an attack on a collection of pulpit illustrations for their lack of historical and critical value. The object being popular and devotional, the utmost that one can fairly ask is faithfulness to sources. As a matter of fact, the work contains very little indeed that is of direct historical value, and it contains much which Catholic and Protestants alike agree to be without historical evidence. Whether this much includes all miracles or only some miracles, is where Catholics and Protestants diverge. Roze calls attention to the interesting fact, of which Protestants are generally ignorant, that the Roman Catholics recognize two classes of miracles which may be used—those which are counted as matters of fact, and those which, though not established by evidence, are profitable for edification, used as parables or illustrations are used. Still this is not the real point. The line of division between Protestants and Catholics lies precisely on the line of “true” ecclesiastical miracles, and the attack on Voragine’s historical and critical character resolves itself almost purely into a Protestant attack on his Catholic belief that the Virgin and the saints do work miracles. It is another case of the *Odium Theologicum*, and the charge of being uncritical or credulous is untrue.

No doubt Voragine was a naïve believer in ecclesiastical miracles and received multitudes of them as historical, but he was far from credulous in his attitude and rejected many—and perhaps after all it is no more of a sin to believe in too many miracles than to believe in too few, and no more uncritical. The book which accepts both Biblical and ecclesiastical miracles at least contains more historical fact than the one which rejects both! Still it is not surprising that a book which is a veritable anthology of miracles which Protestants generally believe to be untrue should, whether it is intended for history or not, be vigorously assailed.

And what is true of ecclesiastical miracles is true of the kindred matters of the worship of the saints and the Virgin. As represented in Voragine, there is much in this worship which is beautiful and to a certain degree inspiring to character, but in the eyes of the Reformers, and in fact, it is all the more dangerous on this ground. The Golden Legend and the Reformation could not exist side by side and the Legend went under.

It is a curious matter that the thing which took the place of the Golden Legend in the popular favor after the Reformation is perhaps the Faust legend. In the Golden Legend the Faust theme of a compact with Satan occurs at least three times, and in each case the sinner is saved through the intercession of the Virgin Mary. This climax to the constant teaching of saint-worship and Virgin-worship was, of course, peculiarly obnoxious to Protestants, and the Faust book of 1587 was, it is said, actually set up by them as a sort of counterblast to the Golden Legend. It was, so it is said, intended to show the awful consequences of selling one's self to the devil—Faust meets a dreadful end instead of being saved by the Virgin as were his counterparts in the Golden Legend. Goethe, of course, returned to the idea of salvation, and it must be confessed that it makes a more winsome tale than the grimmer if more salutary moral of the earlier Faust book.

It is possible that this constructive work, in substituting another wonder cycle for the old, was one of the causes of the decline of the Golden Legend. However that may be, it seems clear that the eclipse came because of Protestant attack and the lack of Catholic courage to defend the work for what it was, rather than from any real lack of literary excellence.

In considering the reasons for the present revival of the work a preliminary condition at least is the passing of the polemic need. The battle has been fought and conditions have changed. Men are disposed to be juster and more discriminating. The Protestant victors especially, who have held the book in captivity for more

than three centuries, can afford to be generous in the recognition of its moral and spiritual as well as of its literary excellences.

That the book was well calculated to promote the love of and reverence for Jesus Christ as well as the worship of the saints, and fitted to encourage charity, fortitude and purity of life, no one can justly deny. One of the most unfair of many unfair attacks on the book was that on its frequent reiteration of the theme of carnal temptation. It is true that the author deals more frequently and more frankly with incidents which ought not to be good form in the literature of to-day than is pleasant. It must be remembered, however, that this is true of all histories of the saints, and that Voragine's treatment is always (when it is his own treatment) with a direct moral aim, and tends to virtue. It must be remembered on the other hand, too, that the secular literature of the time was incredibly full of the same theme, treated from a most vicious point of view and with the most vicious tendency. When this fact is considered, the work is seen to be in fact a most powerful and praiseworthy antidote to the depraved tendencies of the time. It is a pleasure to note that some examination of the manuscripts shows beyond peradventure that the particular incidents for which Voragine has been under imputation for grossness were certainly added after his time, notably the story of Gan-golfus.

A more positive reason for the revival of interest in the work is the very simple fact that it is interesting. It must be confessed that the average reader to-day does not care to sit down and read it through in course, although Mr. Ellis, the editor of the Caxton translation, says that he has himself read the work through from beginning to end as many as six times with "unabated interest." For most readers it is better as a book to pick up and read sections of than as one to be read systematically. It is too much like reading a collection of *Ana*, and it was, in fact, written to be read in small sections. In spite, however, of this, and in spite of all qualifications as to style, it is interesting to-day, if not to "the general" at least to the very considerable number of those with taste and sympathy for mediæval things at their best. The very fact of these two translations and the enthusiastic admiration of at least one of the editors bears eloquent testimony to the fact of the intrinsic interest of the work.

Probably the chief reason for the interest in the *Golden Legend* to-day is, however, the historical—the light which it throws on mediæval life and on the many elements in modern art, literature and folklore of which it is the source. Roze calls it a "veritable manual of Iconography and Liturgic," and it was this fact which

furnished the motive for his work. "It is," he says, "with the idea of being useful to artists and scholars that we have devoted a large share of our life to the study of the Golden Legend." He refers to Ozanam's exposition of its influence on poetry, as well as to the fact, which is beginning to be more realized than it once was, that it is the key to much of the best in painting, glass-painting, sculpture and the like. Probably Roze is not exaggerating much when he says that there is "not a single one of our religious and civil monuments which does not reproduce the tales of Jacobus de Voragine."

It is not to be supposed that the serious student of culture-history will care for translations when the Latin text is so accessible in the (1890) reprint of Graesse, but the many lay lovers of sacred art will welcome the work of Roze and Wyzewa with gratitude, now that Brunet's translation has become rare, and in view of the fact that Caxton's translation contains such a large amount of matter added by various later hands.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

ERNEST CUSHING RICHARDSON.

VIII.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS TO THE TEXT OF THE CONFESSION.

IT will be hardly questioned that the Confession of Faith stands pre-eminent among the doctrinal standards of the Churches known under the general name of the Reformed. It constitutes a common standard for an important group of Churches in Great Britain and the United States, and a bond of fellowship among them. The Church which undertakes to amend the text, or to make additions, obviously assumes a grave responsibility.

A proposition now lies before our Church to add a new chapter on the Holy Spirit and one on the Love of God and Missions. Before a well-grounded claim for the admission of these chapters can be made it must be shown (*a*) that there are at present omissions which call for additions to the text; and (*b*) that the additions proposed are stated with theological accuracy, and are in harmony with the general teachings of the Confession.

Applying this test to the new chapter on the Holy Spirit, we find, by careful comparison, that the Confession is not found guilty of omissions; and that its statements as to the nature, office and work of the Holy Spirit are much more abundant, and expressed with far more theological accuracy and propriety of diction, than the statements of the proposed chapter. This fact has been abundantly set forth in many articles on the subject, and we cannot find that any satisfactory reply has been made to the criticisms offered.

Applying the same test to the proposed chapter on "The Love of God and Missions," we compare what seem to us the cold and lifeless phrases of this chapter with the full exposition of the Confession, in which God the Father is described as, in his nature, most loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin, and rewarding them that diligently seek him; as manifesting an infinite goodness in his providence, which reaches in general to all his creatures, as directing, disposing and governing all creatures, all actions and all things to the praise of the glory of his goodness and mercy, as well as of his attributes of wisdom, power and justice; and, to crown all, so

constituting the Covenant of Grace as to make a free offer therein of life and salvation to sinners without limitation, making faith both a privilege and a duty, and solemnly requiring every minister to publish the doctrine of faith and repentance, so that all who hear the message may turn from all their sins unto God, being moved so to do by "the apprehension of his mercy in Christ to such as are penitent"; thus providing that the Covenant of Grace shall be "held forth in fulness, evidence and spiritual efficacy to all nations, both Jews and Gentiles," and exhorting of his people that they continually offer prayer "for all sorts of men living, or that shall live hereafter" (Conf., chap. ii, 1; v, 4, 5, 7; vii, 3, 6; xv, 1, 2; xxi, 4). The Confession plainly teaches that if wicked men perish, it is by no arbitrary decree, but by their own fault, not knowing God who reveals himself in nature and grace, and obeying not the gospel of Jesus Christ (chap. i, 1, 4; vii, 3; ix, 1; xxxiii, 2).

The new chapter, moreover, utterly fails to draw the important distinction between God's love of compassion for the degraded, the impenitent, the hypocritical, the lost, and the love of complacency which he cherishes for the Church of the redeemed, in whom he is to find his delight forever.

It seems to us to be clearly demonstrable that the new chapters are entirely unnecessary, and, in addition, theologically inexact, and therefore quite unworthy of the place proposed for them in the Confession.

If we turn now to the proposed revision of section 7 in chapter xvi of the Confession which treats of works done by unregenerate men, we find the sentences so transposed that no longer sin, but only deficiency is charged: the charge of sin being brought only against the entire omission of works which God requires. Thus it is proposed to make the Confession inconsistent with its own teachings with regard to total depravity and original sin; inconsistent with the clear statements of other Reformed Confessions; inconsistent with all that the Bible teaches about the pollution which attaches to all that proceeds from the natural heart, the "flesh," in which "dwelleth no good thing"; inconsistent with the solemn warning of Christ that men are destitute of life until in vital relationship with him (John, vi. 53), and that he will utterly refuse to recognize the good works of men as acceptable in his sight unless wrought under the inspiration of that relationship. "Then will I profess unto them, I never knew you" (Matt. vii. 22, 23).

We have no particular zeal about the proposed change in the section relating to the Pope.

There seems to us to have been no sufficient reason, however, for proposing a change in the chapter on Lawful Oaths and Vows.

Oath-bound testimony is at the very foundation of the administration of justice. The magistrate is the minister of God, deriving all his authority from him. The Confession most correctly teaches that a Christian should assist the magistrate by giving testimony in important matters, and with that sanction which gives validity to testimony, as taught throughout the Bible, and as recognized in all the civilized world through the ages. It declares that "an oath is warranted by the Word of God, under the New Testament, as well as under the Old; so a lawful oath, being imposed by lawful authority, in such matters, ought to be taken." We regard the position thus defined to be incontrovertibly true. If then Christians *ought* to act thus, under the given circumstances, it is a certain inference that they sin when they refuse so to act. And yet the Church is asked to deny the validity of this certain inference by striking out the clause which affirms that it is a sin for a Christian to refuse to do what he ought to do. Is it really no sin to refuse to comply with a moral obligation?

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

EDWARD B. HODGE.

REVIEWS OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

I.—PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL; Gifford Lectures, Delivered Before the University of Aberdeen. Second Series: Nature, Man and the Moral Order. By JOSIAH ROYCE, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901. Pp. xx, 480. \$2.25.

The first series of these lectures was delivered at Aberdeen early in 1899 and the volume in which they were given out was the subject of a brief notice by the present writer in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* (October, 1900). The argument in that course was severely metaphysical. It was wholly concerned with the discussion of the significance of the ontological predicate. It considered not, concretely, what is, but, abstractly, what is the meaning of *to be*. Four historical conceptions of Being were made to pass under review—namely, Realism, Mysticism, Critical Rationalism or Empirical Validity and Synthetic Idealism. The defects of the first three were searchingly exposed, while the strength and soundness of the last were very ably and exhaustively set forth.

But all this was confessedly only preliminary to what was to follow. The Gifford Lectureships, by the terms of their foundation, contemplate a discussion of some aspect of the problem of Natural Religion. Prof. Royce has had this provision in mind, and he has seized the fine opportunity that has been presented to him to demonstrate to the religious intelligence of his age how and how well his own distinctive Idealistic philosophy not only fits in with, but also furnishes the very franchise for, a sound religious faith and a healthy religious life.

Accordingly this second volume has been looked for with more than usual interest. The indisputable ability of the author, his eminence among English-speaking philosophers, the intrinsic plausibility of many of his teachings and his reverent spirit in dealing with the high and sacred questions of religion well entitle these lectures to a careful and candid consideration at the hands of all who are interested in the religious aspects of current philosophy or who make any serious attempt to square their philosophical thinking with their religious faith, or *vice versa*. The emphasis in the former series was upon the World; in this it is upon the Human Self—its nature, implications and relations. It can scarcely be said, however, that the scope

of the lecturer's thought is greatly narrowed by the transition ; for it now embraces a Theory of Human Knowledge, a Philosophy of Nature, the Origin and Destiny of the Human Individual, the Moral Order of the World, the Problem of Evil and the bearing of all these upon the fundamental thesis of Natural Religion. These questions are so indissolubly interlinked in Prof. Royce's system that it would be impossible for him to present any one of them and, at the same time, be silent upon the others ; and, although these volumes had their occasion in the Gifford appointment, yet the professor has so revised and enlarged his material for the printer that, taken together, they may be regarded as the clearest and most complete setting forth of his somewhat original and presumably self-consistent philosophical system.

The point of view is that with which readers of Royce have been acquainted ever since the appearance of his first book in 1885—namely, *The Religious Aspects of Philosophy*. He has, however, departed from his original position in this—namely, that at first he interpreted the Absolute almost exclusively in terms of Thought, whereas he now makes Will fundamental in his Theory of Knowledge and central in his interpretation of the Absolute. His ontology, as is always the case, turns with his epistemology. Every human self is latently omniscient. The field of consciousness is divisible into two parts : on the one hand the object of present conscious attention and on the other the "rest of the world." The alternative is between knowing everything and knowing nothing.

"Whoever knows *any* concrete object knows in a sense *all* objects. . . . The objects now concretely acknowledged are related to the objects not now concretely known in precisely the same general sense as is that in which, at any instant of our conscious life, *the objects which our attention focusses are related to what, although present, is lost in the background of consciousness. Ignorance always means inattention to details*" (p. 57).^{*} This partial and local concentration of attention in the tract of the world's facts is the very meaning of finitude, which is defined as "inattention to the wealth and organization of the world's detail" (p. 111). The "world of facts" for me includes all that stands either as presupposition or as goal to my thinking and the principle which determines my action in singling out certain particular facts from others as the object of my conscious attention is that they "*are conceived as thereby enabling us even now to accomplish our will better than we could if we did not acknowledge these facts*" (p. 41). From this it might be inferred that Judgment has the precedence of Will, but Prof. Royce makes a rather hazardous distinction between the Theoretical Ought and the Ethical Ought, and in the subordinate categories of the former he finds warrant for what becomes a virtual primacy of the Will in the knowing act. We are told that all acknowledgment of facts is a conscious submission to an Ought and that "all truth is the object of acknowledgment and not merely of immediate experience" (p. 159). To the Will then is accorded the honor of the initiative : "The fact observed is the fulfillment of our intent to observe that kind of fact." The object of our attention is a fragment, the part of an Organic Unity, which Organic Unity is the Whole, which Whole is the Absolute, which Absolute is God. "When I seek my own goal I am looking for the whole of myself. In so far as my aim is the absolute completion of my Selfhood, my goal is identical with the whole life of God" (p. 135). This is thoroughly characteristic of Royce. What we are conscious of always means more than itself, infinitely more. We never reach satisfaction. What we know means infinity. What is the completion of my incompleteness, and that only.

* All italics in quotations from the text are Prof. Royce's.

"And thus the present moment has about it all the mystery that everywhere clouds finite facts. I am conscious just now, but I am not wholly conscious of my consciousness. If I were, I should be capable of verifying an infinity of facts; for, as the Supplementary Essay, published with the former series of these lectures, has shown at length, to be self-conscious in any complete sense would be to be aware of the completion of an infinite series of presented facts. But if, as is true, I am not completely self-conscious, then I never completely verify *what* it is that I am just now verifying" (p. 18).

Thus it is clear that his ontology is itself a ready-made epistemology. But this is only of human knowledge, which may be and is vastly different from other knowledges. When we speak of anything as present to our consciousness the word "present" is ambiguous. The conception of Series is fundamental, and accordingly, when we are conscious of any one thing, we are conscious of at least a segment of a series of which that one thing is a member. The consciousness of temporal succession has thus a two-fold interpretation. In hearing a familiar line of poetry we are conscious of each word as "what *now* is, and what *no longer* is, and what *is to be* but is *not yet*"; but not only so, we are also conscious of a series of successions constituting the line and giving its definite meaning to every word in it. We cannot take up into our consciousness a very long series; other beings may take up a longer or a shorter than we. Animals may have a much shorter "time-span"; angels a much longer. "God knows the whole time-sequence of the world at once." He can take in the whole endless series of which we can take in a very small part. Eternity is a *totum simul*. God's knowledge is not fore-knowledge; it is eternal knowledge, and "the only thing needed to complete our idea of what an actually eternally consciousness is is the conceived removal of that arbitrary limitation which permits us men to observe indeed a succession, but forbids us to observe a succession at once in case it occupies more than a very few seconds" (p. 142). Accordingly, God knows the completed whole of which our seeking is a quest and indeed of which it is a part. God not only knows it, God *is* it; and in knowing it and knowing us he is but knowing himself.

The origin of the consciousness of Self, as well as of Nature, is strictly social. It is astonishing to find such a keen and penetrating thinker as Prof. Royce so credulous in his acceptance of the all-embracing dogma of Evolution. Possibly it does not condition the central elements of his thought, and yet he gives it a very important place indeed. He denies all recognition of unconscious beings. Nature is not unconscious, but only uncommunicative. He traces four points in common between the conscious and the mis-called unconscious in nature, and these may be roughly stated as follows, namely: Irreversibility, Assimilation by Communication, Habits by way of Rhythms and Evolution. "The essence of the doctrine of Evolution lies in the fact that it recognizes the continuity of man's life with that of an extra-human realm, whose existence is hinted to us by our experience of Nature" (p. 242). We are not now quarreling with Evolution, but we believe that if the author had been half as skeptical in advance concerning this point as he is concerning some others, he would have been led to define and guard it with more care or to reconstruct this whole argument, which is indeed very beautiful and suggestive, on the Interpretation of Nature. For, scientists being judge, Evolution as an unbroken programme of continuity is not finally established.

Our belief in the reality of Nature is inseparably bound up in that of the reality of our fellows, and, moreover, we learn about ourselves from and through our fellows. "*Our fellows furnish us the constantly needed supple-*

ment to our own fragmentary meanings. That is, they help us to find out what our own true meaning is. Hence, since Reality is through and through what completes our incompleteness, our fellows are indeed real" (p. 172). And yet we ourselves are only uncompleted meanings—nothing more. The concept of the individual self is purely an ethical conception. "The Self is not a Thing, but a meaning embodied in a conscious life." Of course all realistic notions of a Self-substance are summarily repudiated. We do not think we are far wrong in saying that the author makes the Human Self more a will than aught else; and if he were asked Whose Will, the answer—even though not the *only* answer—must be *God's*.

"If now I, the individual, exist in one aspect as the expression of nobody's will but my own, does this assertion in the least conflict with our other assertion that I and all beings exist as the expression of the divine will? I answer: There is no conflict; for the Divine Will gets expressed in the existence of me the individual only in so far as this Divine Will first not merely recognizes from without, but includes within itself my own will as one of its own purposes. And since God, for our view, is not an external cause of the world, but is the very existence of the world in its wholeness as the fulfillment of purpose, it follows once more that my existence has its place in the Divine Existence as the existence of an individual will, determined, just in so far as it is this individual will, by nothing except itself" (p. 330).

All this suggests difficulties, to be sure, and Prof. Royce does not forget them. He is brave enough to face them if he is not strong enough to overcome them. His thought is metaphysical throughout, and when he employs the term "ethical" it is commonly with a metaphysical meaning. He identifies the human will with the divine and then turns to the hard task of differentiating them. "Even now, whatever you are or seek, the implied whole meaning of even your blindest striving is identical with the entire expression of the divine will" (p. 271). This is a high and honoring theory of human nature and human conduct. But it holds true, notwithstanding our conscious guilt to the contrary. "Even in the depths of hell the lost, if such there were, would still, despite themselves, serve God amidst their darkness" (p. 350). To be at all is to fill a purpose, and that purpose is the Absolute Purpose. The essence of individual selfhood consists in "*just my conscious intent to be, in God's world, myself and nobody else.*" As I cannot by any possibility be any one else than myself, and as I must continue to be in God's world if I continue to be at all, it were an altogether vain and insane intent which would try to surmount that impossibility. In any case this reduces the problem of Self to a low ultimate term.

I am finite and to be finite is to fix attention upon but a part of the field of facts. "An evil is, in general, a fact that sends us to some Other for its own justification and for the satisfaction of our Will." But is not this precisely what everything which we know does? We are ever being sent in quest of the Supplementing Other which in turn sends us on to its Supplementing Other; and these Others are also we ourselves in our more completed Selves, and they are, too, the ever-receding Absolute. We can never reach it so long as we are finite. Shall we then cease to be finite? Conceivably we might, for we are but aspects of the Will of God: but Prof. Royce believes in the immortality of the Human Individual Self; witness his *Ingersoll Lecture*. He satisfies his mind concerning this difficulty by saying that "the eternal ethical Individual is *infinite but partial*" (p. 447). Everything finite is evil, but none of it is total evil. "To sin is *consciously to choose to forget*, through a narrowing of the field of attention, an Ought that one already recognizes" (p. 359). Certainly this must be regarded as a metaphysical interpretation of what, seen at other angles, might be described in terms more personal

and biblical. But that we sin when, in spite of ourselves, we are serving God is possible, but a trifle confusing to the average mind. Saul of Tarsus believed that he was doing God service when, as he learned afterward, he was not; but can it always be that when we think we are not doing God service we *are*? When I think I am lying I am really, in spite of myself, telling a truth. When my conscience tells me I am against God my conscience is wrong, and whatever I am, whatever I am striving to do, my being and my striving are not only with God—they are *God*. Whatever happens in the temporal order is more or less evil; there is a ceaseless warfare between good and evil, and this warfare is in the divine life itself. I can resist God; I can do wrong. I am “unique.” This word occurs more frequently than any other in Prof. Royce’s discussion of Free Will and of the relation of the Human Self to God.

“I, the individual, am what I am by virtue of the fact that my intention, my meaning, my task, my desire, my hope, my life, stand in contrast to those of any other individual. If I am any Reality whatever, then I am doing something that nobody else can do and meaning something that nobody else can mean; and I have my relatively free will that nobody else can possess. The uniqueness of my meaning is the one essential fact about me” (p. 426). Prof. Royce defines a Person as a “Conscious Being.” As we understand it, he would have been truer to his philosophy if he had reversed the order and said that a Person is a *being conscious*. God is a Person, differing vastly according as he is viewed temporally or eternally. “We are the divine as it expresses itself here and now.” God’s will is not done in the temporal order; it is done in the eternal order, and yet the eternal order is but the “wholeness” of the temporal. “The Temporal Order, taken in its wholeness, is for us identical with the Eternal Order” (p. 386).

An adequate criticism of this very interesting system must not be expected of any amateur in metaphysics. But it is given to the world not merely as a philosophy, but as a treatise on Natural Theology. All philosophy has a theological valuation, to be sure, but particularly the Gifford lectures are designed, in the first instance, to be a contribution to theological literature and thought. Nor can it be complained that these lectures fail in this regard. Accordingly the student of theology may properly venture to sit in judgment upon the theological implications of Prof. Royce’s lectures, while he modestly forbears to enter upon an ambitious and exhaustive consideration of the philosophical postulates and principles involved.

We believe that the professor would have very great difficulty in refuting the charge that his system is substantial pantheism. Indeed, these volumes give us little reason to suppose that he would be much concerned to refute it. Only the Absolute is, and in this he is what he calls a Mystic. God is the Absolute. Substantially we are nothing; ethically we are Individual Selves. We do not much fear that any philosophy will become regnant in Christian thinking which entails pantheistic corollaries, and yet, without dispute, a stiff current has set in in that direction in many quarters to-day. But, however plausible the philosophy, the Christian consciousness revolts against its inevitable implications once they are set forth. Pantheism has a history, and that history is a poor certificate of character. Amiel thought that Christianity must absorb pantheism. This is, of course, impossible, but when pantheism absorbs Christianity, Christianity will have sunk into uselessness and deserved oblivion.

This philosophy minimizes sin. It cannot do otherwise. The uniqueness of the Human Self is another name for its freedom. “As the unique cannot be wholly defined through its external relations, or deduced from them, or causally experienced by means of them, we found each finite self to be in

some aspect of its nature, free" (p. 352). Evil, when viewed from the standpoint of the temporal order, is good, when viewed from the standpoint of the eternal order. My lie is a lie from the one point of view and a truth from the other. I will accept the latter judgment as against the former and go on with my temporally mis-called lying. All this seems to us but feeble resistance to the imperative dictates and mandates of the moral consciousness of man. We suspect any philosophy which belittles sin. It is a real fact and not merely a temporal appearing. The lecture on the Moral Order deals unsatisfactorily with this *crux* of any system. After having identified the Human Self with the Absolute, it strives to differentiate them ethically, so as to give to the former freedom and autonomy. "His acts are his own, even because God's Will is in him as the very heart of his freedom" (p. 375). This suggests the dictum, "I believe because it is impossible."

Prof. Royce's philosophy is ill at ease consorting with the theologies. It is a complex, ambitious, metaphysical scheme. It is ethereally Idealistic. It begins away from home. It arrives at the consciousness of self by way of the consciousness of other selves and of Nature. "I am assured of myself then only in so far as I am assured of the Nature of Being in general" (s. 287). Then we must say that what ought to be primal and basal—namely, self-consciousness—is an exceedingly difficult and uncertain achievement, for if I must be assured of the "Nature of Being in general" first, then I must be one of a very elect few. The profound and erudite problem of the "Nature of Being in general" is far away from the "assurance of self," and it is to discredit first and fundamental truths of consciousness to make any such mastery of mysteries a condition precedent. But what is this self of which even then we are to become assured? "Remember not only that you are dust, in the ancient sense of that word, but also that you are in your inner life, in the way that psychological analysis has now rendered familiar, an insubstantial series of psychical conditions, psychically and socially determined, precisely in so far as such determination is possible—a being whose nature has only such permanence as may prove to be involved in the permanent meaning of those fleeting conditions themselves, in case they indeed may possess any such meaning. View yourself as an incident or at best an episode in the world-embracing process of evolution" (p. 417).

If this is the sort of thing we become assured of in so far as we are assured of the "Nature of Being in general," then we must cling to our old belief that there is a shorter and safer route that brings us to a much clearer and truer knowledge of the self. It certainly taxes ingenuity to show how an incident, or at best an episode, is yet endowed with immortality.

We have been very deeply interested in perusing this volume. We regard it as the professor's strongest and best. His style is clearer, more compact and less open to criticism than in anything else he has written. The temper is calm and offensive epithets and characterizations are nobly lacking. The author has won his way to fame as one of the foremost philosophical thinkers of his time. His insight is marvelous, his constructive powers, at their best in this volume, scarcely less so, and his quiet and persistent quest for further light, along the unfrequented paths of metaphysical meditation, truly classical.

But while we cheerfully acknowledge our indebtedness to Prof. Royce for many valuable and helpful suggestions, we certainly cannot follow him as a disciple follows his master. He insists that the realist must answer his objections to Realism, as set forth in the former volume, or accept his Idealism. This is hardly fair. There are objections to both. The question is which has the graver objections and the larger number of them. We do not believe that the choice lies between Realism, as Royce presents it, and Idealism, as

he presents it. We doubt whether we have here any nearer approach to a final solution of the problem of the *Concursus* of the Human and the Divine than the world has seen before. There is truth in both Realism and Idealism and, doubtless, there is error in both—as he presents them. But for one who heartily accepts what the world knows as Evangelical Truth, there need be little hesitation in making the choice; nor do we suppose that Prof. Royce would be much concerned to affirm otherwise.

Trenton, N. J.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

II.—APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

REASON AND REVELATION. An Essay in Christian Apology. By J. R. ILLINGWORTH, M.A., D.D., Author of "Personality Human and Divine," "Divine Immanence." London: Macmillan & Co., Limited, 1902. 8vo, pp. xix, 271.

The implied postulate of this essay is that the fundamental truths of natural religion constitute the presuppositions of Revelation. The development of this idea, while out of harmony with a certain very influential wing of modern theological thought, is certainly the truest line on which any sound apologetic can be constructed. Historically, Christianity has always claimed for itself that it is rational, *i.e.*, reasonable. Augustine's distinction between what is contrary to and what is above reason has never been shown to be invalid; and we believe that, as explicated by Leibnitz, it never can be invalidated: "For to be against reason means to contradict truths which are absolutely necessary and certain. But to be above reason means only to be contrary to our habitual experience or to surpass our ordinary powers of comprehension" (p. 13). Kant introduced the era of criticism of the Reason itself; and his work issued in empirical Agnosticism on the one side, ignoring all but the phenomenon, and idealistic Gnosticism on the other, ignoring all but the noumenon.

Kant's Will, Hegel's Reason and Schleiermacher's Feeling are combined and harmonized in Lotze's complex and complete personality; and this alone is the organ addressed in Revelation. Christianity is truth in the concrete and not, as is mathematics, in the abstract; and, therefore, it cannot be rationally demonstrated. The heresies of church history tried to explain and, in explaining, to rationalize Christian doctrine—witness Gnosticism, Sabellianism, Arianism, and so forth—and the successful answers to them were always simple reassertions of the fact of the Incarnation. Revelation, *eo facto*, must be dogmatic. "In fact, if we grant a revelation, dogma inevitably follows; and to object to dogma is to deny revelation, for dogma is only the authorized statement of the content of revelation, and as such to be distinguished from all subsequent inferences or speculations to which the subject-matter of dogma might give rise" (p. 129). The author maintains that dogma deals properly with history rather than with philosophy; he describes dogma as "abbreviated history compendiously expressed." We fear that he has forgotten how nearly identical, in their last analysis, truth and fact, or the concrete and the abstract, are; and particularly in Christianity. He tells us that in accepting the Christian dogma of the Trinity and of the Incarnation "we are not entangling ourselves among obsolete speculations"—which is true enough; but he adds: "We are only (*sic*) professing our belief in a historic fact of which the Christian Church—in the best language at its command—has recorded the tradition"

(p. 142). This seems to us altogether too naïve and easy; for certainly there is more in the acceptance of these great doctrines than "only" the profession of belief in a historic fact.

With the author's vigorous contention for the antecedent probability of a Revelation, we are in unqualified sympathy. We do not see the gain for Christianity in widening as far as possible the chasm between it and all other truth. The world is lost in sin and from God; but with the conception of God, as is God, that condition raises the presumption that the end is not yet. In our conscious inability, the expectation of a revelation to assist and to guide is but a part of our general expectation of the ultimate triumph of righteousness, of our assurance of the superiority and survival of the moral and the true. The author very briefly discusses the material content of Revelation. He rightly regards the personal equation in the apprehension of it as so important as to be almost determining. The substance of the Revelation is in this, that God is Love. The essence of Christianity is not in Faith, for all men live by faith. Life is but a universal reciprocity of trust. But the Christian is different from other men "because he lives by the particular faith that God is love" (p. 220). This Revelation appeals to no one faculty but to all of them, as Lotze saw them; and yet the author favors the primacy of the Will. Man is not primarily a reasoner but an agent. He is most interested not in the abstract but in the concrete. Christianity, then, is first of all an appeal through the emotions to the will; this, to be sure, must imply an intellectual view and, hence, the close alliance of Christianity, intellectually apprehended and interpreted, with philosophy—never becoming merely a philosophy and yet ever modifying philosophical thought whenever it has touched it.

The author's last chapter on "The Christian View of the Problem of Evil" is neither strong nor valuably suggestive. We think it much less so than his essay in *Lux Mundi* on "The Problem of Pain" (pp. 93-107). Evolution is heartily embraced, with the dubious entail that man must have fallen in order to rise. Consonantly, Genesis is pronounced mythical in form and there is no knowing how much or how little literal truth it records; although "as ideal history" (whatever that may mean) it is pronounced unapproached and unapproachable. Christian thinkers have held three views concerning evil: First, the everlasting punishment of the impenitent; secondly, the annihilation of the impenitent and immortality conditional on union with Christ, and thirdly, the final conversion of all men to God. The author thinks that because all these have been held by men who were equally devout Christians, "it is impossible to maintain that any one doctrine on the subject is exclusively Christian." This is a surprising *non sequitur* coming from a Bible-receiving Protestant. Concerning the first of the three, which is called the common orthodox doctrine, it is argued that punishment is not necessarily torment, and that therefore the punished soul, in seeing and acknowledging the justness of its fate, may be so resigned as to be "at peace." It is punished, but not tormented. This comes very near to a mild beatitude of the damned, and it is not squared with the teaching of Scripture nor with the words of our Lord Himself.

The book is at its best in discussing the presuppositions of Revelation and strongest outside the sphere of Revelation-content. The essence of Christianity is the Incarnation; and although its soteriological aspects are declared to be absolute and the attainment is in one place distinctly emphasized (see p. 235), yet after all it follows from the author's cast of thought as set forth in this as in his former books, that the Incarnation is the fulfillment of the expectations of reason and the climax of the revealing process. Some readers must feel that in the attempt to harmonize *Siu* with Evolution and

a salvation by atonement with an Incarnation by immanence, there is much land yet to be possessed. However, God's world is a unit and human reason, whose limitations are *de facto* and not *de jure*, must not be wholly put to confusion in reading its meaning: and, with the revealing Logos as the meeting place of Greek thought and Jewish faith, of Plato and Philo, of metaphysics and religion, the formula holds good against all comers that the universe points to Idealism, Idealism points to Theism, Theism points to a Revelation and a Revelation points to an Incarnation; only the Revelation of Christianity is not complete till that Incarnation culminates in the Cross.

Trenton, N. J.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

VISION AND AUTHORITY, or The Throne of St. Peter. By JOHN OMAN, M.A., B.D. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1902. 8vo, pp. x, 314.

This volume gives us a discussion of the ultimate source of authority in religion. It had its occasion in the practical issues of the present ecclesiastical situation in England, but it grew into an inquiry into the foundations on which any Church and all Churches rest. We should say that the author's temperament predisposes him to an undue emphasis of the subjective. In resisting the claims of the Pope, he is tempted to make war on some of his own friends as well. His style is monotonously brilliant, with sometimes keen insight and with occasional quick flashes of thought. But it is not calmly discursive, nor is it in any marked degree either persuasive or convincing.

The treatise is in four books, in this order: The Internal Authority, The External Authority, The Church's Creed and The Church's Organization. In the course of the book many things which are good and true are said, while some things appear which we should call neither good nor true. The argument is meant to be rational, but it displays an excessive tendency toward the rationalistic. It may be wholly true that "no attitude can be so irreligious as acquiescence in the untrue" (p. 5); it is hardly more than a half truth to say that "nothing is true for us till it flash upon our inward sight" (p. 104); but it is wholly untrue to say, "truth is not true except on personal conviction" (p. 182).

Nothing so imperils the plain truth as a scintillating epigram. It often hides the yonder side of a truth just as effectually as it exposes the hither side. The author informs us that the Church must learn that she can "retain no article in her creed she is not able to demonstrate in her life" (p. 212). That sounds well, but is it really true? At any rate it opens up a very debatable question. With a larger interpretation it may possibly be allowed to pass, but strictly construed it is preëminently misleading. Shall we drop from our creed the doctrine of the Trinity, or forsooth is Trinitarianism demonstrable in our life? How about the Inspiration of the Scriptures, the Immortality of the Soul, the Historical Incarnation and Atonement, or the Last Judgment?

It may be said that these may be "demonstrated in the life" indirectly, but we should say that it is *so* indirectly as to render the dogmatic dictum of the author dubious if not wholly erroneous.

The problem the author essays to discuss is a very large and deep one. If we are to take "Back to Christ" for our motto, and if we are to take it as meaning the elimination of all "intermediaries" (p. 185), then here again we would insist that the position of the author is right or wrong, as it may be given or taken. At best it is ambiguous. The reader is left in honest perplexity what is meant when he reads on the next page that "the life of the Church is the supreme manifestation of her Lord." What, then, is the Church but an "intermediary"?

We are uncertain just what is the exact purpose of the book, and we are uncertain, too, whether it is suited to accomplish it. It is hardly needed by those who are in sympathy with the author's views, and it will be of doubtful value to those who need light and leading on the question. And yet the author's spirit is sincere, reverent and loyal to the interests of the truth on the one side and of humanity on the other.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

FROM SCIENCE TO FAITH. The Lowell Institute Lectures, 1900, 1901.

By NEWMAN SMYTH, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902.

In spite of the author's theological limitations this is a charming book. It is a system of Natural Theology, applying Evolution to the world, from its primitive nebula to our final immortality, and is strong in its insistence on directive Providence in nature. The clerical lecturer is wise enough to avoid scientific pitfalls by securing the friendly help of Prof. Sidney I. Smith and Dr. W. R. Coe, very competent guides. But they must have been caught napping when they failed to intercept the statement that "modern Biology teaches an unbroken development from non-living to living." They know very well that on this, as on many other problems, modern Biology is agnostic, though every biologist is at liberty to hold his own opinion as to the probabilities, and some biologists confess that the opinion held by them is motivated by the wish to avoid admitting that there may have been a miraculous creation of life. Unproved opinions even of the highest men do not make science, and so far as it goes all the proofs on this matter favor the other side; though speculations of possibilities at the start merit consideration.

In arguing for Providence it is well shown that everywhere, in the atoms, the molecules, the animal cell, the egg and in the organism, from Amœba up to Man, direction and intelligence, and increasing vital activity, and at length love of life are manifested. At the outset we are told of Laplace declaring that if he were perfect in his mathematics he would be able from any present condition of the world to predict its exact condition at any future time; and he is reminded that his statement implies that the world is rationally made, and that probably he would ultimately find more need of God in his astronomy than he thought. Next we are told of Kepler, the great astronomer, sitting down before the salad prepared by his wife, and exclaiming that it may have come as the result of a "fortuitous concurrence," to which Mrs. Kepler's rejoinder is: "Yes, but it would not have been so nice and well dressed as mine."

In dealing with the moral character of the world's government, the author notes, that as animals advance in organization their enjoyments increase; that it is only among the higher forms that play is seen; and that in this we have evidence of Divine benevolence. Among the non-human animals very little pain occurs; they have no fear of death; and even when death arrives it is the hap of an instant, and it innres to the general happiness, for the death of the lower furnishes the dinner of their betters. Death adds to the total pleasure, because the death of some signifies the birth or the victory of others. "Without death and reproduction, no progressive development is possible; and assuming it, we cannot imagine a system having a greater balance of happiness." We are also reminded of unavoidable limitations, which account in part for the pains of existence; and that "doubtless God could have made a better world, but doubtless He never did." And the course of time is declared to have brought its alleviations, so that to man at least the present is a happier world than was that of our

forefathers. The prolonged infancy of the human species is singled out as greatly benefiting for the development of our individuality.

The argument is carried to its climax by showing that the life of man alone never reaches its finish in this world, but man is the only animal that is tortured by the fear of death, and that a brighter beyond is the only reasonable solution of this difficulty. The chapter on "The Prophetic View of Unfinished Nature" endeavors to meet the scientific presumption that in man as in the lower species death is the end of us, by insisting that in this life hunger and other appetites always have some provision for their satisfaction, and so our soul-hunger must be prophetic of a higher life. This is nature's prophecy of life eternal, in perfect adaptation to a perfect environment. As the "critical points" of nature show not a breach of continuity but a new series of actions, where new qualities suddenly appear, so likewise birth and death are to us critical points, bridges for the open way of the soul at both ends of life. So it concludes that as man's personality stands out as nature's supreme fact, likewise personal immortality is nature's conceivable best; and there it leaves us on the threshold, before an open door, waiting for "supernal revelation."

We are disappointed not to see any explanation that the fear of death, which the author ascribes to man exclusively of all the animals, arises from the fact that man exclusively is a sinner. This is not a mere organic degeneracy, like that which he finds in us in common with the blind lobsters of deep seas. The faith which comes through science, though good so far as it goes, can build no bridges and open no doors into a better life for those who are under sin; and to hold out such hope to them would be to light a wrecker's lamp. It is the "supernal revelation" that teaches us the better faith for the graver case. This sees a Redeemer, and Divine mercy, and forgiveness, and the removal thereby of death's sting, and more than victory for those in bondage. This other faith is also helpful to the providential faith which is so well defended by the author, as it enables us to make allowance for many things in our present experience which should otherwise be hard to understand.

Princeton University.

G. MACLOSIE.

THE LIMITS OF EVOLUTION AND OTHER ESSAYS, Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism. By G. H. HOWISON, LL.D., Mills Professor of Philosophy in the University of California. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1901. 8vo, pp. xxxv, 396.

In the April number of the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, the undersigned reviewed Prof. Howison's recent valuable and suggestive volume. I have now received a private letter from him in regard to my review, in which he thinks I ought to "retract" a certain assertion "as publicly as I have made it." I therefore prepare this brief note for THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, the successor of the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*. But the letter of Prof. Howison is of more than a passing interest. It abounds in new and suggestive ways of putting his thoughts. As a fresh exposition of his somewhat unfamiliar view of the constitution of the universe, I feel called upon to give it to the public in full, except where it is merely personal and private in its character. As the expressions employed are very frank and direct, and might seem to be severe to one who did not know the personal relations of writer and receiver, let me say that these relations are such that no possible brevity or directness on Prof. Howison's part could ever be understood by me as indicating any, even the least, lack of good feeling, or call for anything except the most friendly response.

After some merely personal remarks, Prof. Howison writes:

"Two or three things [in your review], however, I should feel it necessary to amend, as they are misleading.

"(1) The first is the worst. You accuse me of 'an air of hostility throughout the book to . . . science,' as well as to 'orthodoxy and Calvinism and authority in religion.' Now your saying I am hostile to 'orthodoxy,' to Calvinism and to authority in religion, I do not mind. But your saying I am hostile to science I think absolutely without excuse. I cannot conceive where you imagine you get your warrant for such an assertion. I am sure it does me a great wrong, and I think you ought to retract it as publicly as you have made it."

Of course I did not mean that Prof. Howison was hostile to science in the abstract sense, or to the pursuit of scientific inquiries, or to pure science or correct science, for this would be to make him hostile to the truth itself. But after all, a re-reading of the first and the sixth essays leaves on my mind, whether rightly or not, the impression of some considerable degree of impatience with science *as it is*, with the common run of the speculations of scientific men, and with the tendency to magnify the solely empirical method, in distinction from the *à priori*, and to extend it to the realm of philosophy. If I am understood to say more than that, I cheerfully retract. I think that Prof. Howison is friendly to every department of human investigation.

What follows is of more importance. The Professor continues:

"(2) When you say my 'theory of the world is that there exists *from all eternity* [italics mine] a plurality of personal spiritual beings,' etc., you quite mistake my meaning about the 'eternity' of the souls other than God. Eternity, in my system, as in that of Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel, Harris, Caird and Royce, is the name for supertemporal reality, or 'existence itself, in so far as it is conceived of as *necessary*,' to borrow Spinoza's own language in the matter. We all mean simply the absolute and changeless reality of the being, whose process of *experience* lies, so to speak, within this 'eternal' visional instant, and forms a presentation to him, running to a past *in infinitum* and to a future *in infinitum*; this indefinite process being made possible by the spontaneous conscious-form called Time, which is a factor in the 'eternal' or absolutely primal and real consciousness of the being."

In the sentence quoted from me, I was attempting to put into language intelligible to people like myself, who reject totally Kant's doctrine of the ontological or objective invalidity of time, Dr. Howison's idea of the constitution of the world. I did not misunderstand his eternity; but since all souls are each "*causa sui*" and "*necessary*," that would have to mean *to a man who did accept the objective validity of time*, "without a beginning," or "from all eternity" [in my sense of that word]. Putting the review article and Prof. Howison's present remarks together, the reader will perceive what the theory is.

Prof. Howison continues:

"(3) The reason why you still think my view solipsistic is that you state only half of my argument for the reality of other minds. You never get any further than my major premise, viz., that every mind spontaneously defines itself, and necessarily, in terms of others. The equally important minor, that each mind infallibly knows itself to be real, you always leave out. Of course if you stop with my major, you get nothing trans-subjective, or at any rate nothing but one's objective *idea* of a trans-subjective. The refutation of solipsism that I give is this: The *idea* of one's self is im-

possible except in terms of the *idea* of other selves; or, the very *idea* of my being is necessarily conjoined with the idea of others. Hence, if I do *really* exist, that also must really exist apart from which I am unthinkable. But that I do really is certain, is *fact*; for every attempt to suppose the contrary is but the actual existence of the thing supposed not to be. Therefore, as surely as I exist, other minds also exist; when I am *fact*, then they are *fact*."

Nay! It was not misunderstanding of the argument, but rejection of its validity! "The *idea* of one's self is impossible except in terms of the *idea* of other selves"—that I reject. The idea of self requires *some* "check," but, as I said, "the soul defines itself by setting *itself* in one aspect over against itself in another." It does not need to self-definition the idea of *another* self.

Dr. Howison concludes:

"Now I believe this is absolutely sound. If it is sound, I think I may without exaggeration claim that it is a very important contribution to philosophy indeed. For it supplies at one stroke the long-desiderated, solid causeway out of solipsism, the long-missed demonstration of the logical right of our belief in the existence of fellow-minds, and the long-sought demonstration of the being of God."

I close by repeating my former statement that the book is "a mine of fruitful suggestions for every student of the fundamental articles of the Christian faith."

Oberlin, O.

FRANK HUGH FOSTER.

CHRISTENTUM UND BILDUNG. Ein Vortrag von Provincial-Schulrat Professor VOIGT. Zweite durchgesehene Auflage. Leipzig: Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1903. Price, 60 Pf.

Prof. Voigt's discourse on Christentum und Bildung (Christianity and Culture) is a piece of work of no mean merit. The fact that a second edition was called for, which does not often occur in the case of a pamphlet, is sufficient proof that the public, which is interested in the discussion of pedagogical subjects, appreciates the author's work very much indeed.

The concluding sentences of his discourse recapitulate the author's ideas in the development of his subject. Says he: "Our investigation is at an end. Our aim was to show, that Christianity demands culture; that it points out to culture aim and means in a peculiar manner and with matchless depth; that it makes possible for us to approach nearer to the ideal of culture; and finally that it guarantees the reality of this approach." This is the framework of the development of his theme. Jesus, according to our author, is the centre of true human culture. Compared with other great men, He is the only one who has continuous value for our culture. He is God's messenger and the genius of humanity; the royal head of the human race, the foundation and the aim of all true human culture.

The formal development of the theme is excellent. Materially I am not satisfied. It is true many fine thoughts have been expressed with regard to Christ's person, the immortality of the soul, Christ's atoning work; but the author's theological and philosophical position, which is modern, makes it impossible for him to assent heartily to Christ's divinity in—*sit venia verbo*—a metaphysical sense. Culture undoubtedly was man's destination in the state of rectitude; but without Christianity as a remedial scheme, and not only as a guiding principle, true culture, which is pleasing in God's sight, is an impossibility. Christ's calling did not simply consist in *introducing the*

religion of the spirit as a new and higher element into the historical movement. He came to "seek and to save that which was lost." Only on a Scriptural christological and soteriological basis genuine culture can be built up. Modern theologians lose sight of man's lost estate and the result is that their view of Christ and his work is stunted.

I repeat, however, the booklet, as far as it goes, is worthy of earnest consideration by all who are interested in Christian culture.

Dubuque, Ia.

NICHOLAS M. STEFFENS.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE CULT. By J. J. TAYLOR, M.A., D.D. 8vo, pp. 40. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1420 Chestnut street.

A SHORT METHOD WITH CHRISTIAN SCIENCE. By ALBERT G. LAWSON, D.D. 8vo, pp. 53. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1420 Chestnut street.

The former of these pamphlets contains three sermons delivered in the course of the author's regular ministry in the Freemason Street Baptist Church, Norfolk, Va. The latter is a paper "delivered by request before ministerial conferences in Philadelphia and New York." Both are bright and vigorous. Both aim to show, and do show, that Christian Science is "neither scientific nor Christian." In our view the frequent use of the *argumentum ad hominem*, particularly in the second, does not add to their force, though we admit that the temptation to use it is, in such a case as this, well nigh irresistible.

Princeton.

W. BRENTON GREENE, JR.

III.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

DIE REICHSGOTTESHOFFNUNG IN DEN ÄLTESTEN CHRISTLICHEN DOKUMENTEN UND BEI JESUS. Von Lic. PAUL WERNLE, a. o. Professor an der Universität Basel. Tübingen und Leipzig: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1903. 8vo, pp. 58.

The view that our Lord's conception of the kingdom of God was exclusively eschatological, originally advocated by Schmoller (*Die Lehre vom Reiche Gottes im Neuen Testament*, 1891) and afterwards urged with great strenuousness and skill by Johannes Weiss (*Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*, 1st ed., 1892; 2d ed., 1900), seems to be rapidly gaining ground in Germany and may be confidently expected to become in the near future the reigning view to which, for the time being at least, the stamp "*wissenschaftlich*" will attach. Bousset, who at first held more or less aloof from Weiss in this matter, has in a review of the second edition of the latter's book in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung* (901, Col. 563-568), and more recently in a couple of articles in the *Theologische Rundschau* (October and November, 1902), in principle gone over to his view. And now, in the treatise before us, comes Wernle, an advanced Ritschlian, and arrives at the same conclusion in the most approved modern style. The trustworthiness of the Gospels as records of our Lord's teaching has become doubtful to such an extent that even in regard to a central topic like the kingdom it is esteemed unscientific and unmethodical to put directly the question: What view did Jesus hold on this point according to the Synoptical testimony? What these Gospels reflect is not in the first place the opinion of Jesus Himself on any given subject, but the individually colored or histori-

cally modified conception of each Evangelist regarding the content of his teaching. Only by indirection, therefore, it is believed, can we approach the consciousness of Jesus at all. Wernle proceeds to apply this method of indirection. He first inquires what view of the kingdom each of the documents represents, and then seeks to weigh the probabilities that arise from the results thus ascertained with reference to Jesus' own original position. Meanwhile he congratulates himself on the substantial agreement between his own conclusions and those reached by Bousset, who still applies the direct method of interrogating the Synoptists. It goes without saying that an investigation conducted on this principle does not confine itself to the Gospels. Paul and the author of the Apocalypse, as writers standing nearer to the time of Jesus, can lay claim to being heard even before Matthew, Mark or Luke. And back of Matthew and Luke lie the Logia, bringing us nearest to the Lord Himself, although at present approachable through the Evangelists only. Wernle then begins with Paul. Here he finds a twofold conception of the kingdom of God, the eschatological one, according to which it is equivalent to the coming spiritual æon, which shall take the place of the present world of *σάρξ* and *φθορά*. Thus: I Cor. vi. 9; xv. 50; Gal. v. 21; Eph. v. 5; I Thess. ii. 12; and the church conception, according to which the kingdom is a present reality, and that not only as a kingdom of Christ but specifically as a kingdom of God, as Rom. xiv. 17 and I Cor. iv. 20, compared with I Cor. xv. 24 and Col. i. 13, show. This identification between the church and the kingdom, so far as we can see, applies only to the Epistles of the first captivity, to Ephesians and Colossians, because only here the *ἐκκλησία* becomes a collective, all-comprehensive sphere, what we call dogmatically the invisible church, whereas in the earlier Epistles it denotes the local church. The correct formula for Paul's earlier position, therefore, is that the *βασιλεία Χριστοῦ* = the invisible comprehensive background of which the *ἐκκλησία*, are the single visible manifestations; later on the conception of the *ἐκκλησία* is enlarged so that it becomes interchangeable with that of the *regnum Christi*. And even so, the interchangeableness is not complete, for the *regnum Christi* over all things extends further than his organic headship over the church. What Wernle further says to characterize the Pauline conception of this present kingdom of God or Christ is somewhat one-sided: "It is no finished quantity, but in dependence on the progress of missions its limits are widened, and that not peacefully, gradually, but by continual battles between God and his enemies, between the Spirit of God and the dæmons, whilst men are no more than passive objects about whom the struggle is waged." This scarcely covers Rom. xiv. 17, "the kingdom of God is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit." Nevertheless, as a vivid description of what was certainly an important element in Paul's own extremely vivid and concrete mode of viewing the kingdom, and as a corrective of too abstract a representation, the statement has its value. Its one-sidedness foreshadows the one-sidedness of the interpretation in our Lord's own teaching of the twofold aspect of the kingdom, where, as we shall presently see, the tendency likewise becomes apparent to eschatologize as much as possible whatever utterances are found relative to a present kingdom; so that the present kingdom is made out to consist not in righteousness or communion with God as such, but only in certain pneumatic anticipations of the future æon.

The same degree of correctness and the same degree of one-sidedness may be recognized in the pages devoted to the standpoint of the Apocalypse. Of course that great emphasis was to be thrown on the future, one might expect in a book of this kind. Still passages like i. 6 and v. 10 are certainly not, as Wernle himself admits, mere instances of anticipated eschatology. Only,

like the Christology and the Universalism of the Apocalypse, Wernle derives this conception of a present kingdom from the influence of Paulinism.

Among the Synoptists Matthew is first examined. Here the twofold representation of a future and a present kingdom lies on the surface. But the form in which the latter appears in a majority of instances, as in the parables of the mustard-seed and leaven, the exposition of the parables of the wheat and the tares and the fishnet, further in Matthew xvi. 18, xxi. 1-14, xxviii. 18, 20, is at the outset declared younger than Paul, younger than the reality of the church itself, to which these sayings refer. In respect to the two parables first mentioned Wernle's procedure differs from that of Bousset, who thinks that these parables are wrongly understood to refer to the immanent development of the kingdom of God, the real reference being to the surprising suddenness with which the final kingdom will spring into being out of its present small miraculous beginnings and the immense proportion it will assume. We think on this point the exegesis of Wernle is to be preferred, although, of course, we do not share his views as to the later origin of the conception. In the whole Sermon on the Mount Wernle finds no trace of a present kingdom, not even in vi. 33. And yet here, even if it be admitted that the $\sigma\eta\tau\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon$ does not of itself exclude the eschatological reference, since "Seek his kingdom" might mean, "Strive after the privilege of future entrance into his kingdom," still the further statement, "All these things (i.e., such things as food and raiment) shall be added unto you," does not favor such exegesis. The "food and raiment" are to be added not to the seeking after the kingdom but to the kingdom itself, and it would give no sense to speak of them as additions to the eschatological kingdom. Besides, the combination "his kingdom" and "his righteousness" points to a present kingdom of predominantly ethical content. To the same view points the comparison of "the smaller in the kingdom" with John in Matthew xi. 11-13, for where Jesus speaks of "greater" and "smaller," He, as a rule, does not measure by eschatological but by ethical and religious standards. Wernle thinks that, while the conception of a present kingdom here cannot be denied, this must be assimilated as much as possible to the future kingdom, so that after all Jesus would have in mind only the first signs of the coming æon. Here we would rather go with Bousset, who openly acknowledges that the saying as it stands does not fit into the eschatological conception of the kingdom, although we must refuse to follow him where he endeavors to escape the consequences of this admission by the following reasoning: "The original word of Jesus read: Among those born of women none is greater than John. The early church added: The smallest in the kingdom of God ($= \dot{\iota} \epsilon\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\alpha$) is greater than he." Wernle bases his eschatological interpretation on the mysterious words about the $\beta\acute{\iota}\alpha\zeta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ of the kingdom, which have so long been a veritable crux to the exegetes and on which even Dalman in his *Worte Jesu* has not been able to shed any new light. So long as the true meaning of the words is entirely obscure, the sole support for such a use of them must lie in the general congruity of the two ideas of eschatology and violence, a precarious enough basis. When our author finally reaches the conclusion that the first Gospel knows of a present kingdom in a twofold sense: (a) its presence in the miracles which anticipate its final coming; (b) its presence in the church as the regnum Christi, and declares the second form younger than Paul, we must enter our dissent, and maintain that, even discounting the passages of the second class, which speak in terms applicable to the later church (although we see no valid reason for denying such passages to Jesus), there remain still some well-authenticated instances in which our Lord refers to the kingdom as a present reality in the ethical and religious sphere.

The investigation of the Gospel of Luke yields quite a different result. Here Wernle finds, so far as the author himself in distinction from his sometimes intractable material is concerned, nothing but a desire to treat the kingdom as a future thing. Luke is even charged with so manipulating the connection in which certain utterances of Jesus occurred as to make the conception of a present kingdom vanish out of them. From this motive he separated vii. 28 and xvi. 16 and gave the latter a setting which robs it of the last vestige of its original reference. It is hardly possible to believe, apart from the questionableness of the procedure from a moral point of view, that an intelligent writer like Luke can have consciously wrenched an utterance of Jesus from a context in which it was perfectly intelligible and forced it into a new context where, as Wernle himself admits, it loses all sense. What possible meaning can he have attached to the palpable contrast between the law and the prophets which were "until John" and the *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* of the kingdom, which began from then, if this latter term expresses no more than the announcement of the future kingdom? Was there perhaps no such announcement of the kingdom in the law and the prophets? And if the period beginning with John brought something more, something new in reference to the kingdom, then Luke must have attached in this one passage at least a stronger meaning to the *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* and the whole theory about his attempt to eschatologize the kingdom-conception falls to the ground. We confess to equal skepticism with reference to the motive which, according to Wernle induced the Evangelist to place the parables of the leaven and the mustard-seed in chap. xiii, viz., the emphatic expression of an anti-Judaistic Universalism, the tree growing out of the mustard-seed forming a pointed contrast to the fig-tree of vss. 6-9. Unfortunately the polemic against Jesus described in vss. 10-17 arose from the ruler of the synagogue, while it is expressly stated in vs. 17 that the multitude rejoiced for all the glorious things that were done by Jesus; it can, therefore, never have furnished to the mind of Luke a justification for the rejection of the Jews *en masse* and the adoption of the Gentiles in their stead, and thus fails to account for the insertion of the two parables in this context. More convincing is what the author writes about the enigmatical words of chap. xvii, 21, *ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐντός ὑμῶν ἐστίν*. We must confess that considerable weight attaches to the arguments he advances for an eschatological interpretation of this saying. His exegesis briefly amounts to this, that the words mean that, in contrast to its coming, *μετὰ παρατηρήσεως*, the kingdom of God will suddenly stand in your midst—i.e., it will be realized quite unexpectedly. The only thing which makes us hesitate to accept this is the fact that Luke elsewhere frequently employs the phrase *ἐν μέσῳ* for the idea "in the midst of," and not a single time *ἐντός*. This raises the question whether after all *ἐντός* does not mean here "within," so that the passage would remain a witness for the immanent conception of the kingdom. Finally, we receive a very unsatisfactory answer to the question what may have induced the third Evangelist thus to scorn the idea of a present kingdom at a time when the latter had become perfectly familiar. Wernle explains this from the sad developments the writer had witnessed in the history of the church, experiences which rendered it impossible for him to recognize in the church any longer the beginning of the manifestation of the kingdom of God. But at any rate, it must be replied, these sad experiences did not prevent Luke from placing the high estimate upon the church to which the Book of Acts bears witness on every page. If the church was good enough to be made the subject of an extended treatise, it cannot have been too bad to pass for the provisional embodiment of the kingdom. And who will believe that such a consideration determined Luke to fly in the face of the explicit statements of the Apostle Paul, who had declared the church the present kingdom of God?

Mark's position again is held to differ from Matthew's in another respect. While in chap. iv., in the parables of the mustard-seed and the seed growing of itself, he incorporates material which identifies the kingdom with the growing church, yet it is not the thought of this identification to which his main interest attaches. All the parables in this context are given, not for the sake of their subject-matter, but for the sake of their form. The frame is more important to Mark than the picture. His philosophy of the parables carries back into the teaching of Jesus the sharp separation between the church and the world as it was first worked out by Paul. Jesus must have spoken in mysteries to those outside. Mark reasons, because in the Evangelist's own day the world is incapable of understanding the truth of the Gospel. Wernle, however, in so far differs from Jülicher, as he does not believe this theory to have originated from a misunderstanding of the parabolic form of teaching. The theory was there first; afterwards the philosophy of the parables was adjusted to it. But whether this hypothesis presents itself in one form or another, to our mind it labors under the serious disadvantage that it leaves the question unanswered, why the Evangelists introduce this peculiar explanation of our Lord's parabolic teaching at one definite juncture of his ministry and do not associate it with the parables that come before or after. Even if Jülicher's contention were correct that they mean to offer it as an explanation of the parabolic teaching as a whole, the fact that it is thus introduced at one particular point ought to make cautious critics pause and reflect, whether after all there may not be a historic basis for this theory of the Evangelists in Jesus' own intention on a certain definite occasion. Apart from this unintentional introduction of the church-kingdom idea in the material of the parable Mark makes no reference, Wernle thinks, to a present kingdom. On the contrary, he everywhere identifies the kingdom with the future æon. Here, as in Luke, we obtain no satisfactory answer to the question why the Evangelist should have taken pains to avoid the once firmly established idea that the church was a real, if only a provisional, embodiment of the kingdom.

Last of all, the Logia are scanned for an answer to the alternative: future or present kingdom? The answer is believed to be important, because this source, at least in the parts common to Matthew and Luke, shows no trace of Pauline influence. Both sides of the alternative are represented in about equal proportion. But the passages belonging to the former class are all-comprehensive, cover the entire Christian life, have a practical regulative significance. On the other hand, those pointing in the direction of a present kingdom are explainable from specific motives. The two sayings which make the kingdom date from the time after John the Baptist (Matthew xi. 11, 12; Luke vii. 28; xvi. 16) must be interpreted in the light of the desire of the early Christians to prove to the followers of the Baptist that the religion of Jesus was something specifically new. In a similar way Matt. xii. 28; Luke xi. 20 furnish an illustration of the early apologetic use made against the Jews of the casting out of demons in the power of the Spirit, in proof of the divine character of the church. And with reference to the only remaining instance, that of the parables of the leaven and mustard-seed, the hint is thrown out that even this in the intention of the Logia represents an apologetic attempt to justify the smallness of the beginnings of things with the prospect of their greatness in the end: "The divine powers have begun to work, the demons are fleeing, the great cosmical revolution is sure to follow." The kingdom is there, but only by manner of anticipation, in the miracles, not in moral or religious influences as such.

Last of all, on the basis of the foregoing the position of Jesus in the question at issue is defined. This is done in the following propositions: 1. Jesus

emphatically affirmed the strictly eschatological conception of the kingdom. 2. In all probability the belief that in some sense the kingdom is incipiently present can be traced to Jesus Himself. This cannot be affirmed with certainty, inasmuch as the idea might have sprung from the early Christian apologetic. Still after due consideration Wernle rejects this alternative and affirms the authenticity of the utterances involved. 3. The sense in which this presence of the kingdom was affirmed by Jesus can have been none other than the dramatic-supernatural sense. Of an ethical or immanent conception the ancient sources contain no trace. The ethical and internal have their place in the teaching of Jesus, but only as conditions for entrance into the future kingdom. With the kingdom as such they do not at any point coincide. Paul in this respect had a more internalizing conception than Jesus, inasmuch as he at least declared the kingdom to consist in "righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." To Jesus and his first disciples the miraculous element stood in the foreground. 4. So far as can be traced, Jesus held this conviction regarding the presence of the kingdom in the sense defined from the beginning to the end of his life, no development or change of attitude on this point appearing in any of the sources. 5. It is confidently assumed that Jesus had begun to denationalize the conception of the kingdom. On this point lay his great contribution towards the universalism of the religion associated with his name. While his belief in the presence of the kingdom has, against his intention, become the great weapon by means of which the Catholic Church has usurped her hierarchical power, the denationalizing tendency has lifted the idea of the kingdom for all the future clear out of the sphere of ecclesiasticism.

The question may be asked, What is lost by such a reconstruction of our Lord's teaching as is here proposed? What difference does it make if the immanent ethical element be taken out of the kingdom-idea, provided it retain a prominent and necessary place elsewhere in his teaching, say among the requirements for entrance into the kingdom. We answer that in our view it is impossible here to alter the internal arrangement of ideas without at the same time modifying the spiritual emphasis. The kingdom of God was to Jesus the supreme religious ideal. Consequently, whatever is made to fall outside of this can no longer lay claim to absolute importance. If righteousness ceases to be a part of the conception of the kingdom, then, however much it may be insisted on as an entrance requirement, it assumes the character of a means to an end. For this reason we believe that the ultra-eschatological interpretation of Jesus' teaching on the kingdom involves a serious danger to the recognition of his authority as final in the ethical sphere. The spirit of the age is not over friendly to eschatology, and on the other hand is inclined to ethicize in every direction. Will it still continue to bow before Jesus as the supreme teacher of ethics after having been told that righteousness did not form a constituent element of his crowning religious conception? The semi-apologetic tone in which even now writers like Bousset and Wernle speak of the eschatological strain in the ethics of our Lord makes us fear that this question will have to be answered in the negative.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE CHURCH (ECCLESIA). By GEORGE DANA BOARDMAN, D.D., LL.D.
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901. 8vo, pp. xi, 221.

This book is a series of studies in the Christian Ecclesia. Dr. Boardman has already given to the public a corresponding series of studies embodied in his book *The Kingdom*. In the volume before us the subject is treated not

so much from the point of view of the church historian as from that of the exegete. The purpose, particularly in the earlier portion of the book, is to make the studies purely Biblical, and with this in view he has furnished us with a book rich in suggestion.

The subject is treated under three aspects: First, the Church as a Primitive Society; secondly, the Church as a Modern Problem; thirdly, the Church as a Divine Ideal.

The evolution of the Primitive Church is traced through the Acts of the Apostles and the epistles carefully and with completeness. No unwarranted deductions are drawn from the Scriptural language, save it be in the emphasis which Dr. Boardman places upon the implied mode of baptism. At times he seems here to us to have overstepped the limits of logical deduction. In speaking of the conversion and baptism of the Ethiopian Eunuch he says: "We see, for instance, that Philip baptized this Ethiopian solely on the ground that the latter believed that the hero of the fifty-third of Isaiah was none other than Jesus the Nazarene. There is no evidence that Philip catechized the traveler as to the signs of his having experienced religion. He did not admit him on 'probation'; he did not submit the case to any 'session'; he did not baptize the stranger into the fellowship of any church" (p. 15).

We can but ask whether Philip was not as fully convinced of the reality of the man's faith as if, as the Moderator of a "session," he had submitted to him the questions usually asked. Without this knowledge he could not have baptized him.

Again, in his discussion of this event in the life of the church, Dr. Boardman leaves the impression that immersion was not merely the mode of baptism in the early church, but that baptism meant immersion. "Both Philip and the Eunuch went down into the water and came up out of the water—an inconvenience wholly needless if baptism meant only affusion, but a blessed necessity if baptism meant immersion and conversion" (p. 15).

In the discussion of the Church as a Modern Problem there is much that is pertinent to the situation confronting us. There seems to be a tendency to minimize the value of dogma, but Dr. Boardman would by no means dispense with it. Dogma, however, should never be allowed to stand in the way of the soul seeking admission to the church. "The primitive standard of church membership was neither dogma nor rite, but Christliness of purpose" (p. 59). A plea is made for the validity of child conversion. Not that they are sinless, but that the spirit of childhood is the natural emblem of the Christian spirit. "To expect the early conversion of children is profoundly philosophical, for it is in entire harmony with the genius of Christianity" (p. 61).

The difficulty here presents itself as to the manner in which this membership is to be recognized. Dr. Boardman does not believe in child baptism, because he claims to find no warrant for it in the New Testament. He sets aside as of no value the covenant principle and thus loses the natural and, as we believe, the Biblical solution. His suggestion is that the difficulty can best be met by some polity founded upon the plan of probation or of confirmation. The discussion of the modern problem of Baptism is conducted with generous fairness, and the arguments for the change from the primitive mode "by the vast majority of Christ's people" are stated with clearness. Yet he pleads earnestly and with power for the primitive mode. He shows the beauty of the conception, "buried with Christ in Baptism." For him it is impossible to separate between the meaning of the mode and the act itself, and he suggests that a return to this primitive method by churches would abolish many of the disputes which divide Christendom.

He supports his argument by furnishing us with two parallel columns of

New Testament passages in which the word βαπτίζω occurs. In the one column the word is translated "immerse," in the other "sprinkle," showing, as Dr. Boardman thinks, that the sense of the former is at the same time stronger and more accurate.

Dr. Boardman's argument against the "close communion" of the Baptist Church is very convincingly made on the ground that Baptism is but a technical prerequisite to the Lord's Supper. His non-Baptist Irenicon is "Immersion," while his Baptist Irenicon is "open communion."

In his discussion of creeds Dr. Boardman shows them to be essential, but he would have them tested by their value for the present need. Having thus tested them, cling to that which stands and throw away that which falls; for the past, though often oracular, is not always infallible.

In church worship we need to seek a mean between that which is barren of forms and the extreme of the liturgical, which begets lifeless routine. Forms are needed, and those which embody the spiritual language of the soul should not be neglected.

The problem of church unification is discussed. A plea is made for a controlling aim which shall rise above denominationalism, in which the welfare of Christ's kingdom as a whole shall be paramount. Auspicious auguries for this wider and nobler view are found in the numerous union societies throughout Christendom. These point to the realization of this longing of many hearts—namely, one Christian Church throughout the world, even the one Holy Catholic Church of the Son of God.

The third part of the treatise deals with the "Church as a Divine Ideal." After defining the meaning of the word church in its various uses Dr. Boardman draws a sharp distinction between "a church" and "the church." "A church" is the earthly side of Christianity, as "the church" is the heavenly side. We can alter "a church." We cannot alter "the church" (p. 164). This distinction must always be borne in mind and is of the utmost consequence doctrinally and practically. Our Lord's meaning in the difficult passage Matt. xvi, 13-19 is given as follows: "Peter, thou alike in thyself and in thy name, and in thy confession, art rock; and on this rock I will build." This divine ideal is set forth as "The Church of the King's Rock," "The Church of God's Temple," "The Church of Christ's Body," "The Church of the King's Bride" and "The Church of the New Jerusalem." Scripture passages bearing upon these various phases are deduced with care and completeness. The whole discussion is Scriptural and helpful in the highest degree. The book shows a breadth of Scripture study which brings fresh suggestions and new meaning for many who labor in the Church of Christ. It is a fitting companion to *The Kingdom*, for both of which Dr. Boardman has our hearty thanks.

Princeton, N. J.

MAITLAND VANCE BARTLETT.

IV.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS AGE. By JOSEPH MCCABE, Author of *Peter Abelard*, etc. 8vo, pp. vii, 516. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903 (published December, 1902). [Also: 8vo, pp. x, 441. London: Duckworth & Co., 1902.]

Mr. McCabe was formerly known as the Very Reverend Father Anthony of the Order of Saint Francis. He came, however, happily to see the error of his monastic ways, and very properly gave them up. Discharging thus his duty to himself, he has further discharged it to humanity by revealing

some of the abuses of the monastic system in two somewhat pungent and very profitable volumes published during the closing years of the last century—*Twelve Years in a Monastery*, and *Life in a Modern Monastery*. With the opening of a new century he has turned to new themes, and we are already his debtors for two interesting essays in Christian biography—one dealing with *Peter Abelard* (8vo, pp. ix, 402), published in the midsummer of 1901, and the other, this *St. Augustine*, published but little more than a year afterwards. We would gladly forget his past distresses and rejoice only in his present gifts. But Mr. McCabe will not permit this. He drags his past on with him and persists in writing his biographical studies from the point of view of what he himself calls the "escaped monk." In the study of Abelard, this was of little importance: Mr. McCabe's monastic experiences perhaps even prepared him the better to understand Abelard and his times. In this study of Augustine, it has brought something very like ruin.

Our complaint is not merely that Mr. McCabe occasionally obtrudes reminiscences of his own experiences into his biographical sketches. This is a fault of taste. After all, we go to a life of Augustine to learn about Augustine and not about the author; and it is for the moment a matter of indifference to the reader that the author has, say, been injuriously spoken of (as, e.g., p. 201) for having followed his bent and exposed the abuses of a mode of life he once shared. But there is not very much of this in the book and it could not in any event seriously injure its value.

Our complaint is not even merely that Mr. McCabe has brought with him into the broader life he now enjoys a cynical temper and a carping spirit which warp his judgment and deform his pages. Surely the bitterness he is constantly exhibiting against "ecclesiastics" and "hagiographers" is somewhat superfluous. And it is not rendered more engaging by the circumstance that he includes under these complimentary designations well nigh the whole body of his predecessors in the study of his subject—so that there runs through his book a vein of scorn of previous biographers of Augustine. "Mr. Marcus Dods," for example, is an "ecclesiastic" and hence represents the facts of Augustine's life "in safe terms" (p. 38). The picture that "most of his ecclesiastical biographers" draw of Augustine's unregenerate days—though transcribed from Augustine's own account—is mere "pretence" (p. 54). When the biographers follow Ambrose's version of a matter they are "trustful hagiographers" (p. 113). Certain articles in Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Christian Biography* are recommended as "choice specimens of the literary art of tempering justice with mercy, which is so admirably cultivated by the ecclesiastical writer" (p. 312). Drs. Miiman and Smith are satirically characterized as "safe commentators"; and it is added: "If we *must* have our Gibbon served up with an abundance of ecclesiastical sauce, it is at least time there was an improvement in its quality" (p. 111). This kind of thing is really very bad, and it is unfortunately pervasive (cf. e.g., pp. 58, 121, 206, 222, 281, 355, 397, 413). And the unhappy facility of innuendo thus exhibited is permitted to cut much deeper than merely into the credit of previous students of the subject. "It is probable," Mr. McCabe tells us, "that Manicheism did no more than Christianity towards the purification of the Empire" (p. 64). "It is impossible," he says with a truly monkish skill of suggestion, "to discuss here what probability there was of Mithraism absorbing Christianity, instead of Christianity absorbing Mithraism" (p. 106). Similarly, "whether it be that 'Plato wrote a human preface to the Gospels,' as De Maistre said, or that the evangelists wrote a human appendix to Plato, as others think, it is hardly our duty to inquire here" (p. 159). Speaking of Augustine's commentaries on Genesis, he drops the incidental remark: "One reads them

with a feeling of pity now that Mr. Sayce and other reputable scholars have told us whence these stories were copied" (p. 217, cf. pp. 362, 379). Possibly some piquancy may be added to the page by this mode of writing. It will scarcely add to the confidence with which the reader will commit himself to the guidance of the author. But even such faults may possibly belong to the form rather than to the substance of a book.

Our real complaint begins when we note that Mr. McCabe's whole presentation of Augustine's life and character is affected by his point of view, and that not merely in tone and proportion but also in its very substance. He has given us a very different Augustine from the Augustine of what we may call, to please Mr. McCabe, "the hagiographic tradition,"—that is to say, of history, as that history is set down in contemporary accounts (including Augustine's own narrative in his *Confessions*) and embodied in contemporary records. He looks at Augustine through spectacles which have distorted his figure out of all proportion—throwing up into great prominence subordinate elements in his character and unimportant aspects of his life, and obscuring the really significant features. Augustine was above all else and before all else the "reformer of Christian piety," as even Harnack puts it—"even Harnack," for as Prof. West truly points out (*Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, xii, 183), Harnack does not himself do justice in his thought of Augustine to his "personal religion." He revolutionized the whole conception of the truly "Christian life" and introduced into Christendom a completely new ideal of Christian feeling and aspiration. Of all this Mr. McCabe has not a word to say. Of the real significance of Augustine's doctrine of Grace for his own inner life and for the history of thought, he betrays no conception. Here is Hamlet with Hamlet left out with a vengeance. On the other hand the wholly insignificant matter of Augustine's attitude towards marriage and his deflected opinions about the sexual passion are thrown out into a prominence beyond all reason. It might be unjust to say that every nasty story and every morbid expression is sought out and exploited to Augustine's discredit. But a very undue emphasis is certainly thrown on this aspect of Augustine's life and teaching.

Even such distortions of the figure he is drawing do not constitute, however, Mr. McCabe's worst fault as a biographer of Augustine. The fact seems to be that the whole portrait that is presented is dominated by the conception that its tendency was distinctly downward, and that, taken in its entirety, it was fraught with evil rather than good for the Church and the world. To secure this effect Mr. McCabe is at considerable pains first to discredit Augustine's own account of the evil of his early life and then systematically to depreciate the attainments of his later life. His was, it seems, a bright and essentially good boyhood and his young manhood blossomed out into a high-minded devotion to "reason." But then, alas, he fell under the domination of "authority." Reason gradually ceased to be his "darling" (p. 207, cf. pp. 233, 479). He steadily became more and more a dupe to silly miraculous stories (p. 466), a contemner of all that is valuable in life (p. 213), a slave to the ecclesiastical machine, an intolerant controversialist who stopped at no means to secure the defeat of his opponents (pp. 214, 232)—if not a blasphemer, yet certainly a persecutor and injurious. "The bloody pages of mediæval history rise before us as we dwell on his later ideas" (p. 395). Thus Augustine's progress according to Mr. McCabe was the opposite of Paul's: his development, like that of the Church itself, according to Harnack, was a "pathological" process. It is quite likely that (like Harnack, in the parallel case) Mr. McCabe might deny this and declare that "on the whole" there was, in his view, an "advance." We should be forced to reply (as in the case of Harnack) that he has not so

depicted it. The reader takes away from his book the distinct impression that Augustine grew steadily a worse man and a more evil influence as he grew older.

If we ask after the account we are to give of this low view of Augustine's character and work, we must probably make a distinction. Ultimately, it seems to us, it must be traced to Mr. McCabe's point of view as an "escaped monk." He has approached the study of Augustine with a poignant hatred of the monachism of which Augustine was one of the founders in the West—with all that monachism implies of depreciation of the earthly life and its delights and duties alike: and with an equal hatred of the great ecclesiastical system of which monachism has ever been a part and a stay and of which Augustine's teaching, on one of its sides, has supplied a chief theoretical support. This side of Augustine's character and teaching has loomed so big before him as to obscure all else. Augustine the monk, Augustine the ecclesiastic: this is the Augustine he has known and this is the Augustine he has painted. This Augustine he has sought to portray with truth and justice: but he could not think Augustine the monk and ecclesiastic an admirable figure. Above all, he was consumed with zeal to set forth the monk and ecclesiastic as essentially unlovely and essentially injurious to all the higher ideals of living. Accordingly he has given us an Augustine who gradually grows hard and evil before our eyes under the influences of those erroneous—those destructive—views of life and religion, under the influence of which the Christian world has ever since grown harder and harder and more and more corrupt. This is as much as to say, of course, that Mr. McCabe's sketch of Augustine's life is not an essay in pure biography, but is essentially a polemic treatise. It is another assault of the "escaped monk" upon the system from which he has, doubtless through throes and suffering, separated himself. In his first books he gave us a picture of the working of monasticism in modern life: in his *Peter Abelard* he gave us a picture of monastic life in its mediæval conception: in his *St. Augustine* he gives us a picture of the working of the monastic idea in its inception. If he had only put his book forward as a study of such evil tendencies as entered into Augustine's life it would not be so bad. There were these evil tendencies in Augustine's life, and they ought not to be minimized or neglected. Cromwell was right in demanding that the artist should paint truly the wart on his nose. But it would hardly do to look at the wart through a microscope and paint it and it alone in this exaggerated light in all its hideous rugosities, and label it "Cromwell." It is something like this that Mr. McCabe has done to Augustine.

The process by which Mr. McCabe has been able to persuade himself that he was drawing a true portrait of Augustine supplies us with a not inapt illustration of "higher-critical" methods. He tells us in the Preface that his attempt is "to interpret by the light of psychology rather than by the light of theology," or, as he otherwise expresses it, that he has "brought to the story a saving tincture of Pelagianism": that he has "tried to exhibit the development of Augustine as an orderly mental and moral growth." This, of course, involves the elimination of all "supernaturalism"—say, in this instance, obvious divine leading and cataclysmic conversion. The account given of his spiritual development by Augustine himself in what Mr. McCabe calls "his seductive *Confessions*" is therefore set aside at once as "perverse." A very harsh judgment is passed, in fact, on the *Confessions*. They "may be fine literature, but they contain an utterly false psychology and ethics" (p. 24). In them, Augustine is "sternly bent on magnifying his misdeeds" (p. 39). Something like this is said by others also, as, for example, by Harnack and Boissier and with the same general

intent. But they speak far less extremely than Mr. McCabe and never dream of carrying "reconstruction" practically so far. The only documentary evidence being thus discredited, the way is open to give to Augustine an "orderly mental and moral growth"—i.e., of course, to attribute to him such a development as on the whole seems to the special biographer natural in the circumstances. There is assigned to him, therefore, a noble heathen youth, breaking down into a sort of weariness toward early middle life, under the stress of which he flees to "authority" for refuge, and then progressively deteriorates to the end.

It is rather odd to observe how different the constructions of this "orderly" life are in different hands under this method. To make the life "orderly," i.e., to give it the appearance of a continuous development in one natural line, Boissier and Harnack represent Augustine as having been essentially a Christian from his infancy. There is no "Prodigal son" here, says Harnack. "Rather do the *Confessions* portray a man brought up from youth by a faithful mother in the Christian, that is, in the Catholic faith." Boissier takes his start from that wonderful conversation which the converted Augustine held with his dying mother at Ostia, when he seemed borne by the mystic breath of her devotion up to heaven itself. "I picture to myself," he says, "experiences on his part of something of the same sort in his infancy, while his mother talked to him of Christ, as she tried to make a perfect Christian of him and spoke to him words he could never forget." Seeking precisely the same end, Mr. McCabe pursues a precisely opposite course. Monica, he tells us, showed no particular zeal in imbuing the early years of her son with Christian principles, and her later devotion can be supposed to have had only some indirect influence on the course of his development. He grew up frankly heathen: and betrays in the *Confessions* some embarrassment with respect to her early neglect (p. 10). It was not until he was about twenty that his mother "entered upon the long and passionate devotion to her son's conversion which has earned for the simple, ignorant woman an immortal place among the mothers of men" (pp. 66-67). Even then, the low-born (p. 114), ignorant, but earnest woman had her limitations as a religious guide. She did not object very much to Augustine cherishing a concubine, but she objected very much indeed to his cherishing a heresy (p. 66). From all which it appears that the picture drawn of Monica is as much "lowered" in tone as that drawn of Augustine himself.

The mention we have just made of Augustine's concubine leads to raising the question whether the treatment Mr. McCabe gives this certainly sufficiently disgraceful episode in Augustine's life is thoroughly judicious. His attaching himself to a single mistress and living in faithfulness to her for fourteen years is rightly pointed to as implying " (for those days) a rare moderation of character " (p. 40). To say this is, however, probably inadequate. The truth seems to be fairly expressed in the words of Dr. Marcus Dods that are scoffed at on an earlier page (p. 38), viz.: that in this union Augustine formed "a connection which was not matrimonial in the strict sense." That is to say, it *was* matrimonial in a secondary sense, fully recognized as legitimate by the *Lex Julia* and *Papia Poppæa*, and entailing no moral dereliction, though of course not ranking in social standing with "connections that are matrimonial in the strict sense" (cf. Plumptre, in Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities*, i, 422; Moyle, in Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, i, 526; Leonard, in *Pauly-Wissowa*, vii, 835). It was, in a word, a form of marriage, adapted to the case of women of the lower classes, who could not legally become wives of citizens of Rome. So fully was it recognized as a legitimate relationship that there was a strong tendency to give it ecclesiastical sanction. A Synod at

Toledo, A.D. 400, for example, decreed: "If any one who has a believing wife has [also] a concubine, let him not communicate. But let not him who has no wife, but instead of a wife has a concubine, be repelled from communion; only let him be content with union with one woman, whether wife or concubine, according to his pleasure: but let him that lives with others be rejected, until he desists and is restored through penitence" (Mansi, iii, 1001, cf. Loofs, Herzog³, ii, p. 261). Here we have simply a repetition in an ecclesiastical ordinance of the existing civil law and the general judgment of society. It doubtless represents the usage in Africa in the fourth century, and indeed is thought by many to represent the usage of the whole Church up at least to the fifth century (cf. Herzog³, x, 746). Perhaps a due recognition of this fact will account for any winking at the relation which Monnica may be supposed to have exhibited—although the remark of Mr. McCabe (p. 66) that "she seems to have accepted his companion without a murmur" appears to be only an inference from the silence of the *Confessions*.

Such unions, however, though irreproachable under the law of the Empire and involving no moral degradation in the estimation of the highest heathen circles—in which, accordingly, there was more or less tendency among the Christians themselves to acquiesce—nevertheless were discouraged in the Church. When Augustine came to prepare for baptism it appears to have been treated accordingly as a *conditio sine qua non* that this connection should be brought to a close. It seems to be thoroughly out of place, therefore, to animadvert on Augustine's coldness and insensibility towards the companion of all these years, when he prepared to put her from him and to take a wife as a preliminary to baptism (p. 143). In the first place he was not insensible: he tells us that there was left on her departure "a raw and bloody wound in his heart where she had lain." In the next place, he seems to have had no choice. In accepting Christianity he accepted its code of moral law: and he did not accept Christianity in a cold and calculating spirit but under the stress of a great religious and moral upheaval. That he did not solve the problem by marrying his concubine, as Mr. McCabe suggests might have been the proper course, probably in no way argues that he had "no sense whatever of obligation to the woman who had shared his life for fourteen years" (p. 143). It is explained by Mr. McCabe's own remark immediately following: "Evidently, she belonged to a much lower condition of life than his own." "Let a concubine," says the *Apostolical Constitutions* (viii, 32), "who is a slave of an unbeliever, and confines herself to her master alone, be received [to baptism]; but if she be incontinent with others, let her be rejected. A believer who has a concubine,—if she be a slave, let him cease [from her] and take a wife legitimately: if she be free, let him take her as his legitimate wife; and if he does not, let him be rejected." If we may suppose these regulations fairly to represent the usage at Milan at the end of the fourth century—no very violent supposition—they explain Augustine's case as neatly as the recently recovered Laws of Hammurabi fit into all the pliations of the episode of Hagar. We need only presume that Augustine's concubine was of servile or equivalent condition to bring his action into exact harmony with the regulations.

Mr. McCabe has indeed said (p. 42): "It does not seem likely that Augustine's mistress was a slave," though he needs to add that nothing whatever is told us about her social position and, as we have seen, he allows at a later point, that she was "evidently" of a much lower condition of life than Augustine. That Augustine treated her as a slave is evidence enough, in such circumstances, to justify the supposi-

tion that she was a slave. Certainly the parting was not unattended with the deepest emotion on both sides. Augustine tells us that she went away "vowing to God" to keep herself free from future connections. This is surely a fine and pathetic touch. Mr. McCabe treats it with incredible coarseness. Because the "hagiographer"—including in this case M. Boissier!—generally considers that the meaning is that she entered a nunnery, Mr. McCabe, with his customary anti-hagiographic fury, actually contends that it probably means that she went away cursing and swearing! "*Vovens tibi*," he says, "may very well mean that 'she vowed and swore [every African, including Augustine, swore habitually] she would have nothing more to do with men,' either in anger or in her great love for Augustine" (p. 147, note). Surely every simple-hearted reader—we use the epithet inviting Mr. McCabe's scorn—will perceive that a serious vow to God alone can be meant. With such an instance as this before us of the lengths Mr. McCabe can go in his "anti-hagiographic" rage, it is hardly necessary to seek further illustrations of the lowering effect it has had on the picture he is painting of Augustine under its influence.

The book is very free from minor slips in statements of fact. There is a perfectly blind note on p. 449 on the relations of Augustinian and Calvinistic doctrine. There occurs a note on p. 497 in which a curious slip which Dr. Hodgkin made in the first edition of his *Invaders of Italy*, relative to the opponent with whom Augustine deals in the *Opus Imperfectum* is mentioned: in his second edition Dr. Hodgkin corrected it duly, as also other slips of the same kind that deformed the first issue. On p. 292 we meet the odd phrase: "Christian Presbyterians"—as designating a body including M. de Pressensé "and others": we have not fathomed the designed implication. On p. 42 Paulinus of Pella is quite decisively represented as the grandson of Ausonius: the point is still, perhaps, disputable. On p. 380 it is doubtless the insufficiently overseen printer who has foiled the author's evil counsel by giving us נִקְרָה for נִקְרָה. But a truce to such things. We shall mention only one more for the sake of the curious interest that attaches to it. On p. 416 Mr. McCabe speaks of the attribution of Pelagius' Commentary on Paul's Epistles to Gelasius and "then to Jerome himself, the most bitter opponent and critic of its real author," as "a unique and precious fact in the history of heresy." Did Mr. McCabe bear in mind that the "Confession of Faith" presented by Pelagius to Innocent was actually admitted into the *Libri Carolini* at the close of the eighth century as Augustine's; and indeed was produced as Augustine's in 1521 A.D. by the Sorbonne against Luther? There is really no limit to which ignorance cannot go in the confusion of doctrines—as the Presbyterian Church has lately had much occasion to observe!

Let us not close without a word of appreciation of what is praiseworthy in the book. If the portrait which it gives us of Augustine is distorted, it is yet sharply drawn and brings to notice real traits of his character which may now and again be obscured by the "hagiographer." The book may very profitably be read, therefore, along with the "hagiographers" and may supply a useful supplement to them: though assuredly some of the "hagiographers"—say, Tillemont, Bindermaun, Böhringer or Rauscher—must needs be read along with it as a corrective, if we are not to be altogether misled in our estimate of Augustine. It certainly is a very easy book to read: the style is pleasantly flowing and though deformed by cynical turns, yet attractive and picturesque. There does not seem to lie behind its narrative as careful study of the sources as lay behind the narrative of the *Peter Abelard*, but Mr. McCabe, as we have said, makes few slips in matters of fact and writes out of a considerable acquaintance with the ecclesiastical life of the

fourth and fifth centuries. A high degree of literary skill is exhibited and much historical feeling. If Mr. McCabe can only bring himself to write in a purely historical spirit, we feel sure he has a great service to render to the Churches.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

MUSIC IN THE HISTORY OF THE WESTERN CHURCH. With an Introduction on Religious Music among Primitive and Ancient Peoples. By EDWARD DICKINSON, Professor of the History of Music in the Conservatory of Music, Oberlin College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902. 8vo, pp. viii, 426.

One of the most deeply interesting subjects belonging to Church History is the History of Public Worship or Liturgies, and of this subject there is no more fascinating phase than the history of the relations of worship and fine art. Just how far the fine arts have been successfully employed and how far they have failed as instruments in expressing religious truth and in awakening and expressing religious feeling, and when or under what conditions, if ever, they have obscured truth or impeded the movement of really religious emotion are questions which every one would like to have answered. Whatever differences of opinion there are as to the function in worship of those arts which, like painting and sculpture, employ as their material dead matter, even the most rigorous Puritan recognizes the high value to the worshipping assembly of the intellectual arts of poetry and oratory. Between the plastic and the intellectual arts stands music, by eminence the emotional fine art; producing the most violent and the most delicate reactions in the sphere of purely sensuous feeling and, through the power of association, able to inflame the spirit with personal, patriotic or religious emotion. Hence, that music has a place and an important place in public worship is almost universally conceded. Even a Scottish Covenanter, who holds the employment of instrumental music in religious worship to be sinful, will read with approval and delight Milton's noble lines—

Voices and Verse !

Wed your divine sounds and mixt power employ,
Dead things with inbreathed sense able to pierce ;
And to our high-raised phantasy present
That undisturbed Song of pure conceit
Aye sung before the sapphire-colour'd throne
To Him that sits thereon.

Prof. Dickinson's book, therefore, ought to attract the attention of a large number of readers, especially among ministers. His treatment of his subject is admirable. We are not referring to the theoretical section of his introductory chapter, but to the remainder of it—the historical portion—and to the eleven chapters which follow it under the following titles: "Ritual and song in the early Christian Church"; "The liturgy of the Catholic Church"; "The development of mediæval chorus music"; "The modern musical Mass"; "The rise of the Lutheran hymnody"; "Rise of the German Cantata and Passion"; "The culmination of German Protestant music, John Sebastian Bach"; "The musical system of the Church of England"; "Congregational song in England and America"; "Problems of Church music in America." Instead of attempting a formal history, he has unfolded his theme in a series of historical essays, so little burdened with technicalities that the non-professional reader finds no difficulty in grasping the meaning of almost every sentence, and in a fine flowing style which it is a great pleasure to read.

There are statements in the book with which the present writer is far from

agreeing. It was quite unnecessary to the introduction of his subject for the author to say that "we speak no longer of a 'first man,'" or to refer to our "anthropoid progenitors"; for he proposes in the same sentence "to take for our point of departure that stage in human development when art properly begins." Thomas Cartwright was one of the most learned and influential Englishmen who lived in the reign of Elizabeth. Puritanism in England and America owes him an incalculable debt; and so do American citizens as citizens. It is rather startling to read in a book emanating from Oberlin College phrases referring to him like "the most conspicuous of agitators," "first gained notoriety," "the coarseness and violence of this man," "the unlovely Cartwright," "his diatribe." We are quite sure that Prof. Dickinson's displeasure will not reverse the judgment of history that his entrance on the great controversy was, as Froude says, "the apparition of a man of genius," and that his career justifies the conclusion that he was one of the greatest as well as one of the most learned men of his era. There are also some superlative statements of theory to be found in the course of the discussions like the following: "The consciousness, of which creeds and liturgies are but partial and temporary symbols, can find no adequate artistic expression unless it be in the art of music." Blemishes of this kind, however, are exceptions. The book as a whole is an able, uncommonly well written, informing and delightful treatise on a subject of great importance and timeliness.

How well the author can say important things, and how keenly alive he is to the danger that in employing music in the public worship of God æsthetic enjoyment will be substituted for religious feeling may be seen in the following quotation. Prof. Dickinson, after setting forth in a series of well-considered and admirably expressed sentences the peculiar fitness of music as an art to become "the means of fusion between ideas of sensuous beauty and those of devotional experience," makes this remark: "Music may, through its peculiar power of stimulating the sensibility and conveying ideas of beauty in the purest, most abstract guise, help to make the mind receptive to serious impressions; but in order to excite a specifically religious feeling it must coöperate with other impressions which act more definitely upon the understanding. The words to which the music is sung, being submerged in the mind of a music-lover by the tide of enchanting sound, are not sufficient for the purpose unless they are known and dwelt upon in advance; and even then they need reinforcement out of the environment in which the musical service is placed." These are weighty words, and reveal that the writer knows well the limitations which its character as a fine art places upon music as an aid to devotion, and the danger always inherent in its use. Art is the lower, religion is the higher term. Music should be made ancillary to devotion, or it should be ejected from the sanctuary. But the fine arts awaken their own distinctive emotions; and all emotions in the experience of them we are apt to regard as ultimate. Moreover, the emotion awakened by music simulates religious feeling. Here is the crux; here is the danger. A writer who sees it so clearly and states it so well as Prof. Dickinson does has thought deeply into his subject, if not through it. The state of mind in which he wrote what we have quoted is the same as that of Thomas Chalmers when he wrote the impressive passage which begins the last of his "Astronomical Discourses,"—the discourse on "the slender influence of taste and sensibility in matters of religion." The passage may well conclude our notice of Prof. Dickinson's book, which we cordially recommend our readers to buy and read. "You can easily understand," says Chalmers, "how a taste for music is one thing and a real submission to the influence of religion is another; how the ear may be regaled by the melody of sound, and

the heart may utterly refuse the proper impression of the sense that is conveyed by it; how the sons and daughters of the world may, with their every affection devoted to its perishable vanities, inhale all the delights of enthusiasm as they sit in crowded assemblage around the deep and solemn oratorio; aye, and whether it be the humility of penitential feeling, or the rapture of grateful acknowledgment, or the sublime of a contemplative piety, or the aspiration of pure and of holy purposes which breathes throughout the words of the performance and gives to it all the spirit and all the expression by which it is pervaded, it is a very possible thing that the moral and the rational and the active man may have given no entrance into his bosom for any of these sentiments; and yet so overpowered may he be by the charm of the vocal conveyance through which they are addressed to him, that he may be made to feel with such an emotion, and to weep with such a tenderness, and to kindle with such a transport, and to glow with such an elevation, as may one and all carry upon them the semblance of sacredness."

Princeton.

JOHN DE WITT.

THE BARBARIAN INVASIONS OF ITALY. By PASQUALE VILLARI. Translated by LINDA VILLARI. With Frontispiece and Maps. 2 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902. 8vo, pp. xxiv, 484.

The author, in stating the purpose for which this work was written, calls attention to the need, so far as the history of Italy is concerned, of "narratives suited to the general mass of readers. As it is we leap from scholastic books, read at school and quickly thrown aside, to learned works, which are only suited to professional scholars or specialists, as we call them nowadays." The need Prof. Villari thus mentions is a general one. Historiography has not advanced *pari passu* with the exploration and criticism of sources. The work of the literary historian is too lightly esteemed by the rising school of "scientific historians," to whose sincere and severe labors should nevertheless be given high praise. We need more historical monographs, conceived of by their authors as literature and written with the care which results in style; for it is style which attracts the contemporary reader besides being, as Lowell says, "fame's great antiseptic." If for no other reason, we need them to save the present generation of general readers from the misinformation of the vicious and abounding "historical" novel, and from the inability, induced by the "historical" novel reading habit, to become interested in serious historical literature.

Such an historical monograph Prof. Villari has written, narrating that series of related movements by Teutonic peoples—for even the horde led by Attila was largely Teutonic—against the homeland of the Latin civilization, beginning with the invasion of Italy by Alaric and closing with the victorious campaign of Charles the Great against the Lombard kingdom. Of course, one would be glad to have the "general reader" read the eight volumes of Hodgkin's *Invaders of Italy*. But that can hardly be expected of him. At all events he will be more likely to do so after reading a brief and popular work like the one under review.

Considering the limits which the author imposed on himself, his work has been well done. He has a clear and simple style. The prominent characters stand out with distinctness. One feels, after reading the book, that he knows something of the personality of Alaric and Genseric and Attila, of Odoacer and his great conqueror Theodoric, of Belisarius and Narses, of Aistulph and Desiderius, of Pepin and Charlemagne. The narrative is carried forward with grace and ease. But the style of the author does not change in sympathy with a particular theme. The tragedy of the taking of Rome by Alaric,

the battle of Chalons and the heroic struggles of Belisarius in Italy are subjects, one would say, which ought to impart a glow to the story of them written by a sympathetic historian, and should even compel him to something like eloquence. But glow and eloquence are wanting.

Good judgment, however, seems always to be present and to result not only from special knowledge but from the moderation which belongs to large culture. This appears in his characterizations of the barbarian leaders and in discussions like that on the Donation of Pepin. The translation is into readable idiomatic English, indeed into English "up-to-date." One of the latest words taken over from another language is "trek." And "trek" is employed by the translator with inverted commas to describe the migration of a German tribe as distinguished from a march of its men of war.

The subject of Prof. Villari's volume is a subject in Church history as well as political history. And we commend it cordially to those who wish to read a brief story of the external beginnings of mediæval Christianity.

Princeton.

JOHN DE WITT.

SOCIAL GERMANY IN LUTHER'S TIME. Being the Memoirs of Bartholomew Sastrow. Translated by ALBERT D. VANDAM, with an Introduction by HERBERT A. L. FISHER, M.A., New College, Oxford. Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co., 1902. 8vo, pp. xxv, 348. Index.

The principal title of this book is misleading and has been adopted apparently to attract the attention of those who are not acquainted with the obscure but striking personality of Sastrow. Nor is it a fair alternative, as these memoirs, though they throw not a little light on the social condition of Germany in the time of the great Reformer, are very limited in scope. Sastrow belonged to a family which had but recently, through the opportunity offered by the Hanse towns, shaken itself free from the serfdom of the peasantry and by intermarriage with a substantial burgher family taken a great step up in the world. Their field of action lay in northern Pomerania, especially in the towns of Greifswald and Stralsund. The social upheaval of the Reformation epoch made opportunities for the active minds of these aspiring "*novi homines*," and Sastrow is a good type of his class. He made good use of his chance to obtain a classical education, took kindly to the doctrines of Luther, without allowing them to stand in the way of his employment by less progressive spirits, with fierce partisanship entered every quarrel of his friends and relatives at home and in his old age wrote a simple, coarse and self-centred account of his life for the benefit of his descendants. The picture thus presented is very well worth while preserving and may well be welcomed in this English translation. It is essentially a book for the serious student of the period. While often highly diverting, its humor is mordant and its atmosphere far from cheerful. With characteristic vulgarity, too, the author has never omitted an opportunity to tell an unclean story, even when it is at his own expense. Some of the details of these stories the translator has spared us, but more than enough remains to show that Sastrow's Protestantism was more a matter of choice than of conscience, of liberty than religion.

The translation is somewhat lacking in precision in the earlier chapters and throughout would be improved by additional notes, especially upon matters of coinage and relative value of money.

The bookmaking is excellent and the few illustrations good.

Stuttgart Germany.

ETHELBERT D. WARFIELD.

Selected Works of Huldreich Zwingli. Translated for the first time from the originals. Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1901.—The esteemed editor of this work has done an invaluable service to the cause of Protestantism by his works on Zwingli. His previous work, the *Life of Zwingli*, so bright, clear, brief, and yet comprehensive, was quite in contrast with the ponderous works of the Germans on that subject. This book consists of some of the early writings of Zwingli which have never yet been translated. It contains five of Zwingli's early works: 1. *The Visit of the Episcopal Delegation to Zurich*, 1522; 2. *The Petition of Priests to be Allowed to Marry*, 1522; 3. *The Acts of the First Zurich Disputation*, January, 1523; 4. *The Zurich Marriage Ordinance*, 1525; 5. *Refutation of the Works of the Katabaptists*, 1527. He has had these well translated by competent translators and has added a great many valuable notes explanatory of local and personal references in them. Thus the account of the first Zurich disputation is made very valuable because he adds to it in notes extracts from two other accounts of the same disputation. These translations give us an excellent interior view of the events of Zwingli's life at that critical period when Zurich was turning to the Reformed. We are, however, surprised that he calls the Anabaptists by the name Baptists. This is wrong for two reasons: 1, Baptist is not the proper translation of the Latin word Katabaptist. Indeed, in his note to his index he confesses that he made a mistake; 2, The Anabaptists of the Reformation were far from being the Baptists of our day. According to his own teacher, Rev. Prof. Schaff, many of them were not Baptists at all, because careless about the mode of baptism. The book, however, deserves wide circulation. And the University of Pennsylvania has added to its previous reputation for original historical work by publishing it, and the editor has the thanks of the many friends of Zwingli for giving them the works of the Reformer in their own tongue.—*Die Strassburger liturgischen Ordnungen im Zeitalter der Reformation*, von Friedrich Hubert. Göttingen: 1900.—This is an important work, because it sheds light on a difficult and much perverted subject. How is the prayer-book of the Anglican or Episcopal Churches related to the German liturgies for material? This has been a burning question. While books like Richter's *Kirchenordnungen* give many of the German liturgies for comparison with the Anglican, yet here we have a critical scholarly work that follows up minutely the beginnings and changes of ritual at Strassburg caused by the Reformation. First, there is a careful description of each form—marriage, baptism, the church service, the care of the sick and the funeral service. The second part consists of the liturgical forms from 1524–1561 given in full. The first forms were translations from the Latin Mass, and it is very interesting to notice how gradually one Romish error was dropped after another until even the altar gives place to the Protestant communion table.—*Die Homiletik und Katechetik des Andreas Hyperius*, von Achelis und Sachsse. Berlin: 1901.—This book is a translation into German of the earliest Protestant work on Homiletics in the Reformation. Andrew Hyperius was one of the brightest minds and most practical theologians of that age. Though professor of the University of Marburg, which at that time held to Lutheranism of the mild Melancthonian type, he yet held to Zwinglian views and was like Bucer one of the forerunners of the establishment of the Reformed Church in Germany. Notwithstanding his liberal spirit in theology, he still retained great influence in Germany because of his recognized ability. His work was called *De formandis concionibus sacris seu de interpretatione Scripturarum populari*. It was first published in 1553. In 1562 he republished it enlarged. In the first book he discusses the material, form and divisions of the sermon.

He also considers the text and the brief prayer which in Germany is offered just after the reading of the text. He divides the sermon into introduction, proof, refutation and conclusion. In the second part he describes the different kinds of the sermon as doctrinal, controversial, ethical, disciplinary, comforting and the mixed. The second part of the book contains Hyperius' lectures on catechization. This was a posthumous publication (1570) by his pupils Vieter and Friedberg. It, like his Homiletics, reveals his practical mind. He discusses the nature and origin of catechization—the subject, the qualifications of the catechumens, what doctrines should be taught, the qualifications of the catechist and duties of the catechumens. From this brief analysis it can easily be seen that the views of the author are peculiarly comprehensive, clear and convincing for his age. Much of his work could be with profit used by those who write on catechization and the training of young people to-day. The Reformers were men ahead of their times, and the twentieth century cannot afford to ignore them but can study them with profit. — *Geschichte des Pietismus in den Schweizerischen Reformierten Kirchen*, von Lic. W. Hadorn. Konstanz und Emmishofen: 1902.—The history of the Reformed Church of Switzerland is just being written in these days. A few years ago there was published in German for the first time a history of the Swiss Reformed Churches, by Prof. Bloesch, of the University of Bern, and reviewed in this Quarterly. It was an admirable compend of the religious history of Switzerland from the Reformation down to the present time. Prof. Bloesch was noted as a keen, critical scholar of history and his all-too-early death robbed Switzerland of the hope of more splendid historical work from him. But he was inclined, as the Germans say, to the left. While critical, he was cold, and his sympathies were with the rationalists of the milder type. Pietism and experimental religion did not receive much attention at his hands—the recognition that they ought to have had. The work we now review complements what is lacking in Bloesch. It is a much needed book on a hitherto unwritten subject. It covers all forms of Pietism in Switzerland, churchly and unchurchly. The first book in this volume is on the "Origin of Pietism in Switzerland." The second book treats of the separatistic Pietists in Switzerland, as the Inspirationists, etc. Book three treats of the churchly Pietism of Lutz in Bern and d'Annoni of Basel, etc. He, however, calls Lavater a Pietist. Lavater was an Evangelical, not a Pietist, unless we make every one who holds Evangelical views a Pietist, which is not usually done by Continental historians. His last and fourth book is on Pietism in the nineteenth century—a fine description of the great revival at Geneva under Haldane, etc. Of course, he gives rather undue prominence to Bern, but that is his own canton. Altogether, it is a most complete work, and while there are a few errors of judgment and too much foreign matter on German Pietism, yet we hail it as a book that fills a gap in history and ought to be generally in theological libraries. — *The Reformed Church in Pennsylvania* (Part IX of a Narrative and Critical History, prepared at the request of the Pennsylvania German Society). By Joseph Henry Dubbs, D.D., LL.D. Lancaster, Pa.: 1902.—This is the latest volume in the history of Pennsylvania prepared by the Pennsylvania German Society and the third volume on the subject written by the author. It is a brief but comprehensive history, limited, however, mainly to Pennsylvania. It is beautifully printed and lavishly illustrated, as are all the publications of the Pennsylvania German Society, although there is some careless proof-reading, especially in proper names. The esteemed author deserves credit for breaking away from the traditions, many of them uncertain and false, of former historians. He accepts the new revelations of church history as found in the Archives of Holland by Hinke,

Dotterer and Good. There are, however, a few points on which we take issue with the author. Thus he opposes the view that the early German Reformed Church in this country was Calvinistic, and tries to prove his position by the fact that Rev. Mr. Rieger did not sign the Canons of Dort in 1748. The truth was that Rieger signed the Canons of Dort before 1748 and also again in 1752. But whatever may have been Rieger's views, the rest of the ministers were strongly Calvinistic. They signed the Canons of Dort before they came to Pennsylvania, all of them. Their works, as Helfrichs', Hermans', Weyberg's and others, show their strong Calvinism. It is too late to claim that our early Reformed Church in Pennsylvania was Melancthonian. That day has gone by in view of the later historical researches. He also errs in speaking of the early Reformed Church as having an altar. There was no room for an altar in her doctrines, her liturgies or her worship. Nevin and his followers originated her altar about 1855. But the work in many respects is excellent and able and it is a pity that only 300 copies are printed. It is followed by a Bibliography of the Work of German Reformed Ministers, by Rev. Prof. W. J. Hinke, of the Ursinus Theological Seminary, which is quite complete, though, as is usual, a few books are not noted and there are several misprints of names.—*The Pioneers of the Reformed Church in the United States of America*. By H. J. Ruetenik, D.D., LL.D., of Cleveland, O.—This is an admirable compend of the early history of the German Reformed Church in this country and is designed for popular use in the congregations. Although there are a few misprints, yet we congratulate the author on holding so firmly to the view that the early Reformed Church was Calvinistic and Pietistic. The work is published also in German.

Reading, Pa.

JAMES I. GOOD.

V.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

DIE BEKENNTNISSCHRIFTEN DER REFORMIERTEN KIRCHE. In authentischen Texten mit geschichtlicher Einleitung und Register herausgegeben von E. F. KARL MUELLER, D. und ord. Professor der Theologie zu Erlangen. Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Nachf. (Georg Böhme), 1903. 8vo, pp. lxxi, 976.

Prof. Karl Müller is probably the only professor in the universities of the German Empire of to-day who is charged with the especial duty of teaching the Reformed theology. Having previously taught New Testament exegesis there, he was appointed in 1893 extraordinary "Professor of Reformed Theology" at Erlangen, "with a view," as the official statement is careful to inform us, "to the Evangelical Union Church of the Palatinate." In 1896 he was raised to the rank of a regular professoriate, charged with the same functions. In the same year his admirable *Symbolik* was published (reviewed in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for January, 1897, viii, p. 149 sq.). This he follows up now with the present splendid collection of the chief Reformed symbols,—the most comprehensive, accurate and useful collection of them as yet published.

Comparative study of the Reformed Confessions began with the publication of the French Pastor Salnar's *Harmonia Confessionum Fidei Orthodoxarum et Reformatarum Ecclesiarum* at Geneva in 1581. In this work, however, which was motivated by the religious and political needs of French Protestants, the doctrines of the several Confessions drawn upon are stated and compared, topic by topic, and the several documents are not given in their completeness. The first work in which this latter is done, the first

collection of the Reformed Confessions properly so called, was the *Corpus et Syntagma Confessionum Fidei*, etc., of Caspar Laurentius, published at Geneva in 1612. Little advance was made upon this until the nineteenth century. During its course three comprehensive collections of the Reformed Confessions were published, besides others confined to narrower fields, such as Dunlop's for Scotland and Heppe's for Germany. These three were Augusti's *Corpus librorum symbolicorum, qui in ecclesia reformatorum auctoritatem publicam obtinuerunt*, published at Elberfeld in 1827; Niemeyer's *Collectio confessionum in ecclesiis reformatis publicarum*, published at Leipzig in 1840; and the relevant portion of Schaff's *Bibliotheca Symbolica Ecclesie Universalis*, published in New York in 1878. Since the publication of Niemeyer's book sixty years have slipped by; and these years have been, above all that preceded them, years of busy investigation of the records of the Churches and years at the same time of ever-increasing breadth of outlook. Niemeyer, for example, professes to have found it difficult to come upon a copy of the Westminster Confession, the most thoroughly wrought and the most widely influential of all the Reformed Confessions. From the publication of Dr. Schaff's book, at least, no one could pretend to be ignorant of the credal developments in Britain and modern America. "Thus," as Dr. Müller says, "the time has come, with the most grateful employment of all that has been done already, to undertake the task anew and to give in a new edition of the Confessions as complete a survey as possible of the Confession-building labor of the Reformed Churches from the sixteenth century to the present day." Certainly there is urgent demand for such an undertaking; and Dr. Müller has shown himself to be the man to accomplish it.

But by the words "as complete a survey as is possible" it must not be supposed that Dr. Müller means that he has sought to gather together all the Reformed Confessions which are now accessible and to present a complete *corpus* of them. We wish he had done this. But he proceeds immediately to say: "There can, of course, be no thought of absolute completeness. Had such a purpose been entertained, it would have been very easy to double the number of documents included; but that would have made an unmanageable volume which must needs have failed of its end." The principle of selection which has governed his choice of documents to be included seems to have been a double one. No document of large historical significance and no document in continued use and authority is omitted. It is with the latter class that he begins: he has made it his first end to see to it that no Confession, of any importance at least, which remains to-day in authority should be passed by. But absolutely to confine the documents printed to still living Confessions would not give an adequate picture of the Confessional activity of the Reformed Churches: accordingly important historical documents which served really as public Confessions in the past are also included. Other subordinate considerations have intruded now and then to determine choice. The Polish Confessions are omitted altogether to make room for the extended Hungarian ones which are here for the first time made generally accessible. The author's predilection leads him to give in especial fulness the early Zwinglian documents and those belonging to the German Churches. Their comparative inaccessibility in Germany as well as their inherent importance has led him to give in great fulness the Confessions in English speech—including those of the Congregationalists and, strangely enough, those of the Cumberland Presbyterians. The result is a very symmetrically chosen and certainly the most comprehensive collection of Reformed Confessions to be had.

The comprehensiveness of the work may best be exhibited by a brief account of the distribution of its material. Dr. Müller divides the Con-

fessions into nine classes. The first of these contains the "Pre-Calvinian Confessions," and gives us eight documents from Zwingli's Theses of 1523 to the First Helvetic Confession of 1536. Next, seven documents are given as "Swiss Confessions subsequent to Calvin's appearance"—from the Lausanne Theses of 1536 to the Second Helvetic Confession of 1562. The third class is called "Confessions from the West," and includes the Gothic, the Belgic, a Netherlandish document of 1566, and the old Scotch Confession of 1560. The fourth is composed of the "Hungarian Confessions"—three long documents. These are followed, as a fifth class, by a Bohemian Confession of 1609 and the Waldensian of 1655 as Confessions of "Pre-reformation Groups." "Anglicanism and Puritanism" comes next with nine important documents. Then comes "the German sphere" with ten documents. The eighth class is entitled "Orthodox Determination of Particular Doctrines," and includes the Canons of Dort and the Formula Consensus Helvetica. Last of all, under the head of Modern Confessions, eleven documents are printed, constituting along with "the doctrinal article of the Palatinate Union"—which is a very meagre statement indeed, and quite un-Reformed in type—all the creeds at present in use by Churches which are connected with the "Presbyterian Alliance," so far as these creeds are not already printed in the former classes. At the end there is printed the new "Short Statement" issued by our own Church and even the proposed alterations and additions which are at present before our Presbyteries, gathered into an Appendix and characterized quite accurately. Fifty-eight documents in all are given.

When we come to compare the collection with those of Niemeyer and Schaff, we observe that it is much more comprehensive than either. All the documents given by Niemeyer are included with the following exceptions: Zwingli's Exposition of the Christian Faith, 1530, and Calvin's Consensus Genevensis, 1562 (as not really *public* confessions), the Confessio Obergerina, 1570 (as no Confession at all), the Consensus Poloniæ, 1570-1595, and Declaration of Thorn, 1645 (on the general ground of want of space), the Anhalt Repetition, 1579, the Leipzig Colloquy, 1631, and the Bohemian Confession, 1535,—eight in all. All the documents given by Schaff are included except two short American Congregationalist deliverances (Boston, 1865, and Oberlin, 1871), and the Auburn Declaration, 1837. On the other hand, no less than thirty documents included in neither Niemeyer nor Schaff are given. A list of these will be instructive. They are: The Zurich Introduction of 1523, the Articles of the Synod of Bern of 1532, the Confession of the East Frisian Ministers of 1528, the Lausanne Theses of 1536, the Geneva Confession of 1536, the Rhetian Confession of 1552, the Netherlandish Confession of 1566, the Erlau- (or shall we say Eger-?) Valley Confession of 1562, the Hungarian Confession of 1562, the Confession of the Synod of Debreczin of 1567, the Confession of the Bohemian Brethren of 1609, the Congregationalists' Points of Difference of 1603, the Savoy Declaration of 1688, the Confession of the Strangers' Church at Frankfurt of 1554, the Emden Catechism of 1554, the Confession of Nassau of 1578, the Bremen Consensus of 1595, the Book of Stafford of 1599, the Cassel Conference of 1607, the Hessian Catechism of 1607, the Bentheim Confession of 1613, the Doctrinal Article of the Palatinate Union of 1818, the Confession of the Calvinistic Methodists of 1823, the Vaudois Constitution of 1847, the Constitution of the Free Churches of France of 1849, the Declaration of the French General Synod of 1872, the Constitution of the Free Church of Neuchâtel of 1874, the Confession of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church of 1883, the Confession of the American Congregationalists of 1883 and the Brief Statement and other

Documents of the American Revision Movement of 1902-3. In addition to these thirty documents, those who have only Niemeyer and not Schaff would miss also the following documents which are found here: the Waldensian Confession of 1655, the Anglican Catechism of 1662, the Lambeth Articles of 1595, the Irish Articles of 1615, the Declaration of the English Congregationalists of 1833, the Confession of the Free Church of Geneva of 1848 and the Confession of the Italian Free Church of 1870—seven documents. While those who have only Schaff and not Niemeyer would miss also the following documents given here: the Tetrapolitan Confession of 1530, Zwingli's *Fidei Ratio* of 1530, the Confession of Basel of 1534, the Genevan Catechism of 1545, the Zurich Confession of 1545, the Consensus of Zurich of 1549, the Westminster Larger Catechism of 1647, the Confession of Sigismund of 1641 and the Formula Consensus Helvetica of 1675—nine documents. That is to say he who has only Niemeyer will miss no less than thirty-seven of the documents here printed; and he that has only Schaff will miss no less than thirty-nine. While he that has only Müller will miss only eight documents he would find in Niemeyer, and only three very unimportant ones he would get in Schaff. For the completion of this conspectus it is necessary only to note the documents common to all three collections. These are: Zwingli's Theses of 1523, the Theses of Bern of 1528, the First Helvetic Confession of 1536, the Second Helvetic Confession of 1562, the Gallican Confession of 1559, the Belgic Confession of 1561, the Scotch Confession of 1560, the English Articles of 1552, the Westminster Confession of 1647, the Shorter Catechism of 1647, the Heidelberg Catechism of 1563 and the Canons of Dort of 1619. These twelve documents no one of the three editors has found it possible to leave out of a book pretending to give a conspectus of the Reformed creeds. Perhaps it would not be unfair—speaking generally—to regard them therefore as the *crème de la crème*, the finest cream skimmed off of that cream of Confessions which the Reformed creeds in the mass are. The rest may be supposed to demand our study chiefly for historical or local reasons.

We have already seen that Dr. Müller has been forced to omit a number of documents which he might otherwise have wished to include, on the score of want of space. The same consideration has compelled him to print in each case only one text, with the single exception of the Westminster Confession, where the Latin text is printed by the side of the English for the benefit of Continental readers. It is naturally the original form that is in each case by preference chosen; and, very helpfully, where two forms are equally original Dr. Müller has printed the least commonly accessible one. Great labor has been expended upon securing good texts: and a clear indication is in each case given whence each text has been derived. Certain slight liberties have been taken with the texts, here and there—as, for example, in curtailing long quotations from Scripture or the fathers, or in lessening the number of Scriptural references on the margin. But the reader is advised of these and will know how to allow for them; and all such editing has been very judiciously done. In this matter the volume is a great comfort to the student, who soon finds that he can trust the texts given him in a very unusual degree.

The body of the book consists of the bare texts of the Confessions, with only such textual notes as have been necessary. But about sixty pages of Introductory matter are prefixed. This consists of a series of short historical notices of the Confessions included in the volume. Dr. Müller tells us he has made these notices as concise as possible. He certainly has. Nevertheless they supply the information really needed, and as each is accompanied by a short but exceedingly well-chosen list of authorities to be

consulted, the reader is supplied by them with all that is necessary to enable him to prosecute his investigations into the history of each creed. These brief introductions command our highest admiration. We have read them with steadily increasing wonder at the fulness and accuracy of information they display, and at the conciseness and exactness with which it is conveyed. They are models of what can be done in briefest space to put the essential facts before the student. Errors have not been altogether avoided, of course: the range of facts to be adverted to was too great for that to be possible. A few of them Dr. Müller himself corrects in a short list of "Berichtigungen." They are naturally most in evidence in the case of documents which come from regions which are remote from Germany and to which even yet insufficient attention is wont to be paid in Germany. With respect to the Westminster Confession, for example, we may correct two or three slight slips. On p. xlvii it is said that the revision of 1788 was made by "the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, the Northern main-body of American Presbyterianism." Of course, at that date there was no division between "Northern" and "Southern" Presbyterians. In printing the English text of the Confession it is said that the "variants of the Congregationalist Savoy Declaration 1658, and of the North American Cumberland Confession 1829, are noted." By the "Cumberland Confession of 1829" is meant, of course, the Cumberland Confession of 1814. This error is repeated on p. lxx, where the historical notice on the Cumberland Confession occurs. The variants of this Cumberland Confession, moreover, are far from fully noted: only those Dr. Schaff happens to print are entered—which are, however, of course, the most significant ones. We scarcely know how to take the remark on p. xlviii that the theological revisions introduced into the Westminster Confession by the Savoy Declaration " (apart from the Sabbath-question) often justify inferring Cocceian influence." There seems to be little to choose in the matter of the Covenant-theology between the revised and unrevised documents: and the authors of neither were dependent on Cocceian influence for that.

We must not close without noting that the volume ends with an admirable "index of matters," filling thirty pages and so excellently made and well ordered that it constitutes itself almost a comparative study of the creeds. Dr. Müller remarks that he has not dared to leave the preparation of this index to the hands of any merely half-informed person. We should think not. It is a work of true scholarship, and will not only lighten the labors of students of the Confessions, but will betray into becoming students many who might apart from such an enticing inducement feel it entirely too hard a task.

In the space at our disposal we have not found it possible to give more than an external description of this fine volume. We commend it to the lovers of the Reformed theology as well as to the lovers of the Reformed Churches as a work worthy of the best traditions of German scholarship and as supplying a quite new basis for the convenient study of the Reformed Confessions. Prof. Müller has, of course, his own point of view: it is the point of view of the Palatinate Union Church. Now and then in his Introductory notes we catch echoes of it, which we should be glad to expunge and to substitute for them something more "Reformed without reserve." But there are few of even such slight blemishes to be found in this excellent book; and we would not willingly forget that what there is at this moment due to its author is the sincerest gratitude for what he has done and is doing towards making the Reformed truth known once again in Germany.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

THE CROSS AND THE KINGDOM. As Viewed by Christ Himself and in the Light of Evolution. By W. L. WALKER. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1902. 8vo, pp. 338. \$3 net.

This book is ambitious in its aim, as its title might lead one to anticipate; but it is pervaded throughout by an earnestness and even fervor that enlist sympathy and secure careful perusal. The author, who is evidently widely read and an industrious scholar, assumes the task of interpreting, stating and defending the "Evangelical Doctrine of the Cross." The reader at the outset, at least, is apt to feel a little perplexity in giving a meaning to the expression "Evangelical Doctrine of the Cross" and its various equivalents as used by the author. The introductory chapter tells us on its first page that we are here speaking specially of the Evangelical Conception of the Cross as that on which, in some real sense, "Christ died for our sins." On pages 7 and 8 we are further informed that the efficiency of the Cross "has always rested on a certain kind of interpretation, viz., that which we seek to express by the term 'Evangelical'"; and this latter statement comes immediately after being told that "it is one of the glories of the Cross that it has appealed to men in so many different ways, and that it has met their need in so many different forms and under such varying conceptions of it." Similar utterances of seemingly diverse and of certainly questionable import are found on succeeding pages.

In the proposed "defense and restatement" of the Gospel of the Cross the author finds himself beset with many difficulties, especially in showing how to reconcile the necessity for the Cross with the teaching of Christ concerning the love of God as the Father of Men, and with the necessity of viewing the Cross in relation to the whole teaching and work of Christ as the Founder of the Kingdom of God. Furthermore, new difficulties have arisen owing to the following enumerated reasons:

First. The existence of a strong, widespread tendency to go back for our Christianity to the teaching of Jesus himself, especially as that is recorded in the first three Gospels. Second. Sayings of Christ once relied on are, by reason of the new criticism of the New Testament, either questioned or wholly rejected, and this condition extends to the words of Christ, "specially founded on by the advocates of the Evangelical Doctrine of the Cross." Third. The presence in the minds of those who have thought most deeply on the subject of a deep-seated conviction that Christ's death is the natural culmination of His life-work or vocation. Fourth. The necessity of adjusting, if possible, the Evangelical Conception of the Cross to that "new view of the world and of man, and of their relation to God," given us by Evolution. Fifth. The existing weariness and dissatisfaction with endless theories of the Cross, the demand for a more ethical interpretation of its import, together with a decay of interest in a purely individual salvation. What we need, says the author, is "to be able to maintain and commend this Evangelical Conception of the Cross amidst the changed conditions of thought and feeling to-day." Whether the author by the method he adopts can be said to "maintain" what is really and historically the Evangelical view will be questioned by many readers. What he really does is to propound a view which he tells us is the "result of independent study."

The plan of the book is well conceived so far as choice and arrangement of topics are concerned. Parts I to III deal with the data upon which the interpretation of the Cross must proceed. There is very much that is interesting, instructive and valuable in these parts of the book, which, but for lack of space, might be profitably reproduced and discussed. In fact, it is here that the author seems to us most acute and effective, though we find ourselves frequently unable to endorse his opinions. In Part I he considers

the Necessary Implication of the Cross. He maintains that apart from the Cross in the Evangelical interpretation, viz., as that on which Christ died, in some sense, for our sins, His death is, in Pfleiderer's phrase, "a fearful tragedy." Apart from the Cross, where is the Gospel "that shall win the world to God . . . where, in a word, is there any power that shall bring the Kingdom of God, as Jesus anticipated, into the world?" Only with the Cross brought in can we account for "that emergence of the spiritual Christ from the tomb—that resurrection of Christ's Gospel of the Kingdom from the dead into newness of life." We agree with the sentiment that the Cross is the central source of the Gospel-saving power, and that because of his Cross Christ came back "a radically transformed Christ," but He must needs really come back. We cannot conceive the author's treatment (Chapter 2) of the "physical resurrection" of Christ to be tolerable even for argument's sake. Granting the validity of the statement that "even though the physical resurrection, or such visions as are equivalent to it or a belief in such resurrection, be affirmed, this could not have been more than a step towards the new Faith and Life that came to men." Yet what a step! What a *necessary* step! That the bodily resurrection cannot be treated as of subordinate importance, according to the fashion of the present-day ethical interpretations of the Gospel, is only made the more evident by the attempt of the author in this chapter. It is not the Cross simply of Him who gave himself a sacrifice, but of Him whom God hath raised up from the dead that wrought the designated results "in changed lives, in gladdened hearts, in saved souls." It is the fact of the bodily resurrection, in the first instance, that compelled the finding of "some high, imperative, Divine reason" for Christ's death, with its peculiar sense of forsakenness. Only this could have "transformed that dark scene on Calvary into the brightest light that has ever shone on this sinning and suffering world."

In Part II the author deals with the reality of our Lord's Reference to His Cross, both in connection with and also apart from particular sayings recorded in the Synoptics, and he concludes (1) that "it is hardly possible that all these sayings," referring particularly to His death, "have been inserted *post eventum*," (2) that apart from all particular sayings we have every reason for believing that Jesus looked forward to and spoke of His death as holding a most important place in the fulfillment of His mission." But this latter conclusion harmonizes poorly with the statement (page 77) that "it had been hard, perhaps, even for Christ to assure Himself of this necessity, and it depended even for Him on whether the religious representatives of the nation should receive Him or not." Our interest in this book instinctively gathers around this part, and especially Chapter 1; for if Pfleiderer's position be not successfully refuted, then the general Scriptural basis for any doctrine of the Cross is seriously affected, and certainly the already narrow premises of the author are at the vanishing point.

Part III is devoted to the consideration of the Cross as Viewed by Christ. Unfortunately the consistency of this whole part of the discussion is vitiated by the repetition of the opinion that "Jesus manifestly believed it *might* be possible that the people should receive Him and the Kingdom that He brought" without His necessarily dying, and that "He was not absolutely certain up to the very last." Not only is this opinion inconsistent with numberless statements of the author in regard to the great importance attached by Christ to His death, but it renders the comparatively extended discussion of Part III mostly gratuitous. It is "psychologically improbable," to adopt a phrase of the author used elsewhere, that in view of such uncertainty, His mind or any mind would go forward to such an elaborate interpretation of the meaning and even necessity of His death as the author

expounds in numberless passages. Why not say at once and be done that the power of Christ's sacrificial death "lay in men's interpretation of it in the light of an awakened conscience," rather than attach vital importance to the various reflections whereby Jesus sought to reconcile Himself to a merely apprehended but uncertain death at the hands of sinful men? In fact is not this what the author really does at last? (See Part IV, Chapter 2.) Part III deals first with "the Cross as Viewed by Christ in the Light of the Old Testament." Attention is too exclusively confined to the prophecies concerning the sufferings of Messiah or the "Servant of Jehovah," from which Jesus is said to have derived "His ideas, in their forms at least." The next chapter discusses the significance of four special sayings of Christ, viz., that at Cæsarea Philippi, that concerning the Son of Man giving Himself a "ransom for many," that comparing His sacrifice to the Paschal Lamb and the saying in which He spoke of His blood as that of the New Covenant, to which Matthew adds "for the remission of sins." From these sayings it is concluded that our Lord regarded as inevitable His death, and "that He gave Himself as in some sense a sacrifice for the sin of the world, in order that sin being forgiven men might have membership in the Eternal Kingdom." But it would be a great mistake to interpret this sacrifice after the manner of animal sacrifices. Our Lord's "ultimate and governing aims" in this sacrifice were "ethical and spiritual." The experience of Jesus on the Cross, as expressed in the words "My God," etc., is treated in the next chapter, in which the author seems to us to do some of his most thoughtful and cautious work. We can at least agree with him when he says "we here see Christ suffering that which is the last consequence of sin" and "we cannot but believe that His passing through such an experience . . . had some important place" in His work.

In further seeking to understand the nature and efficacy of Christ's sacrifice the author considers (1) the significance of the designation "the Son of Man," (2) the purport of the phrase "Remission of Sin," (3) what light our Lord's teaching concerning the Kingdom of God throws on the subject. We cannot give details here. The designation "the Son of Man" is regarded as having been adopted because it is a real but not generally recognized Messianic title; but "the deepest ground for the adoption of the name was in His consciousness and His belief as to what the true Messiah really was, viz., *the Man who realizes the truth of manhood in its filial relation to God.*" As true man He was in the highest sense both Son of God and Son of man. The author fails to recognize the assertion of humanity in this designation, which would be needless were He wholly, even though uniquely, human. This failure is due in part to his faulty trinitarian position which discards Christ's personal, eternal preëxistence. The author's distinction in Chapter V between Remission of Sins and Forgiveness on Repentance is not Scriptural, nor is he able himself to maintain it; for in showing how the Remission is made real or effective to the individual sinner he invariably uses an expression involving some element of repentance, which, furthermore, he abstracts from faith in a way that does violence to Scripture. We do not need the distinction to maintain the "freeness and fulness" of the Divinely proffered pardon. Rejecting the distinction we reject much in this chapter that goes with it—e.g., the author's view of the *ground* of Remission and also his peculiar abstraction of Remission from Salvation as something "only introductory and contributory," which idea is all the more untenable in view of the author's identification of Remission of Sins with the Pauline Justification.

The import of the book grows clearer in Part IV, the first two chapters of which treat of the necessity, nature and efficacy of the Cross. Here we see

the concentrated effect of the author's own critical and evolutionary pre-conceptions. Christ's sufferings he regards as necessary, not to "propitiate" God or to expiate or "atone for sins." They were vicarious, not because Christ suffered the punishment of Sin in the sinner's stead, but He suffered in obedience to the will of the Father in order to manifest that "Holy Love which God is," and in order to impress upon men's minds the great "evil and evil-desert of sin." The sufferings of Christ, though including all the bitterness of real punishment, were not and could not be "penal," for Christ was sinless in His person. Not "anything in the nature of God demanded the sinner's death." We believe that "no abstract Divine Justice" demanded it, but we are equally of the opinion that no abstract "Holy Love" demanded it. The author reflects upon anthropomorphic views, but his whole position would find wholesome correction from a more complete regard for the implications of a truly psychological and Scriptural anthropomorphism. This is a fundamental lack of most philosophy and theology when dominated by the evolutionary idea. The view of God here presented is totally inadequate. We find difficulty in giving meaning to the author's incidental use of the word "justice" as belonging to God at all, also to his frequent use of the words "*due*" and "*desert*" when speaking of Christ's sufferings and the setting forth of the "penalty due" to or deserved by sin. Of course, we are prepared for a thoroughgoing moral-influence theory of the efficacy of the Cross, which is elaborated in the succeeding chapters, in which the author's peculiar doctrine of the Holy Spirit is exhibited as a spirit of Holy Love and Self-Sacrifice filling men's hearts in view of Christ's sufferings on the Cross, and thus enabling them to carry forward the conflict over the animal nature and selfishness and also to endure the sufferings which, apart from sin, are necessarily incident to our existence. Part IV only unfolds further the author's views of Sin, Man's Original Estate, the Fall, Death, Resurrection, Spiritual Life and Second Advent, which are just those that our evolutionary theologies have made familiar.

We close the book with the feeling that while the author's splendid emphasis of the *fact* of the Cross is timely, we must say that it is scarcely worth while to try, from the author's premises, to build up a Scriptural Doctrine of the Cross. We must have a Scripture before we can have a Scripture Doctrine. Furthermore, the perusal of the book as a whole, and especially the latter part of it, only impresses us the more that the term "evolution" is very rangy. We are reminded of the question recently asked by a prominent professor of biology, "What is evolution anyway?" Whatever it is, and whatever its value in the sphere of certain sciences, we grow more convinced that the specific problems of philosophy and theology remain just what they were.

Omaha.

D. E. JENKINS.

GODSDIENST EN GODGELEERDHEID. Rede gehouden bij de aanvaarding van het Hoogleeraarsambt in de Theologie aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, op Woensdag 17 Dec. 1902, door Dr. H. BAVINCK. 8vo, pp. 68. Wageningen : 1902.

HET OBJECT DER AMBTELIJKE VAKKEN. Rede gehouden bij de aanvaarding van het Hoogleeraarsambt in de Theologie aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, op Donderdag 18 Dec. 1902, door P. BIESTERVEELD. 8vo, pp. 62. Wageningen : 1902.

These two inaugural addresses, covering together one hundred and thirty pages, mark an epoch in the history of the Free Churches of Holland.

It is wholly impossible for our readers in America to get a correct impres-

sion of the significance of this installation of two widely known professors of the theological school at Kampen, in the Free University of Amsterdam—apparently a case of robbing Peter to help Paul—without an introductory historical note. The liberation of the Dutch Church began with the secession of 1834, when a considerable number of members of the Established Church broke with the “Besturen,” the unhistorical governing bodies of the State Church, saddled upon her back by the law of 1816. Its leaders were a few earnest men, young in the ministry and without exception with no renown. These seceders from the start lacked a trained ministry. The original, university-bred leaders were swamped by the hastily prepared pastors, mostly men who under Art. VIII of the Dordtrechtian Church-order had been admitted to the sacred office. But what was done under the stress of circumstances could not fail to leave its impress on the later development of the Church. Science was at a low estimate among the seceders for many decades, and their theology was unscientific. When, therefore, the Seminary at Kampen was organized in 1854 it was from the start committed to a tendency and to views which were not easily eradicated. And not till the advent at Kampen of Dr. H. Bavinck, some twenty years ago, did its teaching lay any claim to the term *scientific*. He made Kampen famous and his *Dogmatics* is perhaps the most up-to-date system of Reformed Theology in print. His colleague, Biesterveld, became professor at Kampen, in the Practical branches, eight years ago, and from the very beginning secured an enviable position and made himself known through many technical publications, some of which are of more than ordinary value.

These two men formed the intellectual backbone of Kampen. Meanwhile the University of Amsterdam was organized in 1880. From its very origin its theological faculty prepounded to such an extent that it was really a school for theology rather than a university in the accepted sense. But it did not possess the *jus promovendi* for the pulpits of the State Church and thus a unique situation was created. The strain finally became intolerable, and when the church of Amsterdam, following the lead of Dr. Kuyper, broke with the “Besturen,” a second exodus from the Established Church began in 1885, which called itself the “Doleantie” (*doleo*), and assumed formidable proportions. Dr. Kuyper was its acknowledged chief and he was the main instrument in bringing about the compact of 1892, by which the older “Christian Reformed Church” (1834) and the “Doleantie” (1885) united under the new name, “Gereformeerde Kerken van Nederland.” A condition of this pact was the maintenance of the Kampen school as “the theological school of the Churches.” To Amsterdam the science of theology was committed, to Kampen the practical theological training needed for the ministry of the Church. This was not stated, but it was practically the case.

As might have been imagined, this “pact” of 1892 from the very first became a bone of contention in the Churches. Each school had a distinct tendency, a distinct view of theology, a distinct view of the relation between the school and the Church. The older school was practical, the younger scholastic; the one did not claim the *jus promovendi* which, as a technical training school, it could not exercise, the other exercised this right and pointed with pride to its titled men. Dr. Kuyper taught several unaccustomed phases of Reformed doctrines, which were in part logical deductions, in part reproductions of teachings of older Reformed theologians, but which from the start stamped some of the older Kampen men. These views mainly touched on Soteriology and Sacramentology, and were in part founded in Dr. Kuyper’s Supralapsarianism. Students of Kampen found it easier to enter German schools for their degree than that of Amsterdam.

Two distinct types of ministers were thus created who were mutually antagonistic: and all true friends of the "Reformed Churches" soon saw that unity of education was the *conditio sine qua non* of the permanent success of the union. Dr. Bavinck began to direct an agitation in this direction more than seven years ago; Dr. Kuyper and he, however, worked at cross-purposes, and the "plan of union" proposed by Dr. Bavinck was defeated.

But the agitation continued and finally, last year, definite plans were made by the two faculties, and the "Concept Act" of 1902 was born. This was presented, in a modified form, to the Synod of Arnhem last summer by two members of the faculty of Amsterdam and two of Kampen, while it bore the name of Dr. Bavinck. It was carried by a two-thirds majority; but the attitude of the minority was so hostile that the decision of the Synod was not enforced, through fear of secession. Since then the parties have drifted further apart and signs of an ultimate separation of the two factions, as separate Churches, are not wanting.

Profs. Bavinck and Biesterveld found their position at Kampen untenable and went over to the Free University, taking a large number of students with them. The vacancies were at once filled by the Curators, against the protests of many of their own number and of numerous individuals, churches and classes, which called for a new synod to carry out the decision of the Synod of Arnhem. The present situation is fraught with great danger. It was under these conditions Dr. Bavinck and his colleague, Biesterveld, were installed at Amsterdam.

The address of Dr. Bavinck is characterized by his usual masterly sweep and evident familiarity with the entire field of theology.

In the choice of his subject, *Religion and Theology*, he calls attention to one of the most important encyclopædic questions of the day. Amidst the fog of prevailing ideas, as to their interrelation, Dr. Bavinck's statement shines brilliantly, like a star of the first magnitude. Here is a man who boldly throws down the gauntlet and dares any one to pick it up. The discussion opens up the question of the scientific character of theology, its demand to be recognized as a science, its relation to the Church, etc.

Dr. Bavinck reviews the aspect of science under pagan and Christian auspices and shows that the true emancipation of science dates from the Renaissance with its positive and negative effects. Very lucidly is shown the futility of the attempt to convert theology to a mere "science of religion."

The older view of religion postulates the existence of God and his revelation to men, and the object of the science of theology, under this older view, was the knowledge of God thus obtained. But the newer view of religion denies these postulates. Doubt has become the source of knowledge. The center of gravity has changed from the objective to the subjective. Kant denied the possibility of *knowing* God, and Schleiermacher made of religion something wholly subjective; faith is a human need, not a divine demand. Thus the views of theology were radically changed. Under the older view it was a scientific arrangement of the teachings of Scripture. Under the newer view it was compelled to exchange the knowledge of God for that of religion itself and became the science of comparative religion. The Church and its theology, the Scriptures, the symbols, Christ himself even were all gradually eliminated from the new field. But the results of this attempt were disappointing and destructive, both in the schools and in the Church, and an intolerable condition was created, satisfactory neither to Science nor to the Church. The radicals sought to solve the matter by simply eliminating theology from the circle of the sciences; the utilitarians, by making a compromise and a division,—thus Bernouille distinguishes between a strictly

scientific and an official ecclesiastical theology. But neither solution solved the problem; they proved failures both from the scientific and from the ecclesiastical standpoint. The conception of theology as a history of religion must, therefore, give way to that of the Christian historical standpoint.

Dr. Bavinck having thus disposed of the newer view of religion and theology, turns to the consideration of the older view of theology as a science of the knowledge of God, as revealed in Christ. All science, as we know it, is founded in Christian postulates and suppositions. But Christianity claims to be absolute. It cannot *prove* itself to the unbeliever; it demands the obedience of faith, and before it can reveal itself it must lift the believer to its own plane. Now the two *principia* of true religion are the Word and the Spirit, the first for teaching, the last for illumination. Dr. Bavinck meets the objections of unbelief by postulating that no science demands universal acceptance, and that its scientific character is not invalidated because all do not agree as to its claims. In all true science there is room for subjectivity. No demand should, therefore, be made of theology which is not equally made of the other sciences.

The author then proceeds to indicate plainly the difference between theology and religion. The latter has the facts, the former the searching after their reasons; here is the *what*, there the *why*. The task of the theologian is therefore an endless one. Religion and theology stand side by side; they never may antagonize each other, they may never be confounded. They are indispensable to each other. Religion is immutable; theology changes, because it is in contact with the endless changes of the ages. One can, therefore, never speak of an *absolute* theology. And on account of this contact, and by reason of its limitation, all scientific theology must be confessional, for theology can never rise above faith. Religion is the element which animates all theology, and in so far only can one be a true Christian theologian as he speaks from and through God. "To study theology is a holy work, a priestly service in the house of God. It is religion itself, a worship of God in his temple, a dedication of mind and heart to the glory of his name."

The second oration, that of Prof. Biesterveld, is less comprehensive in scope. He treats of the *Official (Practical) Branches of Theology*. This subject was chosen because for eight years it was the branch which he taught at Kampen, although at Amsterdam New Testament Exegesis is also entrusted to him.

The historical sketch of the development of what we call Practical Theology, given by the author, is extremely interesting. He begins with the Fathers and traces the path of this part of theological science through mediæval theology. In the period of the Reformation the Speculative branches of theology were not separated from the Practical. Hyperius of Marburg and Zipperus of Herborn were the only exceptions. Voetius, the great Dutch theologian, assigns to the Practical branches their own scientific place, but after him all development ceases. The Lutheran theologians have almost universally denied their scientific character. Schleiermacher defended it and defined its position, but his efforts were a failure and did not even fit into his own encyclopædic system. Nor could this be otherwise, since his theology lost itself in ecclesiology. Nitzsch defined Practical theology as "the self-consciousness of the Church in relation to its duties." In Germany, in our day, the scientific character of the Practical branches is universally denied, as is proven by a rapid review of the most recent and generally disappointing efforts in their direction.

The author then maintains the position taken by Dr. Kuyper, in his *Encyclopædia of Sacred Theology*. This finds the object and *principium*

dividendi in the office as a divine institution in the Church, and gives to the Practical branches the name of "*The Diaconiological Group*," by the side of the *Sacra Scriptura*, the *Ecclesia* and the *Dogma*. The Old Testament had its "*munera extraordinaria*"—patriarchs, prophets, John the Baptist; and also its "*munera ordinaria*"—the priesthood. The New Testament has the diaconate, presbyteriate, pastorate. The author then unfolds the official character of these "*munera*" of the New Testament.

In assigning this place to the Practical branches, the author maintains their scientific character and sees the way open for a clear systematic arrangement; moreover the correct name is thus assigned to these branches. He follows Dr. Kuyper in styling them the *Diaconiological* branches, from *διακονία*. But in choosing this name, Prof. Biesterveld is fully aware "that Reformed theology binds itself to a debt of honor to develop this field of scientific research and arrangement, which practically lies entirely fallow." This conception of the Practical branches will bring an increased valuation of the office of the ministry. This office is finally sketched in all its bearings, and for this office no preparation can be too thorough. He who holds it and exercises its functions must first of all be a converted man, but besides that he must have high intellectual attainments; he must be a thorough student of the Scriptures, a man of æsthetic spirit and a preacher.

Both these orations close with the customary and to us somewhat formal and tedious special addresses to various dignitaries, members of the Curatorium, colleagues, students, etc. Their careful reading, however, convinces us of their extraordinarily high character, their freedom from heated references to the bitter struggle from which they are born, and of the eminent fitness of the men for the chairs they are to occupy in the Free University, which may well be congratulated on the acquisition of two such talented theologians among its corps of professors.

Holland, Mich.

HENRY E. DOSKER.

SEHET, WELCH EIN MENSCH! Drei Vorträge über die Person Jesu, von Lic. ERNST CREMER, a. o. Prof. der Theologie in Marburg. Braunschweig und Leipzig: Hellmuth Wollermann, 1902. Pp. iii, 91.

Prof. Cremer gives us three addresses delivered in Braunschweig at the invitation of the Evangelical Lutheran Union, in November, 1901.

These addresses are not upon what is technically known as the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, as might be inferred from the title. They are an attempt to exhibit the evidence for the Divinity of Christ. Since the appearance of Prof. Harnack's book, *What is Christianity*, there have been a vast number of replies, most of them biblico-theological in character, and many of them directed chiefly against the section entitled "The Gospel and the Son of God, or the Christological Question." This little book is not a reply to Prof. Harnack, but, as the author tells us in the Preface, was occasioned by the book by Prof. Wernle, entitled *Die Anfänge unserer Religion*. Prof. Wernle defended what our author styles "the modern Gospel" as being the Gospel of Jesus Himself, and attempted to show how the beliefs of the apostles about Jesus arose.

The first address is entitled "Was Jesus a Child of His Time?" Here the author endeavors to show that Christ cannot be understood as the product of his age, since he stands in a relation of opposition to his own time, and, in fact, to all times. He stands in opposition to human limitations in general, and to *sin* in particular. Jesus arouses in sinful men just that opposition which the holy God arouses and which God only can arouse. The conclusion is that Christ is divine.

The second address is entitled "The Jesus of the Three First Evangelists and of Paul." Its aim is to show that the Christ of the synoptists is essentially the same crucified and risen Redeemer as the Christ of Paul. Just at this point we must confess to some confusion of mind as to the arrangement of the book. It might appear as if in the first address the question was approached from the standpoint of "apologetics," and in the second address from that of "biblical theology." And this is to a large degree true, if regard is had to the main contents of the addresses. But when we look more closely, it would seem that the first address was intended to show how "He (Jesus) lays bare the bottom of our hearts," and in the second address "how He (Jesus) promises the satisfaction of our highest need" (p. 31). And of course either the biblico-theological standpoint or that of "apologetics" might have been maintained throughout each address. As a matter of fact, however, the first address is largely from the standpoint of "apologetics," and the second from that of "biblical theology." In this second address, Prof. Cremer studies the Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels, in order to show that Christ is there represented as the one upon whom alone depends the establishment of the kingdom of God, the forgiveness of sin, salvation from judgment and entrance into the kingdom; and that He is this because of his Cross and Resurrection. From this the author concludes that there is no doubt that the Jesus of the synoptists is the Jesus of Paul; and also no doubt that Jesus claimed equality with God. In this section the author makes some interesting remarks on the relation of the synoptic teaching to that of Paul and on the purpose of the synoptists. He dismisses with a few remarks the view that would set up a contradiction between the Gospel of Jesus and that of the apostles. He remarks on the "credulity" of his opponents who could not believe in the Incarnation, but could easily believe that Christianity was started by men who were so lacking in the "sense for truth" that they could gradually deify a man. We quite agree with Prof. Cremer in these remarks. We also agree with him that the most effective reply to one who holds that the Gospel as proclaimed by Jesus is a Christless Gospel, while that of the apostles is Christocentric, would be to show that he had not read the Synoptic Gospels aright. This is what Prof. Cremer has done. This is what has been equally well done by K. Schmidt in a recent number of the *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift* (No. 12, 1902). But sometimes an opinion by reason of its very persistence must be met and answered in every possible way. We may, then, not only urge that those who hold this theory have not done full justice to the Jesus of the synoptists; we may also point out the falsity of the antithesis in question. We may ask, for example, what Jesus have we at all save Him whom the apostles give us? What do we know of the "Gospel as he proclaimed it," save from the apostles? Why, then, are we to give more credence to Matthew than to Paul? What are we to do when we find that the authority of Jesus is bound up with that of the apostles whom He commissioned as authoritative teachers? Such questions, however, may probably with justice be said to lie outside the scope of the rather brief address embodied in this little book. Prof. Cremer succeeds in his aim, i.e., to show the Christocentric character of the teaching of the Synoptic Gospels. And if his idea of the kingdom of God is not given in the technical language of biblical theology, so as to discriminate between the kingdom-idea in its abstract and concrete, and in its spiritual and eschatological uses, this too must be laid to the brevity and purpose of the book.

The third address is entitled "The Jesus of John." This is even shorter than the second and still more popular in character. We cannot, therefore, expect even an outline of the Christology of the Fourth Gospel. There is

not attempted even a summary of the teaching of the great Christological discourses. The author presents in a sympathetic and attractive manner the "divine majesty" of Jesus, showing how it roots in the synoptist teaching as being the majesty of the Saviour, and how it goes beyond the synoptist teaching in setting forth more clearly the "eternal relations" of Jesus. Prof. Cremer closes his little book with a short "Supplement" on the "twelve-year-old Jesus" in Luke ii. 41-52.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

The Formation of Christian Character. A Contribution to Individual Christian Ethics. By W. S. Bruce, D.D., Author of *The Ethics of the Old Testament*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George St., 1902. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 8vo, pp. xvi, 369. Price, \$1.75 net.— "The importance of this subject is so great," writes Dr. Bruce, "that the author may be forgiven if he says that it has been the chief motive that induced him to write this volume. It is here that the present weakness of the Christian Church is found. It is in the discovery of the true cause of this weakness that the hope of her recovery lies. The subject might well occupy the attention of our Convocations and Congresses, of our Synods and General Assemblies, not less than it filled the minds of the apostles and guides of the early Christian Church. Well did they know that it was the force of Christian character, cultured and strengthened through the ministry of the Holy Spirit, that gave such inherent power to the Apostolic Church in its contest with the gross pollution of heathendom."

Such being our author's conception of his work, we are not surprised that his discussion is marked by clearness, earnestness and practical aim. Though seldom original, he is throughout master of his subject; and he so presents it that he who runs may read, that the most rapid must feel its importance, and that no one except the unwilling could fail to be helped in the supreme task of character-building.

Unlike Dr. Bruce's earlier and very valuable volume on *The Ethics of the Old Testament*, this book is systematic rather than Biblical in its method. After an introductory chapter and an "historical review" of Christian Ethics, he discusses, "What is Character?" "Character as Affected by Sin," the "Genesis of Christian Character," "Christ the Renewer of Character," "Progress in Christian Life," "Temperance or Self-Control," "The Temperaments and Temper," "Self-Preservation," "Christian Culture of Self, or Self-Development," the "Culture of the Mind," the "Culture of the Emotions," the "Culture of Conscience," the "Training of the Will," "Qualities of Christian Character," "The Power of Habit," "The Spiritual Power."

By character the author understands "a certain type of selfhood, a moral and spiritual ideal, which the man who is environed has clearly, or at least consciously, perceived." It is "the moralized self"; and it embraces "all one's natural and instinctive affections, all his mental and moral endowments, his whole frame of mind, temper and disposition, from which he acts in one manner rather than in another." Hence, it cannot be explained by heredity; it should not be confounded with temperament; and it is more than nature. It includes, above all, "a choice, a settled habit or bent of will." It "takes up the raw material of nature and temperament, and it weaves these into the strong, well-knit texture of a fully moralized manhood." The Christian type of character or selfhood has its ideal in Christ. In consequence of the effect of sin we cannot of ourselves realize this ideal. "Man has been unhinged by evil in the focal point of his being." Christian morality, consequently, is rooted in the Christian religion. Christian char-

acter is possible only because of Christ's atoning work for us, and its only genesis is in the regenerating work of His Spirit. And Christian morality is the legitimate, the necessary, fruit of saving faith. "Forgiveness is a means to an end." Justification is in order to sanctification. The latter involves self-control. Every thought, every disposition, everything in us, must be "brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ"; and if this cannot be done, it must be cut off. But sanctification is not essentially destructive. It may have to cut off much for the sake of the whole, but its aim is to conserve the whole as far as possible in its integrity. Hence arise the duties of self-preservation and of self-respect. "Modern tendencies" in social life and in education must not be allowed to injure originality. Nay, the whole self—body, mind, emotions, conscience, will—must be developed after the ideal of Christ and for His sake. If this is to be done, the practical teachings of physiology, psychology and ethics claim attention; and the best proof of this is the variety and the importance of the suggestions which a master like our author derives from them. What, then, are the "salient qualities" of the character which he would thus teach us and inspire us to build? He recognizes them as "prompt obedience to the divine will," "constancy," "consistency," "simplicity"; and he finds in habit and in the Holy Spirit the "powers" necessary to their attainment. These two are not in opposition. Each has its use, and the one may and should help the other. Habit may make the practice of virtue easy and even congenial, and often it is only by the power of the Holy Spirit that we can form a good habit. On the other hand, character tends to run into rigidity; and when it is fixed, freedom is destroyed and morality becomes impossible. The antinomy here implied can be resolved only by religion. If freedom and habit are contradictory, freedom and grace are perfectly consistent. "A living faith in Christ transforms the law of love into the love of law." "The Christian habit of virtue, the habitually virtuous Christian life, is not bondage to law"; it is rather "the embodiment of freedom," and thns the perfection of morality. The reason for this is that "if any man is in Christ, he is a new creature." He has received "power from on high" such that every one of his right habits becomes an habitual choice. This power is that of the ascended and glorified God-man Himself. "He is not only pleading for us in heaven, but He *is with us and in us on earth.*" By His Holy Spirit He lives in every Christian man and makes him a free manifestation of His power. The Holy Spirit effects this "through the instrumentality of the truth," and "the truth through which He mainly works is composed of the facts of revelation." Our part then is to see that these truths have their normal effect in us; to adjust ourselves to the influences of the Holy Spirit, yield our will to His counsel, and our heart to His occupancy." We should "seek to have the energy of the Holy Spirit *naturalized in us*, so that our character may be the genuine product of a Spirit-possessed soul." We should wait in the performance of every known duty that we may be endued with "power from on high"; and if this be our attitude, we may and should expect to be able to "do all things in Christ which strengtheneth us." Such is the possibility of Christian life in Christian character.

On this admirable discussion, thus most imperfectly outlined, we would, passing over purely philosophical difficulties, venture only the following criticisms:

Specially fine, on the one hand, is its position with reference to environment, nationality, heredity, in a word, the influences that affect character. The power of these is recognized and clearly described; but they are never regarded, as so often in present-day ethics, as omnipotent. We may and should control them more than they can modify us. They are materials

that we build into character; they are not the elements of which character is made up. We are self-determining beings; we need not be the products of circumstances.

On the other hand, it is precisely in connection with this the chief excellence of this work that its main, and probably its only serious, defect appears. The author seems to hold to the prevalent doctrine of what is called "the self-determination of the will." That is, he distinguishes between the self as will and the self as character, and in the last analysis he conceives of the latter as the result of the former. His own language is (p. 40): "Character is a man's self; yet we can never systematize the whole of the raw material of disposition and temperament into character; so that to the end character and self are never quite coincident. There will remain underground longings and appetites that have not been conquered by the habituated self. In the nature of the most depraved these have sprung up and made reformation possible, as the biographies of John Bunyan and John Newton prove, and even an Apostle Peter surprised his friends by his sudden quailing before a woman's question." If this means, as from the expressions used it might, that no man knows himself or is known by others, and that, consequently, there are in every one unimagined possibilities of good as well as of evil, we have no objections to make; for such is the solemn fact. If, however, what is meant is the doctrine of Prof. Samuel Harris (*The Philosophical Basis of Theism*, § 71), that while our natural and rational sensibilities incite and impel the will to act, they do not determine it; in the last analysis the will, however strongly influenced, determines itself: or the doctrine of Prof. James Seth (*A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 380), that, though our feelings as constituting motives and expressing character are very important, there is a real distinction between the character and the self or will; that while the self is what in its character it *appears* to be, it yet is always *more* than any such empirical manifestation; and that it is in "this *more*," and so in the self rather than in the character, that we have "the secret of the moral life": or the doctrine of Julius Müller (*The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, II, p. 47), that "freedom is power to *become*—to form one's own character—out of self"—if this doctrine, however stated, be that of our author, we must take issue with him. This theory involves all the difficulties that embarrass the Arminian doctrine of the "indifference of the will" and even the more extreme doctrine of the "independence of the will." It implies, if it does not teach, that the will is a separate faculty, and that as such it is outside of the domain of cause and effect. This, however, means that the secret of the moral life is in that which determines itself without reason; and this really means that there is no moral life, because what is called such is in its essence irrational. Now this seems to be the position of our author. He does not confine the power of choice to the confirmation or even to the development of character. He says (p. 41), "With every free agent there remains the power to create a character." That is, he makes free-agency consist, not in the self-determination of the person, but in the self-determination of the will; not in the power of choice which is rational and moral because in accordance with the underlying character, but in the power of choice which, in the last analysis, is without reason and so non-moral because independent of character.

Nor does it affect our author's position that he qualifies the statement just quoted and immediately adds, "And there abides the possibility that, if the gracious aid of God's Spirit be accepted and every right influence brought to bear, the bent of character may be changed." The question arises at once, How can the gracious aid of God's Spirit be accepted, unless the bent of character has already been changed? The soul that, as the Bible teaches,

is "enmity against God"—the soul that, as our author holds, has "been unhinged by evil in the focal point of his being"—such a soul cannot "accept the gracious aid of God's Spirit," because he cannot choose to do anything without a reason, and because there is in him no reason why he should, but, evil as he is, every reason why he should not, "accept the gracious aid of God's Spirit." He could do this, if he would; but it is precisely this indispensable condition that cannot be realized until his bent has been changed. Thus our author's qualification simply confirms our view that the self-determination of the will is his theory. It is only on some such theory that one who has been "unhinged by evil in the focal point of his being can be regarded as able to change his bent so as to will to" accept the gracious aid of God's Spirit.

Now the chief objections to this theory are not the philosophical ones that have been already pointed out. At least, from the standpoint of the book under review, this is not the case. A treatise on "The Formation of Christian Character," its account of the genesis of Christian Character must be Scriptural. It is not sufficient that that should be found in regeneration; it is necessary that regeneration should be taken as it is set forth in the Scriptures. It is, however, always represented in them as not merely a process like sanctification dependent on supernatural power, but as a unique act accomplished immediately and only by supernatural power. It is said to be conditioned, not on the free choice of the individual, but on the sovereign grace of God which expresses itself in the consequent free choice of the individual. We are taught that the hope of progress and of reformation lies, not in any power of choosing with divine help to be what we ought to be, when because of our spiritual deadness there is no reason that can appeal to us to do so, but in the facts, that God by quickening spiritual life can create this reason in us; that He has promised to do so in connection with our use of His appointed means; and that when these are sincerely employed by one in behalf of himself it is evidence that he *has been* born again and that thus the bent of his character has been changed by God (Eph. ii. 6-10). In a word, as the model of Christian character is "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ," so with equal clearness and positiveness must its origin be traced solely to God's sovereign grace and creative power.

It remains for us only to observe that the teaching of Weismann (p. 65), that acquired qualities are not bequeathed to offspring, which teaching our author appears to adopt, seems to be contradicted by the statement (p. 135) that "hereditary descent becomes a consuming curse to every man who sins against temperance and purity." Also that the assertion (p. 139) that on "different occasions our Lord sought to commend and to regulate the practice of fasting" is hardly borne out by the revised text of the New Testament. He did not condemn fasting when rightly regulated; but to say that He commended it would seem too strong in view of the omission of Matt. xvii. 21 in the best text, and of the omission of the word fasting in the best text of Mark ix. 29 and, we may add, of 1 Cor. vii. 5. However, these are the merest slips. They are noticed only because of the scholarship and worth of the volume in which they occur. In the purest marble even a speck is out of place.—*The Ten Laws: A Foundation for Human Society.* By Edward Beecher Mason, Minister of "the Church on the Hill," Brunswick, Me. Author of *Sermons for the Monday Club*. New York: A. D. F. Randolph Company, 103 Fifth avenue. Pp. 196.—In style this little book is graceful, strong and often striking. Its exposition of the Ten Laws and its discussion of the questions suggested are sane and helpful. Its main position that these laws "are organic, structural or constitutional in man, being engraved on his original substance, as the law of gravitation is im-

pressed upon matter," is well taken, well maintained and well illustrated. The treatment of the fourth and of the fifth commandments is singularly happy. On the other hand, it is at least not clearly shown that some of these laws are grounded, not only in the nature of man, but ultimately in that of God Himself. They are all regarded, not so much as comprehensive principles to be expounded broadly, but rather as definite laws to be "interpreted strictly." These defects, together with a caricature of Calvinism as gratuitous as it is unjust, are to be regretted specially because otherwise the book is so excellent.

Princeton.

WM. BRENTON GREENE, JR.

VI.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF THE BIBLE. By GEORGE MATHESON, D.D., LL.D., F.R.S.E. Formerly Minister of the Parish of St. Bernard's, Edinburgh. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, publishers. 12mo, pp. 370.

Dr. Matheson is always a poet. However he may try to write prose, he is never far from the domain of the muses. In this volume he is clearly within their territory, and should be judged by the laws of that realm. As a volume of sacred poems, though not in meter or verse, this is a delightful book.

The title does not mean representatives of the men of the Bible, but men of the Bible "who represent some phase of humanity irrespective of time or place."

Sixteen Old Testament heroes are taken. Their lives as there portrayed are treated as portraits, their essential features interpreted and expounded as an artist might expound the works of a master.

"Adam the Child" is a figure representative of all childhood always, everywhere. This is not a primitive picture, but "a picture of the primitive." "You ask is it historical? I answer it has been again and again historical. It has been repeated in your history and in mine. Every step in this Garden story is your story."


Thus the author explains his aims in these studies. He says further: "They are not historical; they are not critical; they are an analysis of the portraits as we see them, without any attempt to inquire how or when they came." He seems, however, to feel that this ideal is not quite possible and defines his point of view a little further, saying that he is actuated by the desire to find ground that is neutral to the two extremes—the Higher Criticism and the Old Orthodoxy. "That common ground is the fact that the figures are before us, and that if there is to be a revelation it is through them in the last result that revelation must come." This is very characteristic of the author. He always finds a peaceful common ground. He always sings the fundamental melodies, and sings them sweetly, and lets the discords work out their harmonies as best they can.

We would not, however, give the impression that in this he is merely "The singer of an empty day." These songs are full of deep philosophy, sweet suggestions both of truth and duty. They present the story of redemption in new melodies, but the substance of the message is preserved. They are delightful reading, and of a class never too large and much to be desired. The spirit of the book is beautiful and the influence uplifting and comforting.

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S. A. MARTIN.

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